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Executive Summary 
  
In 1999, leading footwear and apparel companies joined with human rights groups, 
consumer groups, university officials and others to form the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA), a non-profit organization dedicated to protecting the rights of workers who labor in 
factories in the U.S. and overseas. Companies that participate in the FLA – including 
adidas-Salomon, Eddie Bauer, Gear for Sports, Joy Athletic, Liz Claiborne, Nike, 
Nordstrom, Patagonia, Phillips-Van Heusen, Polo Ralph Lauren, Reebok, and Zephyr 
Graf-X – have agreed to encourage the factories that produce their products to meet 
specified worker protection standards, known as codes of conduct.  FLA participating 
companies have also agreed to monitor how well factories have met these standards 
and to take action to remediate problems as they arise. 
  
The FLA’s first Public Report charts the progress of seven participating companies from 
August 1, 2001 to July 31, 2002, the first year a formal monitoring program existed.  It 
provides the public with an extremely detailed look at how a number of major companies 
try to ensure the factories they source from treat their workers properly.  The purpose of 
the report is to make transparent these companies’ efforts in this regard.  In addition to 
providing detailed descriptions of the companies’ compliance operations, the report also 
includes information that is publicly reported on “tracking charts” which detail instances 
where factories violated codes of conduct.  The tracking charts, which can be found on 
the FLA’s website (www.fairlabor.org), provide information about factories where 
violations occur, including: information about what company the factory produces for, 
what specific violations occurred, what country the violations occurred in, and what was 
done to remedy the problems.  In this way, the report shows not only how participating 
companies have tried to uphold worker protections, but also where they need to 
undertake further measures. 
  
The FLA believes the release of the information in this report, which previously was not 
made available to the public, places FLA participating companies among industry 
leaders in providing information to the public about their efforts to uphold workers’ 
protections.  It’s one thing to say that you are going to try to meet certain standards; it’s 
quite another to tell the public exactly what you have done to try to meet them.  That’s 
what this report tries to do.  The FLA process is still maturing, and as it matures the 
reporting process will mature as well.  Improving working conditions is an on-going 
process.  Much work still needs to be done to improve and standardize codes of conduct 
and monitoring procedures.  The FLA is committed to this work, and we are hopeful that 
future public reports will be even more informative and more useful when it comes to 
understanding how companies try to improve conditions for workers who manufacture 
their products. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the world, there are major gaps in protection for workers, including workers 
producing exports for the global economy.  National governments often fail to enact or 
enforce labor laws.  International standards have insufficient enforcement mechanisms.  
Many governments limit or even prohibit independent workers’ organizations, leaving 
workers with little opportunity to organize to protect their rights.  
 
In the last decade some multinational companies sourcing from factories around the 
world have taken steps to address this problem.  Hundreds of companies now have 
adopted codes of conduct, pledging to protect the rights of workers who produce their 
products.  Yet there is still relatively little public information on how these codes are 
being implemented and enforced. 
 
In 1996 a multi-stakeholder group known as the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) was 
created to address these issues, and its work laid the foundation for the formation of the 
Fair Labor Association (FLA) in 1999.  The mission of the FLA is to combine the efforts 
of industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), colleges and universities to 
promote adherence to international labor standards and improve working conditions 
worldwide.  To advance this mission, the FLA has developed a Workplace Code of 
Conduct and established a system of code implementation, independent factory 
monitoring and remediation, which is designed to bring the manufacturing sites of FLA 
participating companies into compliance over time.  The FLA program complements the 
efforts of the International Labor Organization (ILO), national governments and unions 
by seeking to ensure that participating companies observe the fundamental labor 
standards enshrined in the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct (“FLA Code”) in factories 
where their products are produced.  
 
This report is the Fair Labor Association’s first report to the public.  It examines the 
supply chain operations of seven FLA participating companies, all in the apparel and 
athletic footwear industries, which include more than 2000 factories in more than 70 
countries. The seven participating companies included in this report are companies that 
completed their first year of a two- or three-year initial implementation period during the 
year covered by this report, from August 1, 2001 to July 31, 2002.  This report describes 
the efforts undertaken by these companies to implement the FLA Code and the FLA’s 
monitoring and remediation requirements during this reporting period. 
 
This report includes:   
 
 An overview of each participating company’s approach to monitoring working 
conditions in its supply chain facilities.  
 
 Information on the sourcing patterns of each participating company, including 
the number of factories per country that are involved in the manufacture of 
participating company products.  
 
 Information about the structure, size, and function of the department at the 
participating company responsible for undertaking the work of global 
compliance and a description of the department’s activities.  
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  The number and frequency of monitoring visits carried out by participating 
company compliance staff and FLA-accredited independent external 
monitors.  
 
 A description of the provisions of the FLA Code and the independent external 
monitoring process used to measure and evaluate compliance. 
 
 Example findings of noncompliance with the FLA Code in participating 
company supplier facilities reported by FLA-accredited independent external 
monitors.  
 
 Specific remediation efforts undertaken by participating companies to 
address incidents or patterns of noncompliance with the FLA Code.  
 
Factory-Specific Information 
 
This report is accompanied by 50 individual tracking charts of the compliance situation of 
factories that have been monitored by FLA-accredited independent external monitors. 
Information contained in the charts includes the monitor’s findings of Code 
noncompliance, the participating company’s remediation plan to address the compliance 
issues identified, and the status of the remediation.  The tracking charts are made 
publicly available on the FLA website, which will be updated regularly to include 
additional factory tracking charts. 
 
Public Reporting  
 
This level of public reporting by a group of companies is unprecedented in any industry. 
It allows consumers, investors, workers, advocates, students and the interested public to 
review a wide range of information, and based on that data make their own judgments 
about the steps the FLA and its participating companies are taking to protect the rights of 
workers.  These reports also allow an examination of how the FLA’s system of 
monitoring and verification has worked so far.  The publication of these reports, and the 
reaction they receive, will undoubtedly lead to improved reporting in the future. 
 
Although this is an important breakthrough, this public reporting should be viewed as a 
first step.  This is the first year of implementation and reporting for the FLA and the 
reporting process will evolve and improve.  In this first report the FLA is reliant on a 
significant amount of company self-reporting.  Participating companies do not 
necessarily collect data in ways that are consistent with each other.  Code compliance 
monitoring is still a new field and it has not yet developed a standardized process for 
measuring and reporting on labor rights.  The FLA and its stakeholders, including 
monitoring organizations, are working to raise the standard of monitoring and ensure 
that in the future, factory monitoring results meet a higher standard of reliability and 
consistency.  Improvements have already been made since the period covered by this 
report, as the FLA begins to develop consistent forms of measurement and consistent 
benchmarks for evaluation of compliance. 
 
In next year’s report, the FLA will report again on these participating companies as they 
complete their second years.  The report will be more timely and comprehensive, 
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building on this year’s experience, and will follow the progress of remediation for the 
compliance issues identified this year.  
 
The FLA’s second public report will also cover the first-year experiences of additional 
participating companies that are beginning their implementation programs this year. In 
addition, it will cover university licensees that are participating in the FLA program for 
factories that produce collegiate merchandise.  The FLA is continuing to develop and 
refine its requirements for the many smaller college and university licensees that have 
registered with the FLA as a result of their contractual relationships with the 179 schools 
now associated with the FLA.   
 
Public reporting is an integral part of the FLA process.  By reporting on the activities 
undertaken by participating companies to improve working conditions, the FLA aims to 
serve as a source of independent information to promote public accountability of 
companies and to give consumers the information they need to make informed 
purchasing decisions.   
 
The First FLA Public Report 
 
This Public Report describes the progress made by FLA participating companies in 
implementing the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct during the first FLA implementation 
year (referred to in this report as “Year One”), which started August 1, 2001 and ended 
July 31, 2002.  This was the first year that the FLA system was active: participating 
companies built up their internal compliance systems and conducted internal monitoring; 
FLA-accredited monitors conducted independent external monitoring visits; participating 
companies remediated noncompliance issues found in their supply chains; the FLA staff 
carried out internal reviews of company compliance systems; and participating 
companies submitted reports to the FLA, reviewing their yearly compliance activities. 
The company activities included in this report reflect only circumstances during that 
period.1   
 
The purpose of this first Public Report is to provide information to consumers and other 
interested parties about participating companies’ internal compliance programs and their 
implementation of the FLA Code.  Readers can use the report to learn about some of the 
challenging workers rights issues presented in today’s global economy, and the various 
standards and approaches that can be used to prevent and redress these issues in 
workplaces.  Moreover, this information is useful for consumers, shareholders, workers 
and other stakeholders who are interested in assessing and supporting FLA participating 
companies in their efforts to achieve even higher standards of compliance. 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, this public report is based on the following sources: 
annual reports submitted by participating companies about their compliance programs; 
independent external monitoring reports submitted by FLA-accredited monitors; third 
party complaint reports; and onsite audits of participating company compliance programs 
by FLA staff.  For the sake of space and consistent reporting across participating 
companies, the Public Report does not include all the information contained in these 
materials.     
                                                 
1
 The only exception that the FLA has made in reporting activities that took place outside of this period relate to FLA 
independent external monitoring visits that were originally scheduled to take place during Year One.  In some cases, due 
to local situations, scheduling conflicts, or other administrative issues, independent external monitoring visits actually took 
place later in 2002, after the July 31st end date.   
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 Readers will observe that this report is descriptive in nature; it does not provide any 
explicit evaluation of company programs.  The reason for this is that this report covers 
the first year of a two- or three-year implementation period for each participating 
company, at the end of which the FLA will assess each company’s level of compliance 
with its standards.  This report describes the internal compliance systems of participating 
companies and these companies’ efforts to fulfill their FLA obligations.  We see that 
most participating companies are undertaking projects that place them as industry 
leaders in terms of corporate social responsibility, and we have included examples of 
such projects in this report.  In the interest of transparency, we have also reported on 
some company practices that do not fully fulfill FLA obligations.  We are hopeful that 
continued exchange with other leading companies and labor experts through the FLA 
will help participating companies to continue to progress in the development of their 
approach to compliance.   
 
Readers can participate in this learning process.  We provide as many examples as 
possible in this report to provide insight into the complex nature of this undertaking.  We 
are confident that by reading the complete Public Report, even non-specialist readers 
will come away with a better understanding of the challenges facing companies and 
workers in today’s global economy, as well as the efforts made in Year One by FLA 
participating companies to address these challenges. 
 
The Structure of this Public Report  
 
This year’s Public Report covers the compliance programs and activities of the following 
companies: adidas-Salomon, Eddie Bauer, Levi Strauss & Co.2, Liz Claiborne Inc., Nike, 
Phillips-Van Heusen, and Reebok International Ltd.  This report does not include 
information about Gear for Sports, Joy Athletic, Patagonia, Polo Ralph Lauren, or Zephyr 
Graf-X, which were approved for participation in the FLA in 2001, but requested a later 
starting date in order to give them time to mount their compliance programs.  Nordstrom 
became a participating company in the FLA in October 2002, as the first specialty 
retailer to adopt the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct.  Because it began participating in 
the FLA after the reporting period ended, it was not included in this report.  All six of 
these companies’ first years of implementation will be reported on in the second FLA 
Public Report.  
 
This report is divided into five sections.   
 
First, we summarize the FLA process.   
 
In this section, we provide background about the FLA system, and the obligations 
of companies participating in the FLA.   
 
Second, we provide a review of each FLA participating company.   
 
Each company report includes: 
                                                 
2
 Levi Strauss & Co. (LS&CO.) announced its decision in October 2002 to withdraw from the FLA program, after 
completing its first year of implementation.  LS&CO. is no longer a participating company in the FLA, but the results of 
LS&CO.'s first year of implementation are included in this report, and the monitoring results of 8 factory visits are included 
in tracking charts on the FLA website.   
 
 6 
 o An overview of the participating company’s approach to code 
implementation, monitoring and remediation 
 
There is a diversity of approaches to compliance among the FLA 
participating companies.  In this section, we review the structure of each 
company’s compliance program, its approach to monitoring, remediation 
and follow-up, and compliance improvements.  We also clarify the 
timeframe (two or three years) that each company has chosen for its 
initial implementation period in the FLA. 
 
o Data on the participating company’s supply chain, internal monitoring 
visits and FLA independent external monitoring visits  
 
A table is provided for each participating company, which lists the number 
of its applicable facilities, internal monitoring visits and FLA independent 
external monitoring visits.  Approaches to monitoring vary.  Some 
company compliance programs internally monitor 100% of their 
manufacturing facilities; some target monitoring at the highest volume 
producers; and still other programs target internal monitoring based on a 
risk assessment.  
 
Moreover, approaches to reporting varied during this first year of 
reporting.  While some participating companies had developed systems to 
record the number of facilities where monitoring took place, others 
focused on the number of monitoring visits per country.  This explains the 
deviations that readers may notice in reporting across companies.  The 
FLA is in the process of developing systems for more consistent reporting 
during Year Two. 
 
Please keep in mind when reviewing these tables that relying solely on 
the numbers provided in these charts would provide an incomplete view 
of any company’s monitoring approach.  However, in the context of each 
company’s report these tables are one of many tools by which readers 
can more fully understand a company’s approach to monitoring.  
 
o Activities undertaken by the participating company to fulfill its 
obligations in accordance with the FLA Charter 
 
These activities are listed under each company obligation.  Readers can 
refer to the Obligations of Companies provided in Appendix A.  These 
obligations are the minimum standards that participating companies must 
meet.  Companies are of course free to exceed these and some have. 
 
o Examples of participating company efforts to address noncompliance 
issues in innovative or progressive ways 
 
Accounts that are provided in text boxes are often offered as examples 
that provide more insight into the complicated processes of remediation.  
Each of these text boxes represents situations during the reporting period 
that are dynamic and on-going.  Therefore, these scenarios are not 
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offered as universally applicable or completely redressed.  This 
information has been provided by each company and has not been 
independently verified by the FLA.  The FLA hopes that strong examples 
of process will inform future remediation actions taken by the FLA and 
participating companies.  
 
Third, we provide some initial analysis of aggregate FLA findings from Year 
One.   
 
In this section we describe the role of independent external monitoring and 
remediation in the FLA.  First, each provision of the FLA Code is described, 
including the relevant ILO Conventions and other international instruments 
supporting the standard.  Then, we offer a brief overview of the monitoring 
methodology and general compliance issues pertaining to each Code 
provision.  Finally, we provide data on the incidence of noncompliance per 
the FLA’s findings, specific examples of the most common findings pertaining 
to the Code element, as well as individual examples of remediation efforts 
undertaken by participating companies to address noncompliance.  
 
Fourth, we discuss the role of the Third Party Complaint Procedure in the FLA 
and the example of the BJ&B case. 
 
In this section, we describe the process through which third parties can 
submit complaints to the FLA with respect to noncompliance at an applicable 
facility of any company participating in the FLA, including licensees of FLA-
affiliated colleges and universities.  To illustrate the Third Party Compliant 
Procedure in practice, we describe the case of the BJ&B facility in the 
Dominican Republic.  
 
 
Finally, we conclude.  
 
In this section, we offer some concluding thoughts about the first year of FLA 
implementation and about directions in which the organization and its 
participating companies are heading.  We discuss the avenues for cooperation 
that the FLA offers companies, as well as FLA projects that are underway to help 
companies address endemic noncompliance issues in a systematic way.   
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II. The FLA Process 
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Compliance with international standards is a process, not an event. 
 
The FLA methodology involves participating companies adopting the FLA Workplace 
Code of Conduct (“FLA Code”) and implementing a comprehensive compliance 
program, including internal monitoring, throughout their supply chains.  The FLA 
accredits independent external monitors, who conduct independent monitoring of the 
companies’ applicable facilities; requires companies to remediate problems identified in 
their supplier facilities; and independently verifies and accounts for the companies’ 
internal compliance programs.  
 
Given the fact that compliance is a lengthy process, each participating company has an 
initial implementation period to fulfill the Obligations of Companies, as set out in the FLA 
Charter.  This period can be for a term of two or three years, at the discretion of the 
participating company.  
 
 
The FLA Process  
 
1. Code of Conduct implementation   
 
By participating in the FLA, a company commits to implementing the FLA Code 
principles in the manufacture of its products3.  This requires designating a person or 
division in the company responsible for promoting Code compliance in the company 
supply chain.  Company compliance personnel must be trained, and they in turn need to 
ensure that Code standards are recognized as a basis for continuing business 
relationships with suppliers and contractors.  
 
 
2. Internal monitoring   
 
The obligation of companies to conduct internal monitoring goes beyond simply going to 
factories to inspect them for compliance.  Companies are responsible for establishing an 
internal system of promoting respect for the Code standards through education, 
monitoring, and remediation.  
 
The requirements of an internal monitoring program include efforts to:  
 Inform workers of their rights under the Code – orally, by posting the Code 
standards in facilities, and through other activities to educate workers;  
 Establish relationships with local labor and human rights NGOs and unions to 
assist in identifying situations of noncompliance with the Code;  
 Train company monitors about the Code standards, applicable local and 
international laws, and effective monitoring techniques;  
 Provide workers with a confidential reporting channel with which to report 
noncompliance to the company;  
 Conduct periodic announced and unannounced factory visits, worker and 
management interviews, and audits of wage, hour, and other employee records; 
and 
                                                 
3
 Please refer to the FLA Charter for a detailed description of the participation criteria for companies, including company 
requirements for designating applicable brands in the FLA system. 
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 Establish means of remediation to correct and prevent noncompliance with the 
Code standards.  
 
3. Independent external monitoring   
 
In addition to internal monitoring, companies that participate in the FLA agree to allow 
FLA-accredited independent external monitors to monitor their applicable facilities4 for 
compliance with the FLA Code.  Independent external monitoring is primarily a tool for 
measuring the implementation of participating company compliance programs. It acts as 
a check on the implementation of internal monitoring and provides an objective 
assessment of compliance levels at a particular facility.  The compliance issues 
identified by independent external monitoring visits serve as a priority list for the 
participating company to address at the factory level, and to improve upon throughout its 
supply chain.  
 
In Year One, the FLA’s independent external monitoring process involved participating 
companies selecting the monitors and contracting them to conduct either announced or 
unannounced inspections of high-risk facilities, which were selected in consultation with 
the FLA.  During the course of the year, modifications were made to the independent 
external monitoring process in order to strengthen the integrity and independence of the 
process.  Now, in Year Two, the FLA staff selects the factory, the monitor and the date 
of the visit.  All monitoring fees are paid by the FLA, and the FLA staff receives the 
report from the monitor at the same time that the participating company receives it.  The 
percentage5 of independent external monitoring visits required of each company has 
also been changed to 5% of a company’s applicable facilities, a level significantly higher 
than the level of monitoring undertaken by national labor inspectorates and statistically 
sufficient as a control group for the FLA to assess whether participating company 
compliance programs are being effectively implemented. 
 
 
4. Remediation   
 
Participating companies must demonstrate a commitment to promote sustainable 
improvements in factory conditions. When noncompliance is identified by either internal 
or independent external monitors, the participating company is responsible for working 
with the factory to effect remediation and improve workplace conditions.  
 
Examples of action items that might appear in a remediation plan include: 
 Making physical changes to the facility, such as installing additional fire exits or 
improving ventilation;  
 Building capacity at the management level, such as improving production 
planning to reduce the need for excessive overtime; and  
                                                 
4
 In accordance with the FLA Charter, participating companies must submit to the FLA a list of their applicable facilities 
producing their applicable brands, which are subject to unannounced monitoring visits conducted by accredited 
independent external monitors.  
 
5
 The percentage of independent external monitoring visits required of each participating company had originally been set 
at ten percent of the company’s applicable facilities, with the cost to be shared between the FLA and the participating 
company. During Year One, that was changed to five percent, with companies covering the entire cost of visits through 
the payment of assessments to the FLA. 
 11 
 Conducting training for management or workers in any of the Code provisions, 
such as training supervisors and workers in freedom of association or in the safe 
handling of chemicals.  
The FLA maintains that companies should not pull production from factories that are 
found to be noncompliant with the standards; instead, companies are encouraged to 
work with the factory to improve conditions and protect the rights of the workers 
responsible for manufacturing their products. In cases where the factory is unwilling or 
unable to meet the requirements of the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct, the FLA 
recognizes that the participating company reserves the right to terminate its business 
relationship with the factory. 
 
 
5. Verification 
   
In order to independently verify the progress and effectiveness of a participating 
company's internal compliance program, the FLA:  
 Conducts an annual audit of the company's compliance program to review 
internal procedures and documentation;  
 Makes field visits to observe the work of local compliance staff and assess 
factory conditions; and  
 Reviews reports submitted by independent external monitors to ensure that all 
noncompliance is remediated by the company in an appropriate and timely 
manner, and if necessary, schedules further factory visits by monitors.  
 
6. Public Reporting 
 
As part of their obligations to public reporting under the FLA, participating companies 
agree to be transparent to the public at a macro and micro level.   
 
At the macro level, the FLA issues a Public Report like this one, which reviews the 
global compliance record of each company. 


 
At the micro level, the FLA publishes tracking charts that track the progress of FLA 
independent external monitoring and remediation in individual factories. The FLA 
provides on-line information about the findings from FLA independent external 
monitoring visits to selected facilities, and the ensuing remediation undertaken by 
FLA participating companies in these facilities. The data are posted on the FLA 
website and information about remediation efforts is updated periodically.  
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The FLA University Program 
 
There are currently 179 colleges and universities affiliated with the FLA, and these 
schools are the foundation of the organization’s University Program.  In order to seek 
assurances that products bearing their names are produced under fair and proper 
working conditions, FLA colleges and universities require all of their licensees to 
participate in the FLA.  Due to the commitment of our member schools, over 1200 
licensees of various sizes have affiliated with the FLA. 
 
 
Monitoring and Reporting  
 
The nature of participation by a company that is a college or university licensee depends 
on the size of the company.  The monitoring process and requirements for licensees with 
total annual revenues over $50 million are the same as those for the FLA’s participating 
companies.  Mid-sized licensees are required to internally monitor their company-owned 
facilities and participate in a pooled monitoring program in which 10% of all of the 
company-owned facilities of licensees in this category will be monitored by FLA-
accredited monitors.  Licensees with annual revenues under $1 million disclose factory 
information to the schools that they are licensed with.  As a requirement for participation, 
all licensees must agree to adopt the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct and are subject 
to the FLA’s third party complaint procedures.  Additionally, every FLA school requires 
the public disclosure of factory locations where its licensed products are manufactured, 
which is made accessible to the public on the FLA website. 
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adidas-Salomon 
 
 
Basic facts about adidas-Salomon: 
 
adidas-Salomon consolidated revenue in FY2001:  
 US$5.93 billion 
 
Applicable adidas-Salomon Brands (percentage of  total 
sales):  
adidas® brand footwear, apparel and hardware (79%) 
Total applicable facilities worldwide: 
389 facilities 
 
 
adidas’s  Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of adidas-Salomon’s compliance program 
that relate to the production of adidas brand goods.  While adidas-Salomon has 
developed a consistent approach to compliance for all of its brands, the company’s FLA-
specific activities technically apply only to the adidas brand.  Therefore, for the sake of 
clarity, we refer to adidas’s compliance activities throughout this report.  adidas-Salomon 
reports that it plans to integrate its other brands into the FLA system after the initial 
implementation period. 
 
In addition to some basic facts about adidas-Salomon’s participation in the FLA and the 
structure of its compliance program, this section provides readers with a general 
overview of the company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on 
noncompliance issues during the reporting period.  Please keep in mind that the 
activities described below took place during the Year One reporting period (August 1, 
2001 through July 31, 2002), and were undertaken in order to fulfill the monitoring plan 
that adidas-Salomon submitted to the FLA when it became a participating company.  
adidas-Salomon has committed to implement its monitoring plan over the course of three 
years, in accordance with the FLA Charter.  
 
The Compliance Program  
 
adidas-Salomon group was approved as an FLA participating company in 1999.  The 
adidas-Salomon Standards of Engagement (SOE) include benchmarks for labor, health 
and safety which correspond with the standards enumerated in the FLA Workplace Code 
of Conduct (FLA Code).  In addition, adidas-Salomon has benchmarks dealing with the 
environment.  During the reporting period, adidas-Salomon Social and Environmental 
Affairs (SEA) department consisted of an internal monitoring team of 30 full-time staff 
members organized into three regional teams, who implemented adidas-Salomon’s SOE 
in the field.  Three Regional Directors reported to the Global Director of Social and 
Environmental Affairs.  The Global Director in turn reported to the Global Legal Counsel, 
who is member of the executive Board.    
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During this reporting period, the adidas compliance program focused on exchange with 
stakeholders as a means to achieving long-term improvements in the facilities where 
adidas goods were produced.  For example, the company held its first stakeholder 
consultation in December 2001, which involved NGO groups in Asia.  The consultation 
was organized to gather views and feedback from NGOs about their opinion of adidas as 
a socially and environmentally responsible company.  Similarly, the company conducted 
a survey of 16 footwear suppliers in 2001, which included questions about the 
company’s implementation of its Standards of Engagement.  adidas reported that such 
feedback from stakeholders has greatly influenced the company’s approach to 
compliance.  
 
Monitoring  
 
adidas reported that its internal SEA team conducted 839 audits throughout its supply-
chain during 2001.  All of these audits were undertaken by the adidas SOE compliance 
team.  Approximately 85% of all adidas-Salomon facilities and 100% of adidas’s 389 
applicable facilities were audited at least once during Year One.  Many of those facilities 
were audited several times due to findings of more serious noncompliance issues during 
initial factory visits. While most internal audits were announced, adidas performed 
unannounced visits when serious noncompliance issues were reported in particular 
facilities.  
 
During the reporting period, adidas conducted evaluation audits in all potential facilities 
before engaging in a business relationship with those facilities.  The adidas audit 
process involved interviews of managers and workers (on- and off-site), examination of 
the supplier’s financial and personnel related documentation, and physical inspection of 
the facilities.  During the reporting period, adidas introduced a rating structure to 
evaluate suppliers' performance.  The rating structure has provided the means to 
address noncompliance issues more systematically, and to make sourcing decisions that 
accord with compliance standards. In this sense, adidas supplier compliance ratings 
influence the volume of production orders to be placed at a facility.  Factory compliance 
ratings were also a determining factor when adidas consolidated its supply chain in 
2001-2002.   
 
During Year One, 42 applicable facilities of adidas-Salomon were monitored by FLA-
accredited independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations6.  In 
proposing facilities for independent external monitoring, adidas targeted those facilities 
that had a higher risk of being noncompliant based on assessments of country risk 
factors or factory-specific characteristics reported by adidas SEA staff.   
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
adidas reported that the SEA team developed corrective action plans for all audited 
sites, and verified the implementation of these plans through follow-up visits to facilities, 
phone calls with management, and/or electronic correspondence proving corrective 
action, such as documentation of new policies and digital photography of improvements.  
The adidas personnel who followed-up with facilities included the SEA team, as well as 
SOE-trained Sourcing and Product Integrity representatives.  adidas-Salomon explained 
                                                 
6
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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that the involvement of non-SEA staff in the verification process provided adidas with 
more opportunities to oversee facilities, and to bring a more cohesive corporate 
message to suppliers about compliance as a company-wide commitment.  
 
adidas enforced a Global Sanctions Policy for suppliers who did not support or 
implement the relevant compliance measures.  adidas estimated that this policy would 
contribute to a more effective and systematic global approach to noncompliance 
throughout adidas’ supply chain.  According to this policy, adidas adjusted the volume of 
production programs or terminated business relations depending on the severity of the 
noncompliance issue.  Termination of the business relationship due to noncompliance 
was deemed a last resort by the company.    
 
 
adidas’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  These obligations represent 
minimum standards for participation in the FLA and participating companies often 
surpass these standards. The information provided in this section is in no way an 
exhaustive recounting of all adidas’s compliance activities during the reporting period.  
Rather, this section contains selections from the information that adidas-Salomon 
reported to the FLA in order to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its SEA 
department.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
adidas distributed and communicated its Standards of Engagement (SOE) to all 
suppliers. Suppliers were required to sign a manufacturer’s agreement committing to 
comply with these standards in order to engage in business with adidas.   





The SEA team communicated periodically with suppliers about the FLA monitoring 
program, as well as other compliance-related topics, such as adidas’ policy on 
subcontracting.  Communications included annual letters to suppliers explaining the 
internal and FLA monitoring processes and expectations.  Supplier management 
also participated in face-to-face meetings with SEA team members, and signed an 
acknowledgment letter after receiving SEA compliance materials.  They also signed 
a commitment line on the SOE posters which are then posted in the workplaces.   
adidas provided Guidelines on Health, Safety and Environment and Guidelines on 
Employment Standards to all suppliers and staff.  These manuals provide guidance 
for implementation of the SOE and sustainable compliance activities.   
SEA team members met with factory management during factory audits and follow-
up visits, and reinforced the standards and approaches to best practices during 
these sessions.   
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
adidas has translated the Standards of Engagement (SOE) into more than 40 
languages, and required all suppliers to post SOE posters in employee common 
areas of facilities in all relevant workplace languages.  Factory managers were also 
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required to sign each poster to indicate to workers their commitment to the 
standards.  
During this reporting period, adidas-Salomon’s monitoring program focused on 
educating suppliers and workers about the SOE.  The FLA received records 
demonstrating that adidas suppliers attended more than 260 training sessions in 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Americas and Europe.  Trainings focused on basic 
labor and health, safety, and environmental standards included in the adidas SOE, 
as well as specific subjects, such as management-worker communications. Some of 
these trainings were conducted by the International Labor Organization (ILO), Prince 
of Wales Business Forum, Verité and Business for Social Responsibility.  A portion 
of these trainings also involved workers and union representatives.   

 adidas considered that worker interviews during factory audits were a means by 
which SEA staff could inform the workers about SOE standards.  adidas reported  
that its staff increased its focus on this aspect of the audit process during this 
reporting period.  
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 All adidas internal audit reports and corrective action plans were archived in regional 
databases.  SEA data were used in sourcing decisions and were tracked against 
corporate supply chain performance benchmarks. 
 During the reporting period, adidas developed a database which would be able to 
organize audit data, as well as the factory scoring system described above. This 
database would allow audit reports to be uploaded to servers located in the three 
regional offices, or through internet connections. It was designed to generate reports 
quickly, including compliance ratings, action plan items, schedules and deadlines, 
people responsible for implementation, and FLA reporting requirements. This 
database is to be implemented during the next reporting period.  
 
 
D) Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 When hired, all internal monitors received an orientation to adidas’s Standards of 
Engagement (SOE) from their Regional Manager, and were further trained at local 
supplier workshops held by Business for Social Responsibility. adidas reported that 
members of the SEA Team attended 98 trainings during the reporting period. 
Sessions were sponsored internally or contracted externally with groups such as 
Business for Social Responsibility, the International Labor Organization, Hill and 
Knowlton and external consultants. Members were trained in compliance and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related subjects, such as the standards of the 
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), International Standards 
Organization (ISO), Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), as well as 
personnel skills. 
 In 2002, SOE staff attended technical training seminars and developed additional 
tools for use in the field, including the Guide to Best Environmental Practice manual 
and the Field Auditors Handbook (Jan 2002, October 2002).  In the past, adidas 
developed various training resources for SOE team members, new hires and other 
staff with regard to compliance.  Texts include: adidas-Salomon Guidelines on 
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Employment Standards; adidas-Salomon Guidelines on Health, Safety and the 
Environment; as well as technical resources that cover environmentally-sound 
conduct for the textile industry; good practices in health, safety and the environment 
(HSE); fire safety; extraction and ventilation; food handling; country labor regulations 
and environmental laws.   
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
 As discussed above, adidas SEA personnel undertook 473 internal audits in 2001 of 
389 applicable facilities.  All FLA applicable facilities were visited during this time at 
least once for audits or remediation.   
 In 2001 adidas focused on auditing and rating “local market” suppliers (i.e., those 
suppliers that produced for local adidas subsidiaries, and produced adidas product in 
the same countries where products will be sold) for the first time.  Approximately 
50% of “local market” suppliers were audited and corrective action plans were put in 
place. In addition, SEA personnel visited almost all international suppliers that had 
not been visited in 2000, and made repeat visits to some problematic facilities. 
 adidas upgraded their Labor and Health, Safety and Environment auditing tools 
(including  standardized performance grading for facilities) during this period, and will 
field-test them during the second FLA implementation year.  
 In consultation with the FLA, adidas commissioned 42 independent external 
monitoring visits (10% of its applicable facilities), as mentioned in the “Monitoring” 
section above. These visits were conducted by: Intertek Testing Systems (18), Verité 
(14), Cotecna (4), MTL (4), and Global Standards (2). 
 
 
F) Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
 
 adidas reported that the worker interview portion of its internal auditing methodology 
was designed to give workers an opportunity to speak frankly.  Interview venues 
included off-sites locations (e.g., restaurants and workers’ neighborhoods), and 
discrete sites at the factory (canteens, recreation areas, dormitories and other non- 
production related environments) to preserve worker confidentiality and prevent 
retaliation against workers.  adidas monitors provided all workers interviewed with 
their business cards, which included a local address and phone number where the 
monitor could be reached should future noncompliance issues arise.   
 adidas also looked to local groups with which they had established relationships as a 
confidential channel through which workers could report noncompliance.  
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
 
 Consultation and outreach was undertaken with a broad range of local groups in 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, El Salvador, 
Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Canada, the USA, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
the UK and Turkey. 
 adidas held two regional Stakeholder Dialogue sessions during the year, which the 
company described as venues designed to give stakeholders an opportunity to 
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evaluate and comment on adidas’s compliance program, and to report on working 
conditions in the supply chain.   
 The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) has been evaluating adidas’s remedial 
activities at PT Dada, an Indonesian supplier of hats to US universities.  WRC has 
engaged adidas in a dialogue about worker awareness of changes brought about by 
remediation.   
 While adidas did provide further details about their relationships with local groups, 
the company requested that these remain confidential in the interest of continued 
trust-building.  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
 
 Following audits, adidas led discussions with the factory management about audit 
findings. These findings were used to create corrective action plans with exact 
completion dates.  The factory management was responsible for addressing the 
noncompliance issues in the corrective action plan and reporting back to adidas with 
regard to progress and/or completion.  The factory reports to adidas included 
verification documents and/or pictures, and were often an interim step to follow-up 
site visits conducted by SEA team members. 
 Corrective action plans included various combinations of training, education and 
management system development.  In the interest of longer-term solutions, these 
aimed to address the root sources of noncompliance issues, rather than simply the 
results of workplace dysfunctions.  
 The findings from factory audits resulted in a supplier performance grading (see 
explanation above).  This grading was combined with other supplier performance 
benchmarks to determine the product volume that would be allocated to the supplier. 
As stated above, in instances of serious noncompliance, adidas reserved the right to 
terminate business relationships.  
 Deadlines for the corrective actions that were negotiated with the factory 
management depended upon the seriousness of the noncompliance issue and the 
technical/organizational feasibility of the individual remediation.  These issues 
ranged from zero-tolerance cases that required immediate and unequivocal 
remediation, to action items requiring capital investments (e.g., installing extraction 
systems or new roofs) with longer implementation periods.   
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adidas: Linking Women’s Health to Compliance  
 
The majority of the workforce employed in apparel and footwear factories around the 
world is women.  adidas’s compliance team observed that it is common in some 
countries for young female workers to lack education in the areas of health and hygiene, 
safe sexual practices, and in pre-natal and post-natal care. In fact, in some cases, 
workers have never had access to basic information concerning their own reproductive 
health. The team considered that, in addition to having potentially serious implications 
for women workers, their families and their communities, a lack of understanding about 
fundamental health issues could lead to considerable inefficiencies in factories.  
 
adidas, therefore, started its Women Health Project, which aims to educate women 
workers about leading health issues.  The company’s goals were threefold: 1) positively 
impact women workers’ lives by improving their health and that of their families; 2) 
support the implementation of adidas’s Standards of Engagement (SOE); and 3) help 
eliminate “slowdowns” in productivity caused by illness and absenteeism. 
 
adidas started this program as a pilot project in Vietnam.  The company plans to roll out 
similarly formatted projects on a broader global scale in cooperation with international 
NGOs, as well as other brands, in the next reporting periods. The SEA team began the 
project in Vietnam by consulting with the Reproductive Health and Information Center, 
Maria Stopes, and an independent local consultant to produce four different user-friendly 
leaflets addressing: 1) pre-natal care; 2) post-natal care and breast-feeding; 3) sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS; and 4) family planning and health.  Each of the 
leaflets reviewed relevant SOE standards and the local labor code, medical/health 
information, and workplace health and safety tips. 
 
These leaflets were distributed to women workers in Vietnamese factories over the 
course of several health education training sessions, which were led by a factory nurse 
or doctor.  Factory management attended these sessions as well.  adidas arranged for a 
female factory representative in each factory to manage the training program so that 
there would be a local contact for workers to approach with health questions.  Members 
of the adidas compliance team supported these efforts at the local level; however, they 
encouraged local actors to oversee these programs in order to enhance local capacities.  
 
These projects have not been operating long enough to measure their impact on 
women’s health or productivity in any quantitative manner.  Nonetheless, adidas 
considered that the project supported the implementation of the following standards: 
 
 Forced labor – the trainings reinforced understandings about women’s needs for 
maternity and lactation leave, as well as adherence to a policy of voluntary 
overtime working hours;  
 Discrimination – the trainings focused on issues of discrimination relating to 
gender, marital status or parental status, and provided various reasons for 
rigorous enforcement of this standard; 
 Working hours – by having a healthier workforce, and therefore less 
absenteeism, management would be able to schedule production more 
accurately, meaning that excessive overtime work could be avoided. Moreover, 
with proper pre-natal and post-natal care, expecting mothers and management 
would be able to plan maternity leave more effectively.  
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 The trainings also taught women about the protections provided by local law to pregnant 
women and women with children in their first year of infancy.  
 
In addition to the effects this program is expected to have for compliance, adidas 
anticipates that the expertise brought to the project by local and international NGOs will 
lead to measurable health improvements for women workers and their communities.  
adidas has high hopes for the project in coming years, as the project is rolled out in more 
countries, and in collaboration with a greater number of partners. 
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adidas’s Factory/Audit Profile 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where adidas’s 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
adidas-Salomon Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
 
 
China (68), Portugal (37), Turkey (26), Vietnam (25), Indonesia (25), 
Thailand (21), Taiwan R.O.C. (21), Mexico (17), Malaysia (16), USA 
(15), Tunisia (11), Italy (11), UK (10), Singapore (6), Honduras (6), 
Germany (6), El Salvador (6), Bulgaria (6), Philippines (5), Pakistan (5), 
Hong Kong (4), Canada (4), Lao P.D.R. (3), South Korea (3), Japan 
(3), Cambodia (3), Ukraine (2), Sri Lanka (2), Spain (2), Morocco (2), 
Macedonia (2), Macau (2), Greece (2), Albania (2), Brazil (1), Poland 
(1), Peru (1), Mauritius (1), Ireland (1), India (1), Hungary (1), Croatia 
(1), Colombia (1), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1) 
 
389 
Internal 
Monitoring Visits 
(8/01-7/02)* 
 
China (96), Portugal (20), Turkey (39), Vietnam (37), Indonesia (44), 
Thailand (20), Taiwan R.O.C. (17), Mexico (31), Malaysia (18), USA 
(18), Tunisia (5), Italy (3), UK (0), Singapore (10), Honduras (13), 
Germany (1), El Salvador (30), Bulgaria (11), Philippines (6), Pakistan 
(8), Hong Kong (2), Canada (3), Lao P.D.R. (2), South Korea (5), 
Japan (1), Cambodia (6), Ukraine (2), Sri Lanka (1), Spain (2), 
Morocco (3), Macedonia (2), Macau (3), Greece (2), Albania (4), Brazil 
(0), Poland (1), Peru (3), Mauritius (1), Ireland (0), India (0), Hungary 
(1), Croatia (0), Colombia (2), Bosnia-Herzegovina (0) 
 
473 
FLA Independent 
External 
Monitoring Visits 
Counted for Year 
One  
 
 
China (12), Portugal (3), Turkey (3), Vietnam (2), Indonesia (6), 
Thailand (2), Taiwan R.O.C. (1), Mexico (4), Malaysia (3), El Salvador 
(4), Philippines (2) 42 
 
* The number of internal audits is higher than the number of applicable facilities in some countries, because multiple visits 
were made to certain locations.  These numbers should not be interpreted as signifying 100% coverage in these countries 
since some facilities received multiple monitoring visits while others were not visited during the reporting period. 
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Eddie Bauer 
 
 
Basic Facts about Eddie Bauer: 
 
Eddie Bauer consolidated revenue in FY2001:  
 US$1.6 billion  
Applicable Eddie Bauer Brands (percentage of  total 
sales):  
Eddie Bauer® Apparel (87% of total business) 
Total applicable facilities worldwide: 
309 facilities 
 
 
Eddie Bauer’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of Eddie Bauer’s Global Labor Practices 
Program.  In addition to some basic facts about the structure of Eddie Bauer’s 
compliance program and its participation in the FLA, it provides readers with a general 
overview of the company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on 
noncompliance issues during the reporting period.  The information provided below 
applies to the first year of Eddie Bauer’s monitoring plan (August 1, 2001 through July 
31, 2002).  Eddie Bauer has committed to implement its monitoring plan over the course 
of three years, in accordance with the FLA Charter.   
 
The Compliance Program  
 
Eddie Bauer was approved as an FLA participating company in April 2001.  During the 
reporting period, the Eddie Bauer Global Labor Practices Program was headed by the 
Director of Corporate Social Responsibility, who reported to the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Vice President, and later to the Sourcing and Production Vice President, 
of Eddie Bauer. Two full-time staff members oversaw the Global Labor Practices 
Program from headquarters, while three full-time and twelve part-time staff, based in 
International field offices throughout Asia and the Americas, implemented the Global 
Labor Practices Program in the field.  These staff members conducted the majority of the 
internal monitoring visits that took place from August 2001 through July 2002. However, 
in order to monitor factories located in countries or regions where Eddie Bauer did not 
have local staff, the company relied on third-party monitoring conducted by Global Social 
Compliance (GSC) to supplement its monitoring efforts in 14 factories.  
 
During the reporting period, Eddie Bauer’s Corporate Social Responsibility Department 
focused its work on developing a comprehensive and data-driven risk assessment 
system.  This system allowed the company to prioritize monitoring activities and the use 
of limited resources by targeting its monitoring activities in countries and factories at 
greater risk of noncompliance.  In addition, Eddie Bauer reported that it had incorporated 
consultation with local organizations into its Global Labor Practices Program.  Outreach 
to NGOs was a new activity for the company, and was developed to better inform its 
activities.   
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Monitoring 
 
Eddie Bauer conducted 110 internal audits during Year One.  The company developed 
the aforementioned risk assessment system to identify and prioritize facilities that were 
likely to have more serious noncompliance issues in Year One, but the implementation 
of the system commenced after the reporting period.  Country risk assessments used 
criteria such as general human rights, past compliance trends, child labor, and 
government enforcement of labor laws, to determine high risk countries, while facility-
specific information gathered by Eddie Bauer staff was used to prioritize facilities within 
countries.  The Global Labor Practices staff then targeted its internal monitoring system 
at these facilities.   
 
Eddie Bauer generally conducted announced internal visits, although in cases where it 
received allegations of noncompliance, certain visits were unannounced.   Eddie Bauer 
internal monitors used the FLA audit instrument to conduct audits, which included 
management interviews, a walk-through of the facility, and one-year payroll records 
review.  The information collected was then cross-referenced with worker interviews, 
which were usually conducted on-site, with 25% of the worker population in factories of 
up to 100 workers, capping at 25 worker interviews conducted in factories with larger 
workforces.  The monitors who conducted worker interviews and management follow-up 
visits all spoke the relevant local languages.  In order to ensure that there was no 
retaliation against workers who were interviewed, Eddie Bauer monitors often checked in 
with interviewed workers when they returned to factories on follow-up visits.  
 
When Eddie Bauer started a business relationship with a new vendor, its criteria for 
engagement included Global Labor Practice compliance.  The process was overseen by 
Eddie Bauer’s Supply Chain Operations Department, which required vendors to 
complete the proper forms and meet “Vender Establishment Criteria” before the 
department would issue purchase orders.  Eddie Bauer’s Supply Chain, Corporate 
Responsibility, and Sourcing Departments worked together to ensure that apparel 
factories were in compliance with Eddie Bauer’s Workplace Code of Conduct prior to 
production.  Eddie Bauer maintained that “substantial” compliance with the Code must 
be confirmed before production could begin in new facilities.  
 
During Year One, 15 applicable facilities of Eddie Bauer were monitored by FLA-
accredited independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations7. 
 
Remediation and Follow-up  
 
Eddie Bauer field monitors communicated the findings of evaluations to headquarters 
staff, the local office and the supplier after every monitoring visit. Representatives from 
the local Eddie Bauer office, either from Global Labor Practices Program staff or 
Sourcing staff, were most often responsible for following up on remediation and 
verification upon receipt of audit reports.  Eddie Bauer’s Global Labor Practices Program 
determined suitable corrective action plans and remediation timelines in consultation 
with factory management.   
 
                                                 
7
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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Follow-up occurred either through follow-up audits, telephone calls, photographs, 
documentation of worker training, etc. In cases where monitoring uncovered serious 
noncompliance issues, Eddie Bauer made arrangements for local monitors to return to 
the problematic facilities regularly.  In some cases, visits took place weekly until factories 
were brought into compliance.   
 
Corrective action in accordance with agreed-upon deadlines determined future Eddie 
Bauer engagement with suppliers.  As a matter of policy, the Global Labor Practices 
Program “works with suppliers in a spirit of partnership.” However, the company 
maintained that it would terminate a relationship with a vendor if there were repeated or 
serious code noncompliance issues, or signs of unwillingness to comply with corrective 
action requested.  
 
 
Eddie Bauer’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  Since these obligations 
represent minimum standards for participation in the FLA, the FLA encourages 
companies to surpass these standards, which they often do.  The information provided in 
this section is in no way an exhaustive recounting of all Eddie Bauer’s compliance 
activities during the reporting period.  Rather, this section includes information that Eddie 
Bauer reported to the FLA to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its Global 
Labor Practices Program.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
 Eddie Bauer developed its “Standards for Business Partnerships” Code of Conduct 
in 1995 and adopted the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct upon joining the FLA.  
The company required all applicable licensees, contractors and suppliers to adopt 
the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct when entering into business relationships with 
them. To the end of further clarifying standards included in the Code, the Global 
Labor Practices team produced and distributed the Eddie Bauer Labor Practice 
Update newsletter, which included the Code and compliance program details, to all 
suppliers several times a year.  
 Eddie Bauer distributed an Annual Vendor Certification Form to existing and new 
suppliers.  These were signed and returned to confirm that the Code was applied, 
and that employees have been informed about the standards.  The written 
agreements also confirmed that Eddie Bauer suppliers agreed to periodic inspections 
and audits for compliance with the standards, including those by accredited external 
monitors.    
 Eddie Bauer conducted 11 FLA Vendor Compliance Seminars in most of its key 
sourcing countries in Asia. These were county-specific trainings, focusing on local 
labor law and compliance challenges and Eddie Bauer requirements of suppliers.  
During this reporting period, Eddie Bauer trained 356 supplier staff representing 116 
suppliers, in addition to 67 Eddie Bauer field staff.  Local venders also attended 
Business for Social Responsibility supplier compliance workshops when they were 
offered in their area.   
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 Soon after Eddie Bauer became an FLA participating company, 51 company 
associates participated in corporate staff workshops that included reviews of Eddie 
Bauer’s participation in the FLA and resulting company obligations.  
 Corporate sourcing associates and other staff were required to take the course 
describing Eddie Bauer’s Global Labor Practice Program and the FLA, which has 
been taught four times a year at Eddie Bauer University. The reported goal of this 
exercise has been to underscore Eddie Bauer’s policy that labor practices must be 
considered in sourcing decisions. 
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
 Eddie Bauer distributed a poster-sized Code, translated into 29 languages, to its 
suppliers.  Approved apparel suppliers were required to display it on the factory floor 
in the languages of the workers. 
 During worker interviews and factory visits, Eddie Bauer monitors and other staff 
informed workers of the Workplace Code. 
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 The Global Labor Practice program utilized the Eddie Bauer design, production and 
shipping database for its compliance records during the reporting period.  
Compliance staff classified factories as “Active Approved” (i.e., no on-going 
compliance issues reported), “Conditionally Approved” (i.e., pending remediation 
verification), or “Failed.”  Global Labor Practice staff was able to use the database in 
regional offices to access and input data including field monitor evaluations, findings 
and remediation, and progress made in corrective action. 
 During the reporting period, the Global Labor Practices staff made plans to upgrade 
the database for improved management of information about monitoring visits and 
follow-up activities. These would take place during the following reporting period. 
 
 
D) Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 Eddie Bauer maintained its policy of hiring company monitors with strong 
qualifications in the field of compliance, including a demonstrated knowledge of 
monitoring practices and the capacity to speak the local language.   
 Eddie Bauer provided monitors with the Eddie Bauer Monitoring Plan; the Eddie 
Bauer FLA Auditor Training Manual; Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) labor 
law summaries and other labor law publications and databases; the Eddie Bauer 
FLA Audit Instrument; and the FLA Monitoring Guidance Document.   
 Monitors received 25% of their training through “textbook” learning.  The other 75% 
was gained through visits to factories with more experienced monitors, including 
some third party monitoring groups.   
 Eddie Bauer monitors also attended BSR supplier workshops in the countries for 
which they are responsible.  
  
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
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  Eddie Bauer conducted 110 internal audits during the reporting period.  This 
exceeded Eddie Bauer’s original plan to audit 20 percent of applicable facilities in 
Year One. It is important to note that some of the 110 factories monitored are no 
longer on Eddie Bauer’s “active” list due to sourcing decisions. 
In consultation with the FLA, Eddie Bauer undertook a total of 15 FLA independent 
external monitoring visits (approximately 5% of its applicable facilities), as mentioned 
in the “Monitoring” section above. Verité performed one of these visits, while Intertek 
Testing Services (ITS) undertook the remaining fourteen visits required by the FLA.   

 
 
F) Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
 
 Eddie Bauer conducted worker interviews when monitoring facilities. Eddie Bauer 
maintained that monitors did not attribute information shared with them to any 
specific worker and confirmed with factory management that workers will not be 
penalized.   
 The Global Labor Practices Program also sought information from factory workers 
through consultation with NGOs.  
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
 
 During 2001 and 2002, Eddie Bauer consulted with various organizations from the 
following countries: Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, the United States and Vietnam.  While Eddie Bauer provided further details 
about these organizations to the FLA, the company requested that this information 
remain confidential.  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
 
 Eddie Bauer reported that the Global Labor Practices Program designed corrective 
action plans to address issues raised in every facility where Eddie Bauer found 
noncompliance issues.  It reported that Global Labor Practices staff developed these 
corrective action plans and corresponding deadlines on a case-by-case basis, based 
on the particular situation and the severity of the issues.   
 Eddie Bauer held suppliers responsible for the implementation of the corrective 
action plans in accordance with agreed-upon deadlines, and maintained that the 
fulfillment of corrective action plans is a condition of future Eddie Bauer engagement 
with suppliers.  
 As described above, depending on the character of the noncompliance issue, Eddie 
Bauer staff returned to facilities and/or required that management provide 
documentation (e.g., photos, training attendance sheets, etc.) to prove that the 
factory had completed prescribed corrective action.  In some cases, local staff 
returned to facilities on a regular basis to ensure that serious issues, like abuse and 
discrimination, were no longer taking place.  
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Eddie Bauer: Collaborating through the FLA  
 
The Fair Labor Association endeavors to provide participating companies with the 
opportunity to combine efforts to improve factory conditions. The goal is to share 
resources, experiences and skills in addressing issues, and to increase leverage with 
factory management.  In this case, Eddie Bauer collaborated with other participating 
companies and the FLA to address serious noncompliance issues that were discovered 
in one of the factories where it produces.  
 
During the summer in 2002, the FLA advised Eddie Bauer that it had received a 
complaint about workplace code noncompliance issues that were allegedly taking place 
in a factory producing for Eddie Bauer in the Americas.  The complainant reported that 
management was engaging in intimidation of a union organizer; discrimination against 
pregnant employees; forced overtime without overtime pay; and health and safety 
noncompliance, such as lack of ventilation, excessive heat and poor water quality.   
 
At the time of the allegations, two other FLA participating companies, Levi Strauss & Co. 
and Liz Claiborne, Inc., were also sourcing from the facility.  Through the FLA, the three 
companies coordinated initial investigations of the allegations.  All three company 
internal inspections confirmed some of the allegations that were included in the 
complaint.  As a result, the companies contracted an FLA-accredited independent 
external monitor to conduct an extensive evaluation of the factory.  The accredited 
monitor conducted worker and management interviews, in-depth reviews of factory 
records, and a visual inspection of the factory.  At the conclusion of the factory audit in 
November 2002, all three participating companies and the FLA reviewed the monitor’s 
findings, and communicated with one another about the next steps for remediation.  
 
Over the course of the next months, the companies jointly consulted with factory 
management several times, and worked together to devise a corrective action plan.  The 
corrective action plan included deadlines for each corrective action, and required the 
factory to submit detailed monthly reports on its progress.  These reports included drafts 
of policies and procedures, as well as photographs, to prove that changes had been 
made in the factory.   
 
At the time of this report, corrective actions are still underway.  With support from the 
participating companies, the factory has hired a full-time Human Resources Director, 
following an evaluation of the existing organizational structure.  The factory has also 
been working with a payroll expert to address overtime and wage issues, as well as an 
independent, senior labor rights advocate and a labor rights attorney, who have advised 
on appropriate policies and have developed management and worker trainings.  These 
experts have drafted policies and procedures at the factory regarding wages, 
discrimination and harassment, and the right to freely associate.  They have also started 
to educate factory employees about their workplace rights, health and safety issues, as 
well as the new policies and procedures that had been put in place.  Moreover, this has 
allowed for the formation of numerous worker committees at the factory.  
 
Eddie Bauer remains engaged with the other FLA participating companies and the 
factory.  The companies’ compliance teams coordinate follow-up visits to the factory, 
which take place as official audits on a quarterly basis.  In between these formal audits, 
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the participating companies have arranged that staff members visit the facility when they 
are in the region.  
 
Although Eddie Bauer and the other participating companies have seen progress at the 
facility as a result of their coordinated intervention, they recognize the need for continued 
improvement with respect to compliance. They remain committed to continued 
collaboration to implement sustainable solutions at this factory and at other facilities.   
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Eddie Bauer Factory/Audit Profile 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where Eddie 
Bauer’s applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the 
number of internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during 
the reporting period.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
Eddie Bauer Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
(as of January 
2002) 
 
China (88), Hong Kong (45), United States (15), Philippines (12), 
Turkey (12), Mauritius (11), Mexico (11), Vietnam (11), Thailand (10), 
Macau (9), Cambodia (6), Canada (6), Italy (6), Malaysia (6), Sri Lanka 
(6), Dominican Republic (5), El Salvador (5), Pakistan (5), Bahrain (4), 
Bangladesh (4), Australia (3), Japan (3), Germany (2), Guatemala (2), 
India (2), Indonesia (2), Maldives (2), Singapore (2), Taiwan (2), Tunis 
(2), United Arab Emirates (2), Colombia (1), Israel (1), New Zealand 
(1), Peru (1), Portugal (1), Qatar (1), United Kingdom (1), Zimbabwe 
(1), Brunei (0), South Korea (0) 
 
309 
Internal 
Monitoring Visits 
(8/01-7/02)* 
 
China (29), Hong Kong (12), United States (0), Philippines (0), Turkey 
(2), Mauritius (0), Mexico (0), Vietnam (11), Thailand (11), Macau (6), 
Cambodia (4), Canada (0), Italy (0), Malaysia (11), Sri Lanka (2), 
Dominican Republic (0), El Salvador (0), Pakistan (0), Bahrain (0), 
Bangladesh (3), Australia (0), Japan (0), Germany (0), Guatemala (0), 
India (0), Indonesia (5), Maldives (0), Singapore (4), Taiwan (0), 
Tunisia (0), United Arab Emirates (0), Colombia (0), Israel (0), New 
Zealand (0), Peru (1), Portugal (0), Qatar (0), United Kingdom (0), 
Zimbabwe (0), Brunei (5), South Korea (4) 
 
110 
FLA Independent 
External 
Monitoring Visits 
Counted for Year 
One  
 
 
China (7), Hong Kong (4), Dominican Republic (1), Indonesia (1), 
Mexico (2)  
15 
 
*Factory audits were conducted in some countries where production did not occur during the reporting period, but 
production started after the period of time covered by this report.  In addition, in certain countries, the classification of 
some factories was changed from Active to Inactive for a wide range of sourcing reasons.  
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Levi Strauss & Co. 
 
 
Basic Facts about Levi Strauss & Co. (LS&CO.) 
 
LS&CO. consolidated revenue in FY2001:  
 US$4.26 billion 
Applicable Levi Strauss & Co. Brands (percentage of  
total sales):  
Levi’s® (74%); Dockers® (26%)  
 
Total applicable facilities worldwide: 
540 facilities  
 
 
Levi Strauss & Co.’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of the Levi Strauss & Co. (LS&CO.) 
compliance program.  In addition to some basic facts about LS&CO.’s participation in the 
FLA and the structure of its compliance program, this section provides readers with a 
general overview of the company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up 
on noncompliance issues during the reporting period.   The activities described below 
took place during the Year One reporting period (August 1, 2001 through July 31, 2002), 
which was the first year of a three-year implementation period, according to the initial 
monitoring plan that LS&CO. submitted upon becoming a participating company.   
 
It should be noted that LS&CO. ended its participation in the FLA in October 2002.8   
 
The Compliance Program  
  
Levi Strauss & Co. established its compliance program in 1991.  LS&CO. became a 
participating company in the FLA in July 1999, and subsequently withdrew from the FLA 
in October 2002.  During the reporting period, LS&CO.’s compliance program was 
headed by the Senior Vice President of Worldwide Supply Chain with the Director of 
Global Code of Conduct.  They oversaw the work of 2 full-time compliance personnel in 
their headquarters office, and 27 full-time staff and many part-time staff (8 full-time 
equivalents) located in 17 field offices around the world.  All internal audits were 
conducted by LS&CO. employees during the reporting period, with the exception of two 
third-party audits (categorized as internal audits in the FLA system), which were 
undertaken by Verite.  
 
Monitoring 
 
LS&CO. has specified its standards for compliance in the Levi Strauss & Co. Terms of 
Engagement (TOE), which it has applied to all manufacturing and finishing suppliers.  
                                                 
8
 Levi Strauss & Co. (LS&CO.) announced its decision in October 2002 to withdraw from the FLA program, after 
completing its first year of implementation.  LS&CO is no longer a participating company in the FLA, but the results of 
LS&CO.'s first year of implementation are included in this report, and the monitoring results of 7 factory visits are included 
in tracking charts on the FLA website.   
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When approving LS&CO.’s application for participation, the FLA determined that the 
TOE upheld all of the standards included in the FLA Workplace Code.  During Year One, 
the company performed internal audits at all its contracted facilities (100%) at least once.   
Prior to engaging in a business relationship with a new supplier, LS&CO. conducted 
internal audits at all factory locations where LS&CO. product was proposed to be 
produced, and assessed the supplier’s level of compliance.  Internal audits included: 
interviews with the facility management; worker interviews; a review of personnel, wage 
and working hour records; and a physical walk-through and inspection of safety 
conditions in the factory and dormitories, if they exist.    
 
During Year One, 30 applicable facilities of LS&CO. were monitored by FLA-accredited 
independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations9.  A number of 
these monitoring visits were unannounced.  When proposing facilities for independent 
external monitoring, LS&CO. targeted those facilities where it had a significant sourcing 
presence, or where potential for collaboration with other FLA participating companies 
existed.  LS&CO. also favored those countries where it considered the stronger FLA 
independent external monitors to be accredited.  
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
Following monitoring visits, LS&CO. compliance staff worked with contractors to develop 
corrective action plans, which listed each action item required for remediation.  LS&CO. 
classified action items in three categories: zero tolerance, immediate action, and 
continuous improvement.  Zero tolerance items were violations of guidelines related to 
child labor, prison/forced labor, unethical or illegal practices, use of corporal punishment, 
and failure to comply with agreed-upon action items.  Immediate action items related to, 
among other subjects, serious life safety issues, inaccurate records, and lack of permits.  
Continuous improvement items were less serious in nature or may have required 
significant capital investments, and therefore may have had longer timeframes for 
redress.  LS&CO. compliance staff maintained contact with management about progress 
being made with regard to continuous improvement items.  
 
LS&CO. conducted follow-up visits between annual monitoring visits to verify 
implementation of agreed-upon action items.  LS&CO. looked to field assessors and 
other company employees, who visited the facilities on a regular basis, to informally 
monitor factory conditions as well. 
 
Following LS&CO.’s Zero Tolerance policy, if a contractor was unwilling or failed to meet 
the corrective action commitment, LS&CO. upheld its policy that it would end its 
business relationship with the contractor.  LS&CO. considers ending a business 
relationship on these grounds as a last resort. 
 
 
Levi Strauss & Co.’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations   
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  Since these obligations 
represent minimum standards for participation in the FLA, the FLA encourages 
                                                 
9
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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companies to surpass these standards, which they often do.  The information provided in 
this section is in no way an exhaustive recounting of all LS&CO. compliance activities 
during the reporting period.  Rather, this section includes information that LS&CO. 
reported to the FLA to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its TOE program.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
 LS&CO. established its Terms of Engagement (TOE) standards in 1991.  It 
distributed TOE standards brochures to all cut, sew and finish suppliers, including 
product (accessory) and country licensees and agents during this reporting period.   
The brochures have been translated into 45 languages.  
 The TOE guidelines and a required written commitment to implementing the 
standards have been included in all LS&CO. purchase orders and licensing 
agreements.  This included permitting access to facilities and personnel for periodic 
inspections.  
 LS&CO. created a Supplier Guidebook in 2002, which explained detailed factory-
level TOE requirements, including the company’s four levels of TOE noncompliance 
(Zero Tolerance, Immediate Action, Continuous Improvement, and Acceptable).  This 
guidebook was distributed to suppliers and was made available to suppliers of U.S. 
products through a supplier website. 
 The company included orientation to TOE standards in the supplier development 
process with all prospective suppliers.   
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
 The LS&CO. compliance team strived to ensure that poster-sized versions of the 
TOE guidelines were prominently displayed in both English and the prevalent local 
language in several locations of all supplier factories. 
 LS&CO. revised these posters in 2002 to include photographs of workers.  These 
posters were translated into 45 languages and posted in supplier factories. 
 Compliance team members worked with suppliers in Europe and Asia to conduct 
employee education sessions on the TOE standards.  In Europe, LS&CO. provided 
orientations to factory workers in every major sourcing country. In Asia, worker 
education pilots were conducted in China and India. 
 LS&CO. conducted several half-day orientation sessions on its TOE standards for 
key suppliers in every region in 2002.  In addition, LS&CO. offered half-day 
orientation sessions in San Francisco and New York to key managers for U.S. 
product licensees. 
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 LS&CO. has had a global TOE audit form since 1992.  Data from these forms have 
been retained in a global electronic TOE database since 1996. 
 In 2002, LS&CO. enhanced its TOE database to enable compliance staff around the 
world to upload findings from TOE monitoring visits via an off-line interface.  In 
addition, the database was enhanced with the capacity to generate advanced reports 
on TOE performance across suppliers and by region. 
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 In 2002, LS&CO. developed a TOE “pre-assessment questionnaire” for new 
suppliers, which was implemented in that same year.  The new questionnaire gave 
the LS&CO. compliance staff the opportunity to gain essential information about the 
factory and to enhance the implementation of the TOE standards from the outset of 
the business relationship.    
 
 
D) Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 LS&CO. has conducted field training for its compliance staff since 1992.  It added 
formal classroom training for its compliance staff in 1998.   
 LS&CO. monitors have periodically participated in Business for Social Responsibility 
(BSR) code of conduct workshops that were held in their respective regions.  They 
also attended the BSR annual conference. 
 In 2002, LS&CO. took a number of steps to build and enhance the competencies and 
skills of its internal monitors, including the establishment of global “TOE assessor 
competencies” and the development of new training programs. 
 LS&CO. revised and updated its formal internal monitor training program in 2002.  
The program is now 3 days of classroom training, supplemented by field training.  
 In 2002, LS&CO. also developed and pilot-tested a formal training program on 
gathering information from workers.  This is a 4-day program, designed for internal 
monitors.   
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
 As mentioned above, LS&CO. conducted annual internal monitoring visits for all cut, 
sew, and finish suppliers, which has been a LS&CO. policy since 1992.  In 2001, 
LS&CO. also began conducting annual internal monitoring visits of all of LS&CO.’s 
product licensee supplier factories (which is not required by the FLA).  All 772 
internal audits were undertaken by trained LS&CO. TOE Assessors (i.e., internal 
monitors). In addition to the formal internal monitoring visits, other LS&CO. staff, 
including sourcing personnel, may visit facilities more frequently, in conjunction with 
compliance follow-up and verification activities. 
 While the majority of internal monitoring visits were announced, LS&CO. conducted 
unannounced visits when there was reason to suspect ongoing situations of 
noncompliance in facilities. 
 In 2002, LS&CO. enhanced its approach to worker interviews by developing a more 
globally consistent process, through which staff would gather information from 
workers through both on-site and off-site discussions with workers.  This process 
was expected to be rolled out to all compliance staff in 2003.  LS&CO. reported that 
this process would enhance the company’s ability to assess compliance with the 
TOE standards. 
 In consultation with the FLA, LS&CO. commissioned 30 FLA independent external 
monitoring visits (6% of its applicable facilities), as mentioned in the “Monitoring” 
section above.  The monitoring visits were conducted by Intertek Testing Services 
(16), Verité (5), and Merchandise Testing Laboratories (9). 
 
 
F) Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
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  LS&CO. internal monitors shared their contact information with the workers they 
came in contact with during factory visits.  
 LS&CO. staff also encouraged workers and labor organizations to inform the 
company of potential TOE noncompliance via its corporate website.  The company 
received reports of alleged noncompliance through the website during the reporting 
period. 
 In 2002, as noted above, LS&CO. developed an enhanced, globally consistent 
process to gather information from workers during internal monitoring visits.  LS&CO. 
reported that one of the guiding principles of this process was the protection of 
workers from retribution for sharing information about factory conditions.    
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
 
 Since establishing the Terms of Engagement (TOE) in 1991, LS&CO. reported that it 
has maintained its long-standing relationships with human rights, labor, and other 
international and local institutions during this reporting period.  LS&CO. has 
integrated specific recommendations for the enhancement of the TOE process that 
some of these groups have made. 
 In the course of internal monitoring visits and gathering information from workers, 
LS&CO. reported that it periodically consulted with representatives of legally 
constituted unions. 
 Out of respect for these civil society groups, and for other confidentiality reasons, 
LS&CO. has requested that the names of these groups not be published. 
The Levi Strauss Foundation has established a sourcing grants program that helps 
to ensure workers rights in communities where LS&CO. products are made.  The 
focus of the grants is on local community organizations’ access to health care, 
information about workers’ legal rights, preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
increasing economic development opportunities, and ensuring access to education. 

  
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
 
 LS&CO. consulted with suppliers to develop corrective action plans for instances of 
noncompliance.  Suppliers were then responsible for the remediation of problems by 
implementing the corrective action plans.  When suppliers were unwilling or unable 
to complete these improvements, LS&CO. ended the business relationship. 
 In 2002, with the goal of ensuring greater global consistency in supplier remediation, 
LS&CO. developed detailed global guidance for its internal monitors on remediation 
for specific TOE noncompliance, including supplier action steps and suggested 
timeframes.   
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A Levi Strauss & Co. Case Study:  
Overtime and Harassment in Asia 
 
This case study provides an interesting example of how the FLA methodology works 
in practice. It also demonstrates a process through which civil society and 
representatives of workers can report code noncompliance to a participating 
company, which can then intervene with a remediation plan.   
 
In 2002, Levi Strauss & Co. was notified by an email to its corporate website that 
violations of its code of conduct were allegedly occurring in a factory producing both 
Levi’s® and Dockers® brands in Asia.  The complaint was reported by an external 
party - a priest, on behalf of some of his parishioners who were migrant workers in the 
country. The allegations included excessive overtime, inadequate compensation for 
overtime work, and harassment.  To verify the allegations, LS&CO. conducted its own 
internal investigation, followed by a factory audit by a non-FLA independent monitor.  
Both the internal investigation and independent monitor confirmed the allegations that 
violations were occurring at the factory.   
 
Based on the information, LS&CO. worked with factory management to address the 
violations and to develop a corrective action plan.  The plan involved: 
 Educational programs for management and employees on wages, scheduling, 
and harassment issues;  
 Development of a comprehensive management plan to implement systems for 
assessing code of conduct compliance in the factory;  
 Full back payment of wages to the workers for their overtime; and 
 Engagement of an independent monitor to verify completion of remediation.  
  
When submitting its annual report to the FLA, LS&CO. reported that with the 
cooperation of the factory, the remediation plan was underway, and full payments of 
back wages were made to the workers.  The educational programs for the factory 
management and employees had also taken place.  In the meantime, the LS&CO. 
order at the factory had been completed, and the company reported that future orders 
to the factory would depend on continued factory cooperation with remediation 
efforts.  This case demonstrates how participating companies can use their eco
leverage to facilitate positive improvements in workplace conditions in factories where 
their products are produced.  
nomic 
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Levi Strauss & Co. Factory/Audit Profile 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where LS&CO. 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
LS&CO. Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
 
 
China (107), Japan (55), India (30), Tunisia (25), Canada (24), Mexico 
(23), South Korea (21), Indonesia (19), Philippines (19), Vietnam (18), 
Thailand (17), Dominican Republic (14), Taiwan (13), Turkey (12), 
Bulgaria (11), Italy (10), Pakistan (9), Bangladesh (8), Cambodia (8), 
Greece (8), Colombia (8), United States (8), Malaysia (7), Morocco (7), 
Portugal (7), Romania (7), Brazil (6), Spain (5), Malta (4), Australia (3), 
El Salvador (3), Belgium (2), France (2), Israel (2), Jordan (2), Poland 
(2), United Kingdom (2), Costa Rica (2), Guatemala (2), Hong Kong 
(1), Croatia (1), Germany (1), Netherlands (1), South Africa (1), 
Sweden (1), Honduras (1), Nicaragua (1) 
 
540 
Internal 
Monitoring Visits 
(8/01-7/02)* 
 
China (170), Japan (60), India (37), Tunisia (18), Canada (25), Mexico 
(28), South Korea (23), Indonesia (16), Philippines (16), Vietnam (25), 
Thailand (12), Dominican Republic (11), Taiwan (18), Turkey (43), 
Bulgaria (10), Italy (56), Pakistan (14), Bangladesh (1), Cambodia (13), 
Greece (13), Colombia (9), United States (20), Malaysia (1), Morocco 
(5), Portugal (16), Romania (15), Brazil (5), Spain (6), Malta (4), 
Australia (1), El Salvador (5), Jordan (3), Poland (13), Costa Rica (3), 
Guatemala (3), Hong Kong (23), Croatia (5), Germany (3), Netherlands 
(2), South Africa (15), Sweden (1), Honduras (4), Nicaragua (1) 
 
772 
FLA Independent 
External 
Monitoring Visits 
Counted for Year 
One  
 
 
China (7), India (5), Mexico (2), South Korea (2), Indonesia (6), 
Philippines (1), Thailand (2), Dominican Republic (1), Bangladesh (3), 
Portugal (1) 30 
 
*LS&CO.’s internal monitoring numbers include pre-sourcing monitoring visits in factories where the 
company may not have opted to source, as well as follow-up visits, which explains why the number of 
internal monitoring visits is greater than the number of LS&CO. applicable factories.  It should be noted that 
all applicable facilities received at least one visit from LS&CO. compliance staff.  
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Liz Claiborne, Inc. 
 
 
Basic Facts about Liz Claiborne, Inc. 
 
Liz Claiborne, Inc. consolidated revenue in FY2001:   
US$3.44 billion 
 
Applicable Liz Claiborne, Inc. Brands (percentage of  
total sales):  
Lizsport®, Lizwear®, Liz&Co®, Liz Claiborne® – Women, 
Collection, Dana Buchman®, Villager®, Emma James®, 
Russ®, Crazy Horse®, First Issue®, Special Markets 
Corp®, Sigrid Olsen® [added this year], Liz Claiborne Men’s 
Sportswear®, Crazy Horse® – Men’s  
Total = 56% of total consolidated revenue  
Total applicable facilities worldwide during reporting 
period: 
338 facilities  
 
 
Liz Claiborne, Inc.’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of the Liz Claiborne, Inc. compliance 
program.  In addition to some basic facts about the structure of Liz Claiborne’s 
compliance program and its participation in the FLA, it provides readers with a general 
overview of the company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on 
noncompliance issues.  The activities described below took place during the Year One 
reporting period (August 1, 2001 through July 31, 2002).  The company has committed 
to implement its monitoring plan over the course of three years.   
 
The Compliance Program  
 
Liz Claiborne, Inc. (LCI) is a founding participating company in the Fair Labor 
Association, and its predecessor, the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). LCI adopted 
the standards created by the AIP in 1997, and still uses these today.  During the 
reporting period, LCI’s compliance program was headed by the Senior Vice 
President/General Counsel and the Vice President of Human Rights Compliance, who 
reported to LCI’s Chairman of the Board/CEO.  There were four full-time compliance 
staff members: one staff member based in the U.S. and the remainder in East Asia. LCI 
also cited country general managers, senior manufacturing and operations 
management, and other LCI associates as participants in LCI’s compliance program to 
varying degrees during this reporting period.  In addition, LCI relied on 11 part-time 
monitors (of which 4 are LCI staff and 7 are LCI agents’ staff) to carry out internal audits 
in the field, and contracted with Global Social Compliance (GSC) to monitor facilities in 
areas where LCI compliance staff were not located.  GSC performed fifteen of the 
ninety-six internal audits that LCI conducted during this period.   
 
LCI reported that its main focus during the reporting period was enhancing 
communications and training.  The company developed the compliance section of its 
contractor manual, and worked through local offices to reinforce management and 
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worker understanding of LCI Standards.  Meetings and trainings at various levels of the 
LCI supply chain -- from information meetings for workers in factories, to supplier 
trainings, to new guidebooks and consultations with monitors, to LCI staff advisory 
sessions focused on compliance and the FLA -- aimed to improve understanding and 
implementation of the company’s standards.  
 
Monitoring 
 
LCI conducted internal audits of 28% of its applicable facilities during this reporting 
period. All internal audits were scheduled and announced.  For LCI, internal monitoring 
visits entailed a review of factory records, worker and management interviews and a 
factory walk-through to evaluate health and safety issues and general working 
conditions. Internal monitoring targeted those facilities where LCI was producing the 
highest volumes per region, or new factories, since all new factories undergo internal 
audits before LCI places an order there. LCI also steered away from arranging audits in 
facilities that it considered lower risk because non-FLA monitoring (i.e., monitoring of the 
apparel lines it produces for Wal-Mart) had already been undertaken there.  It therefore 
did not conduct internal audits in 3 facilities where LCI’s “Russ” brand apparel was being 
produced for Wal-Mart, since Wal-Mart had already commissioned Global Social 
Compliance to monitor facilities where Russ was manufactured.  
 
During Year One, 18 applicable facilities of LCI were monitored by FLA-accredited 
independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations10.  In 
proposing facilities for independent external monitoring, LCI selected sites according to 
the risk factors listed in the FLA Charter – namely country, production and company risk.  
These visits targeted factories in Mexico and China, where LCI determined the risk of 
noncompliance seemed to be greatest.  Within these countries, factories were selected 
by the volume of production they were doing for LCI.  
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
Following the completion of an audit, LCI communicated with the factory management 
about the audit findings and corrective action plan within one week from the audit.  In 
general, the factory was responsible for correcting any noncompliance within 30 to 60 
days after the audit, depending on the corrective action required. LCI explained that if 
findings of noncompliance were not serious, and management expressed interest in 
correcting noncompliance, LCI rated the relationship with the factory as “conditional” 
until corrective actions were undertaken.  
 
It has been LCI policy that its sourcing department takes the completion of corrective 
actions into account when making sourcing decisions.  Therefore, in the event that a 
factory did not complete a corrective action plan in good faith, LCI “suspended” business 
with that facility.  If corrective actions were eventually undertaken, LCI would consider 
returning to the factory.  LCI reported that only in “extreme” circumstances will the 
company completely terminate a business relationship with a factory.  
 
                                                 
10
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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Liz Claiborne Inc.’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  Since these obligations 
represent minimum standards for participation in the FLA, the FLA encourages 
companies to surpass these standards, which they often do.  The information provided in 
this section is in no way an exhaustive recounting of all of LCI’s compliance activities 
during the reporting period.  Rather, this section includes information that LCI reported to 
the FLA to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its compliance program.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
 Liz Claiborne, Inc. established its first Code of Conduct (LCI Code) in 1994.   
 The LCI Code was distributed to all suppliers, along with a receipt form, which 
suppliers were required to return to LCI to confirm their agreement to abide by the 
Code and cooperate with LCI auditing procedures. LCI reported that the majority of 
contractors have returned these forms.  During the reporting period, LCI continued to 
follow-up on any outstanding acknowledgement letters.   
 LCI included a page on its contractor website, which specifies that satisfying LCI’s 
Code is a condition for doing business.    
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
 The LCI Code was posted in the languages of management and workers at all 
factories where LCI products were made.  It was translated into 14 languages.  
When LCI conducted business in countries where the local language was different 
from one of these 14 (e.g., Vietnamese), LCI posted the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct in the local language.   
 LCI supplemented code postings by sometimes communicating standards to workers 
orally, or through posted pictures or distributed comic books.  
 LCI held meetings with suppliers in Mexico, North China, Hong Kong/South China 
(2), Saipan and Guatemala, where LCI’s compliance staff addressed its monitoring 
program and FLA guidelines, clarified key workplace standards, and reviewed best 
practices.   At these meetings, some suppliers agreed to distribute LCI Standards to 
workers at the time of hiring, and to announce the Standards to all workers.   
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 In order to verify and quantify compliance with its standards, LCI monitors used the 
“Liz Claiborne, Inc., Global Human Rights Standards and Questionnaire for 
Contractors and Suppliers” in all new overseas factories, and a modified version of 
the FLA monitoring guidance document in existing factories.    
 LCI compliance staff sent a self-certification questionnaire to suppliers that were not 
internally audited during Year One.  LCI estimated that the large majority of suppliers 
have responded. The company used the questionnaire to ascertain their suppliers’ 
compliance policies and practices, and to assess factory risk levels. 
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 LCI maintained internal records in the form of hard copy files for all factory 
questionnaires, correspondence between headquarters and regional staff or factory 
management, in addition to audit reports and corrective action notes. During the 
reporting period, LCI developed a corrective action tracking sheet so that regional 
and headquarters staff could share files.  They also explored a shared follow-up 
reminder file for use in the following implementation year.  
 
 
D)  Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 LCI developed the Guidebook, which provides guidance on the practical meaning of 
LCI’s Global Human Rights Standards.  It was designed as a companion to the LCI 
Audit Document, and provides qualitative and quantitative measures of benchmarks, 
as well as questions and answers to give guidance for each standard.   
 LCI also required monitors to be familiar with local laws for the facilities they 
monitored. LCI accessed such information through the BSR website, and distributed 
it through General Managers in each region. In Asia, LCI confirmed internal monitors’ 
understanding of distributed material through phone or in-person meetings.  
 For new staff, LCI conducted monitor trainings in local offices and in factories in 
Northern China, Taiwan and Mexico. These trainings included tips for effective 
management interviews and payroll reviews.  
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
 During the reporting period, LCI revised the auditing guidance document to comply 
with FLA monitoring requirements.   
 LCI internally audited 96 out of its 338 applicable facilities (28%) during the first 
implementation year.  
LCI complemented full factory audits with factory “short forms” which were completed 
by compliance staff when visiting a factory.  The “short forms” addressed basic 
health and safety issues.  LCI reported that 45 additional factories were reported on 
in short forms during the first implementation year.   

 In consultation with the FLA, LCI commissioned eighteen FLA independent external 
monitoring visits in Mexico and China, as mentioned in the “Monitoring” section 
above.  These were conducted by Cotecna (7), COVERCO (1), Intertek Testing 
Services (7), Merchandise Testing Laboratories (2), and Verité (1). 
 
 
F) Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
 
 LCI encouraged suppliers to develop grievance systems in factories by which 
workers could confidentially communicate problems to factory management during 
the reporting period.   
 The LCI Code posters, which were posted in the local language in each factory, 
included LCI’s regional office number for workers to call with noncompliance issues. 
It is stated that their identity would be kept in confidence.   
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G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
  
 For the past four years, LCI has had a working relationship with COVERCO in 
Guatemala. This past year LCI cooperated with Mujeres de Solidaridad to provide 
doctor’s services and health seminars to workers in a Guatemalan factory.  
 In Shanghai, LCI coordinated a supplier conference with Shanghai Women’s 
Confederation, which was attended by a number of other local groups.   
 In Taiwan, LCI developed a relationship with the Chanunan Holy Family Catholic 
Church Handicapped and Migrant Workers Center after following up on a complaint 
issued by the organization last year.   
 LCI consulted with various groups around the world during the reporting period.  The 
company has requested the FLA not to make this information public for 
confidentiality reasons.  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
 
 LCI internal monitors reviewed audit findings and corrective action plans with 
management within one week of an audit.  In the case of new factories, these 
findings were used to determine whether LCI would engage in a business 
relationship with a given facility. LCI generally required that corrective actions be 
completed within thirty to sixty days after the audit, depending on the nature of the 
corrective action. 
 Regional LCI staff was responsible for follow-up.  For auditing visits undertaken by 
third-party monitors, a relevant LCI merchandising staff member was responsible.  
These corrective actions were in turn reviewed by the relevant LCI Regional 
Manager in Asia or the Vice President of Human Rights at headquarters, depending 
on where the facility was located. 
 To verify completion of corrective action plans, LCI staff returned to the factory, or 
relied on photographs in cases of noncompliance that LCI staff deemed as less 
serious.  In instances when corrective action plans were not fulfilled, LCI compliance 
staff relied on support from LCI divisional manufacturing staff or local merchandisers 
involved to push for compliance.  In cases when this pressure did not work, orders 
were moved to other factories.   
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Liz Claiborne: Freedom of Association and Other Compliance Issues in Guatemala 
 
In many countries where domestic governments do not enforce the right to freedom of 
association, the possibility of unionization is often associated with job losses or 
decreased orders from buyers.  It can also result in severe divisions in the workplace.  
Some workers fear they will lose their jobs if their workplace is unionized; others insist 
on exercising their freedom of association.  The FLA requires participating companies to 
inform workers of this right, and to assure workers that they will not relocate if a union is 
formed in a factory where they are producing. In the case below, Liz Claiborne, Inc (LCI) 
pursued such steps to address a heated Guatemalan freedom of association case.  
      
Since 1999, LCI has conducted an intensive independent monitoring pilot project in 
Guatemala in cooperation with a foreign-owned factory and the independent monitoring 
group, COVERCO (FLA-accredited in 2000). During that time, LCI reported seeing 
considerable improvements in factory conditions, as all involved actors gained 
experience in monitoring and remediation.   
 
In July 2001, a group of workers registered to form a union in that factory.  The factory 
management discouraged the formation of unions, and suggested that the factory could 
close down if the union was instated. According to various reports, in following days, 
suspected union organizers were forced to resign, while remaining organizers were 
harassed by other workers.  The factory management barred COVERCO from 
inspecting the factory, based on their suspicions that the monitors were responsible for 
organizing the union.   
 
Tensions in the workplace heightened, and clashes between union and non-union 
workers took place on the factory grounds. In order to assess the situation, LCI 
considered it necessary to have COVERCO enter the factory and report on its findings.  
After LCI contacted factory management, COVERCO was again granted access to the 
factory and immediately began an investigation.   
 
COVERCO’s report confirmed the need for the factory management to protect the union 
workers.  As a result of ongoing communication with LCI and executives at the factory’s 
parent company, the local management confirmed the workers’ right to free association 
through posted signs and verbal announcements.   Seven union workers were reinstated 
with pay, and LCI sent an open letter to the workers informing them that a business 
relationship with the factory would be maintained, provided that workers respected each 
other’s right to opt in or out of union membership. In addition, LCI held a training session 
on the LCI Code for management and supervisors.  They discussed the frequency of 
LCI’s and COVERCO’s return visits and the proper procedures for workers to 
communicate grievances.  The Guatemalan Ministry of Labor also started an 
investigation of noncompliance with Guatemalan labor law that may have taken place 
during the incident. 
 
In following months, with the help of COVERCO and LCI’s local agent, who regularly 
visited the factory, LCI worked with factory management to begin to address divisions in 
the workplace. While the government has not offered findings from its investigation, and 
the union has very limited participation among the 1,200 workers at the factory, LCI 
reports that there are signs of continued improvement in the factory.  The management 
hired a new human resources officer, and a labor lawyer to develop and implement new 
factory compliance policies.   
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 When reporting on this situation, LCI highlighted the important role played by the 
factory’s parent company in opening this factory to one of the first independent 
monitoring projects of its kind, and maintaining open lines of communication following 
this heated situation. LCI considers that without their cooperation, this situation would 
likely have a very different outcome.  Although LCI reported this as an example of 
positive outcomes, the company continues to engage in ongoing remediation and 
maintains the call for freedom of association at this Guatemalan factory.   
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Liz Claiborne, Inc. Factory/Audit Profile 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where LCI’s 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
Liz Claiborne Inc. Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
 
 
China (97), India (43), Hong Kong (39), South Korea (17), Sri Lanka 
(17), Mexico (16), Taiwan (12), Turkey (12), Indonesia (9), Philippines 
(9), Dominican Republic (8), Saipan (7), Thailand (6), Macau (5), 
Guatemala (4), Macedonia (4), Mauritius (4), Peru (4), United States 
(4), El Salvador (3), Bangladesh (2), Colombia (2), Honduras (2), 
Jordan (2), Mongolia (2), Italy (1), Japan (1), Madagascar (1), Malaysia 
(1), South Africa (1), Swaziland (1), Turkmenistan (1), United Kingdom 
(1) 
 
338 
Facilities Where 
Internal 
Monitoring Visits 
Were Conducted 
(8/01-7/02)* 
 
China (24), India (22), Hong Kong (7), South Korea (7), Sri Lanka (3), 
Taiwan (3), Mexico (0), Taiwan (0), Turkey (9), Indonesia (3), 
Philippines (1), Dominican Republic (0), Saipan (3), Thailand (0), 
Macau (1), Guatemala (1), Macedonia (0), Mauritius (4), Peru (0), 
United States (0), El Salvador (0), Bangladesh (1), Colombia (2), 
Honduras (0), Jordan (1), Mongolia (0), Italy (0), Japan (1), 
Madagascar (0), Malaysia (1), South Africa (0), Swaziland (1), 
Turkmenistan (1), United Kingdom (0) 
96 
FLA Independent 
External 
Monitoring Visits 
Counted for Year 
One  
 
 
China (5), Mexico (9), Dominican Republic (1), Thailand (2), 
Guatemala (1) 
18 
 
 
* These figures represent the number of facilities where full internal inspections (including document reviews, factory walk-
through, and management and worker interviews) were conducted, as reported by LCI in accordance with the FLA 
Charter.  In many cases, third party monitors and LCI staff conducted follow-up or other kinds of visits to each of these 
facilities, but these visits are not reflected above. 
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NIKE, Inc. 
 
 
Basic Facts about Nike: 
 
Consolidated revenue in FY2002:   
US$ 9.89 billion 
Applicable Nike Brands (percentage of  total sales):  
Nike (95%) 
Cole Haan and Bauer (5%) 
 
Total applicable facilities worldwide: 
758 facilities 
 
 
Nike’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of Nike’s compliance program.  In addition 
to some basic facts about Nike’s participation in the FLA and the structure of its 
compliance program, this section provides readers with a general overview of the 
company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on noncompliance issues 
during the reporting period.  The activities described below took place during the Year 
One reporting period (August 1, 2001 through July 31, 2002).  
 
The Compliance Program  
 
Nike is a founding participant in the Fair Labor Association, and its predecessor, the 
Apparel Industry Partnership.  In 2001, Nike committed to implement its FLA obligations 
over the course of three years, in accordance with the FLA Charter.  Nike’s compliance 
program centers on its Code of Conduct, which corresponds with the FLA Workplace 
Code of Conduct.   
 
Over the course of the reporting period, Nike’s compliance staff almost doubled in size.  
By the end of the reporting period, it consisted of approximately 64 staff members.  The 
compliance program was headed by the Vice President of Compliance, who reported to 
the Vice President of Apparel Sourcing.  The VP of Compliance was supported at Nike 
headquarters by a staff of approximately 10, with the remainder of the compliance team 
working from regional offices in Asia, Europe and the Americas. Four regional leaders 
head regional teams, which deal with footwear, apparel and equipment factories. The 
work of Nike’s internal compliance staff was supplemented by Global Social Compliance 
(GSC), Cal Safety (CSCC), IA Capital, and Price Waterhouse Coopers, who collectively 
performed 426 “Management Audits” (described below) for Nike.  
In order to link compliance with production, Nike required that all production staff focus 
on compliance for as much as 15% of its time, and included criteria in staff performance 
reviews.  As a result of this effort to integrate these departments, Nike reported that a 
portion of its compliance activities were carried out by Nike staff who were not based in 
the compliance department.   
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During the reporting period, Nike’s compliance efforts focused on sustainable solutions 
to noncompliance issues, as well as increased transparency of its supply chains.  By 
increasing its staff size, Nike established a compliance team that would be able to work 
more closely with factory management with a view towards addressing noncompliance 
issues at their root.  While the company reported that this approach was far more time 
and resource intensive than an approach which focused on “quick fixes”, Nike 
considered such close mentoring to be beneficial in the long-term.   With regard to 
transparency, Nike endeavored to issue public reports on its supply chain in a 
systematic manner.  The company published its collegiate producing facilities, and also 
started to publish the findings of its internal monitoring visits.  While this program stalled 
due to legal complications, Nike reported its continued dedication to transparency in 
order to foster a balanced understanding of realities on the factory floor.  
Monitoring  
 
During the reporting period, Nike conducted two forms of monitoring, SHAPE (safety, 
health, attitudes, people and environment) Audits and Management Audits.  SHAPE 
Audits are conducted periodically in all Nike facilities on an announced and 
unannounced basis. Management Audits are targeted at facilities where Nike has 
developed strategic partnerships and at higher risk facilities.     
 
During SHAPE Audits, Nike compliance and sourcing staff conducted factory 
walkthroughs to evaluate basic health and safety, as well as environmental compliance, 
and some management practices, such as reviewing time cards and management and 
worker training records.  Management Audits were performed by third-party monitoring 
groups, and included intensive audits of payroll and time card records, working hours, 
management and worker interviews, and a factory walkthrough to evaluate working 
conditions benchmarked against Nike’s Code of Conduct.  Overall, 1,056 SHAPE Audits 
were conducted during the reporting period.  Of the 426 Management Audits that were 
conducted during this period, 262 targeted existing facilities based on a predetermined 
audit schedule, while 164 were “pre-sourcing audits” (see explanation below).  
 
Before sourcing from a new facility, Nike first assessed the country in which the facility 
was located.  The compliance department would evaluate the country’s political, social, 
legal and business characteristics to determine the application of the rule of law in that 
country and its factories. Through this “New Country Approval Process” senior 
compliance staff met with key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to 
assess the degree to which the rule of law was upheld there.  If Nike’s criteria for a 
production country were met, facilities located in that country were eligible for 
consideration for sourcing.   
 
In order to start sourcing from a new facility, Nike sourcing executives would initiate the 
“New Source Approval Process” (NSAP) by submitting a NSAP form to Nike’s 
compliance staff.  The compliance team would then carry out a Management Audit, 
which was usually conducted by a third-party monitor during the first implementation 
year, as well as a SHAPE Audit to determine the facility’s current compliance 
performance.  If each of these scores were high enough (taking local standards into 
consideration), the VP of Compliance would approve the factory for sourcing.  Such 
approval was contingent on the factory’s agreement to strive towards meeting Nike’s 
compliance standards, which often included undertaking several corrective actions to 
come into compliance with Nike’s Code.  
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 During Year One, 63 applicable facilities of Nike were monitored by FLA-accredited 
independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations11.  Thirty 
percent of these were conducted in footwear factories, and seventy percent of these in 
apparel and equipment factories. In consultation with the FLA, Nike chose to 
commission independent external monitoring visits in a sampling of facilities and 
countries.  In order to diversify this first experience with FLA independent external 
monitoring, Nike contracted with both global and local monitoring groups accredited by 
the FLA.  
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
When noncompliance issues were identified during SHAPE, Management Audits, and 
FLA independent external monitoring visits, Nike compliance staff worked with factory 
management to develop a “Master Action Plan” that addressed the findings of past 
audits and periodic compliance visits.    These corrective action plans designated 
specific individuals within the factory responsible for addressing each identified issue, 
along with timeframes for completion.  Often, remediation involved incremental 
improvements, since Nike reported that it generally was not possible to remediate every 
problem in a factory simultaneously.  Through management and worker training, as well 
as other corrective actions, Nike maintained a general policy of committing the 
necessary time to bringing cooperative factories into compliance.  
 
Corrective action plans were communicated to sourcing and quality control departments 
so that they could use their leverage with the factory to bring about effective and rapid 
remediation.  These business units also followed up with factories with regard to 
remediation.  In most instances, either compliance staff or sourcing or production staff 
followed up on remediation through return visits to factories.  The compliance 
department also relied on information provided by management that proved corrective 
action had been taken, such as photographs, copies of newly mandated policies, revised 
employee handbooks, and training attendance sheets.  
 
Despite Nike’s focus on close cooperation with management to address workplace 
issues during the reporting period, Nike maintained a policy to terminate relationships 
with factories that refused to undertake corrective action plans in earnest.  
 
 
Nike’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  Since these obligations 
represent minimum standards for participation in the FLA, the FLA encourages 
companies to surpass these standards, which they often do.  The information provided in 
this section is in no way an exhaustive recounting of all Nike’s compliance activities 
during the reporting period.  Rather, this section includes information that Nike reported 
to the FLA in order to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its human rights 
program.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
Nike revised its Code of Conduct during the reporting period.  While the Nike Code 
standards remain the same, changes were made in the way they were presented for 
increased clarity of the standards.  The Nike Code has been translated into 20 
languages.  










Also during this reporting period, Nike finalized its Code Leadership Standards (CLS) 
which clarify each standard and provide guidance to management and Nike staff with 
regard to ways to implement the Nike Code most effectively.   
Upon contracting with suppliers, Nike provided them with Contractor Compliance 
Manuals, which included the Nike Code, guidelines for Nike Code implementation 
and SHAPE Audits, explanations of the monitoring process, etc.  
Suppliers were required to submit NIKE Contractors Compliance Profiles which 
included their commitment to abide by the Nike Code, and to inform workers of the 
Code.  When they signed Nike Supplier Agreements they also committed to 
implement the Nike Code and to submit to periodic announced and unannounced 
inspections.  
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
Nike required all factories producing Nike goods to post the company’s Code in the 
workplace languages and English.  Moreover, Nike mandated that local labor law 
was posted in factories wherever required by law.  
Nike provided to the majority of its factories laminated Code summary cards for 
distribution to workers.  
Nike engaged suppliers in trainings about the Code of Conduct.  Trainings used 
Nike’s Code Leadership Standards and Contractor Compliance Manuals to improve 
suppliers’ understanding of Nike standards.  
Nike undertook several worker training initiatives during the reporting period.  In 
Vietnam, the company arranged that more than 31,000 workers received training on 
sexual harassment in the workplace. In factories in the Americas where management 
and workers came from different cultures, Nike arranged cross-culture training 
programs for management and workers. In Vietnam, machine safety trainings took 
place in 6 factories, involving more than 19,200 workers and supervisors.   
Nike compliance staff periodically conducted trainings for Nike production managers 
to equip them to conduct SHAPE inspections when visiting factories.  All new 
compliance department hires, and a range of existing and new Nike employees from 
other departments, received compliance training in different venues – from formal 
training sessions to brown bag discussions on particular compliance topics.  
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
During the reporting period, Nike compliance staff undertook a review of its 
compliance database to ensure that it was up-to-date and included all of the facilities 
where Nike produced.  This database was designed to run in conjunction with the 
Nike sourcing database to ensure that all factories producing for Nike were being 
monitored.  The database also recorded each factory’s remediation efforts in order to 
track the progress of “continuous improvement” in each workplace.  
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This database was available to all compliance staff.  Information generated from the 
database was shared on a routine basis with the Nike production and sourcing 
groups to ensure their participation in efforts to improve particular factory conditions. 









Contractor Compliance Profiles (described in Section A above) were used to collect 
basic data about suppliers, which were in turn input into the database.  These are 
collected from suppliers annually.  
 
 
D) Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
New monitors received training in SHAPE auditing through on-site visits with 
experienced staff.  
With the introduction of Nike’s Code Leadership Standards (CLS), the compliance 
staff participated in trainings that focused on different modules of the CLS.  Trainings 
took place over the course of several weeks for each regional team, and provided 
participants with hands-on material that covered domestic labor law, key international 
labor standards, management systems, and health, safety and environmental 
practices.  
The Nike compliance department also developed a CD-Rom called “Pre-Game” to 
train all internal compliance staff and other Nike employees about Nike’s compliance 
standards and processes. The CD-Rom was also designed as a training tool for new 
employees coming into the compliance program, who go through the Pre-Game 
process.  
Nike’s staff included experts who benchmarked international practices and norms 
and contributed to staff trainings.  Their expertise covered international labor 
standards, environmental practices, health and safety and training. In addition, 
trainings during this reporting period were offered to staff and suppliers in 
cooperation with a range of groups, including the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), International Standards for Occupational Safety, Global Alliance, World Vision, 
and Environmental Resource Management-Certification and Verification Services 
(ERM-CVS).  
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
Nike performed 1,056 SHAPE inspections globally during the reporting period. As 
described above, these inspections focused on basic health and safety, and 
environmental compliance issues.   These were carried out every six months in the 
majority of the facilities where Nike produced during the first implementation year.   
Nike contracted with third-party monitoring groups to conduct 426 Management and 
Pre-sourcing audits, which included a more in-depth factory visit, and records-
reviews, worker and management interviews, and factory walkthroughs.   
In consultation with the FLA, Nike arranged for FLA independent external monitoring 
visits in 63 of its applicable facilities, as mentioned in the “Monitoring” section above.  
This amounted to eight percent (8%) of Nike’s applicable facilities.  These 
independent external monitoring visits were conducted by the following FLA-
accredited monitors: Cal Safety (7), Cotecna (4), Global Standards (3), Intertek 
Testing Services (35), Kenan Institute Asia -Thailand (1), Merchandise Testing 
Laboratory (9), Phulki (2), and Verité (2).   
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Nike upgraded the audit tool used by compliance staff for Management Audits for 
use in Year Two.  The tool incorporated monitoring approaches suggested by 
various stakeholders.  










 
 
F) Provide Employees with the Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
 
Nike’s standards required suppliers to provide workers with confidential and effective 
grievance mechanisms.   
Nike reported that its compliance staff in Asia developed a relationship with workers, 
who periodically report noncompliance issues or other grievances to them.   
During the reporting period, Nike made improvements to its internal Management 
Audit program, designed to provide workers the means to contact local compliance 
staff following an audit in order to report noncompliance or other concerns.  
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
 
Nike’s primary NGO partner during the reporting period was Global Alliance.  Nike 
worked with Global Alliance in six factories in Thailand to offer training in legal and 
civic education, and health to a total of 16,800 workers. They also conducted three-
day intensive trainings for supervisors on communication, team building and 
supervisory skills. In Vietnam, they conducted a health training program for 
approximately 4,500 workers. In Indonesia the partnership conducted worker 
interviews with 2,275 workers to re-assess their needs, while close to 40,000 
workers participated in health awareness seminars.  Management also participated 
in management/communication seminars.  Smaller-scale programs were also 
conducted in China and India.   
In Indonesia, Nike partnered with International Standards for Occupational Safety 
(ISOS) to evaluate and upgrade occupational health program practices in 10 Nike 
contractor footwear factories. 
Nike engaged with the Mexican NGO, Espiral, which did a pilot study through worker 
interviews and group discussions.  The group’s report, entitled “Voices of the 
Workers”, recommended approaches to worker interviews, which were incorporated 
in Nike’s new Management Audit tool.   
Nike partnered with the Ministries of Education and local footwear suppliers in 
Vietnam and Indonesia, and World Vision in China, to provide after-work educational 
and vocational training to factory workers.   
Nike is a signatory to the Global Compact and is actively engaged in ongoing forums 
facilitated by the Compact.   
Nike compliance field teams consulted with various local ILO offices and local and 
national unions during the reporting period. For example, Nike communicated with 
the AFL-CIO in Mexico to remediate noncompliance in two facilities in Latin America, 
and worked with local union leaders in Vietnam to benchmark local factories against 
Nike-contracted facilities.  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
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All monitoring reports were submitted to Nike compliance staff, who created Master 
Action Plans (MAPs) for factories in order to address particular noncompliance 
issues within specified timeframes.  




MAPs, or corrective action plans, were provided to Nike sourcing and production 
staff.  Nike compliance staff and these departments regularly monitored factory 
progress on the implementation of corrective action plans.  
During the reporting period, compliance regional leaders communicated regularly 
about MAPs so as to develop common approaches to remediation.  
While Nike reported that it aimed to cooperate with factory management towards 
continuous improvements, it maintained a policy to terminate relationships with 
factories if they did not undertake corrective action in good faith.   
 53 
Nike: “Remediate. Don’t Terminate” 
 
In today’s global marketplace where companies can choose to produce in thousands of 
factories worldwide, it is not difficult for companies to flee from production sites where 
serious noncompliance issues arise.  Often companies opt to avoid the challenges and 
complexities involved in remediating problems in the workplace in consultation with 
factory management.  Although this is a tall order at times, FLA participating companies 
commit to a policy of “remediate, don’t terminate” in factories where management is 
willing to cooperate in corrective action.  The example below exemplifies Nike’s 
commitment to its FLA obligation.   (Reebok, another buyer of the factory’s products, 
was also intensively involved in forming a resolution to the conflict, but is not detailed in 
this section). 
 
In the first week of January 2001, workers at Kukdong International Mexico, an apparel 
contractor for Nike in the state of Puebla, staged a work stoppage.  The stoppage was in 
response to the illegal firing of 5 workers and the forced resignation of 20 other workers 
who had reportedly complained of low wages and rotten food served in the factory 
cafeteria.  In the ensuing days there was a tense stand-off, which was followed by 
violence and continued tension between management and many workers.  
 
Nike compliance staff went to the factory to address the situation in the days following 
the factory stand-off.  Workers were eager to establish an independent union in the 
factory, citing that the current union was corrupt and did not represent their interests.  
Continued targeting of pro-independent-union workers, and other ongoing 
noncompliance issues in the workplace indicated serious problems in the factory.  
Therefore, Nike commissioned Verité to conduct an independent external monitoring 
visit to the factory under the auspices of the FLA.      
 
Among other findings, the independent monitor reported that factory workers were not 
permitted to form and join unions of their choice. Continued reports of harassment and 
discrimination against pro-independent-union workers implied that the workers’ rights to 
freely associate were being violated.  
 
Following the monitoring visit, Nike worked out a remediation plan with management.  
With regard to freedom of association, first steps included reinstatement of workers and 
an end to harassment and discrimination against those workers who were trying to 
organize.  Nike also worked with the Ministry of Labor and other local authorities to 
ensure that the labor law was enforced fairly in the factory.   
 
After nine months of discussions, internal and independent external monitoring, 
observations by independent groups such as the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), and 
remediation, the workers at Mex-Mode (the new name for Kukdong) achieved a 
precedent-setting victory as the only independent union with a signed collective 
agreement in Mexico’s maquila sector.  By April 2002, the new union, SITEMEX, 
reached a settlement with Mex-Mode that increased workers’ wages and benefits at the 
factory.  At that point, Nike stood by its commitment to reward factories that make 
improvements in accordance with its Code by placing an order at the factory for 75,000 
fleece sweatshirts.   
 
Nike reports that it considers the Kukdong/Mex-Mode situation to have been a valuable 
learning experience.  It taught Nike about where it could improve its internal monitoring 
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program, as well as the value of cooperation with other brands and the FLA in 
remediating serious noncompliance issues.  
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Nike Factory/Audit Profile 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where Nike’s 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
Nike Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable Facilities * 
 
United States (155), China (138), Thailand (92), South Korea (80), 
Mexico (72), Malaysia (54), Taiwan (54), Indonesia (53), India (42), 
Italy (39), Sri Lanka (39), Portugal (33), Turkey (32), Canada (26), 
Vietnam (23), Philippines (22), Brazil (21), Japan (18), Pakistan 
(17), El Salvador (15), Greece (15), Australia (14), Hong Kong (13), 
South Africa (11), Bangladesh (8), Bulgaria (8), Tunisia (8), United 
Kingdom (8), Dominican Republic (7), Morocco (6), Guatemala (5), 
Spain (5), Argentina (4), Germany (4), Honduras (4), Macau (4), 
Holland (3), Israel (3), Peru (3), Romania (3), Belarus (2), Chile (2), 
Egypt (2), Fiji (2), Micronesia (2), Singapore (2), Albania (1), 
Colombia (1), Ecuador (1), Hungary (1), Lithuania (1), Macedonia 
(1), New Zealand (1), Russia (1) 
 
1181 
Internal 
Monitoring 
Visits (8/01-
7/02)** 
SHAPE Audits 
 
United States (66), China (242), Thailand (144), South Korea (96), 
Mexico (44), Malaysia (8), Taiwan (56), Indonesia (56), India (26), 
Italy (11), Sri Lanka (14), Portugal (42), Turkey (34), Canada (23), 
Vietnam (48), Philippines (19), Brazil (19), Japan (9), Pakistan (4), 
El Salvador (21), Greece (1), Australia (0), Hong Kong (11), South 
Africa (0), Bangladesh (9), Bulgaria (3), Tunisia (5), United 
Kingdom (0), Dominican Republic (5), Morocco (7), Guatemala (1), 
Spain (2), Argentina (9), Germany (0), Honduras (4), Macau (5), 
Holland (0), Israel (1), Peru (0), Romania (3), Belarus (2), Chile (1), 
Egypt (2), Fiji (1), Micronesia (0), Singapore (0), Albania (0), 
Colombia (0), Ecuador (1), Hungary (1), Lithuania (0), Macedonia 
(0), New Zealand (0), Russia (0) 
 
1056 
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 Management 
Audits 
 
United States (45), China (84), Thailand (43), South Korea (30), 
Mexico (32), Malaysia (4), Taiwan (17), Indonesia (21), India (17), 
Italy (0), Sri Lanka (11), Portugal (9), Turkey (17), Canada (3), 
Vietnam (7), Philippines (4), Brazil (11), Japan (12), Pakistan (0), El 
Salvador (3), Greece (0), Australia (6), Hong Kong (11), South 
Africa (5), Bangladesh (2), Bulgaria (2), Tunisia (4), United 
Kingdom (0), Dominican Republic (0), Morocco (3), Guatemala (4), 
Spain (0), Argentina (3), Germany (0), Honduras (4), Macau (3), 
Holland (0), Israel (0), Peru (0), Romania (1), Belarus (2), Chile (1), 
Egypt (1), Fiji (1), Micronesia (2), Singapore (0), Albania (0), 
Colombia (0), Ecuador (0), Hungary (0), Lithuania (0), Macedonia 
(0), New Zealand (1), Russia (0) 
 
426 
FLA Independent External 
Monitoring Visits Counted for 
Year One  
 
United States (10), China (14), Thailand (4), South Korea (4), 
Mexico (3), Taiwan (2), Indonesia (8), Portugal (4), Turkey (2), 
Vietnam (3), Philippines (3), Bangladesh (2), El Salvador (4) 63 
 
 
* Represents the number of facilities that produced Nike, Cole Haan and Bauer products during the reporting period.  
These numbers include facilities that were dropped from the sourcing base during the same period as well as facilities that 
newly began producing during the same period.  Therefore, collectively, these facility counts are larger than the actual 
number of facilities producing Nike-related products at the beginning or ending of the reporting period. 
 
** Nike’s compliance department distinguished between SHAPE Audits and Management Audits during the reporting 
period.  SHAPE Audits were undertaken by Nike staff and involved factory walkthroughs to evaluate basic health and 
safety, as well as reviews for environmental compliance and some management practices, such as reviewing time cards 
and management and worker training records.  Management Audits were conducted by third-party monitoring groups 
during the reporting period and included full examination of payroll and time records, worker and management interviews, 
as well as factory inspection for health and safety and working conditions.  As is evident in some of the country numbers, 
many factories were SHAPE audited several times during the year; others were not visited at all.  
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Phillips-Van Heusen 
 
 
 
Basic Facts about Phillips-Van Heusen: 
 Phillips-Van Heusen consolidated revenue in FY2001:   
US$1.43 billion  
Applicable Phillips-Van Heusen Brands (percentage of  
total sales):  
Van Heusen apparel (30%)* 
Total applicable facilities worldwide: 
73 facilities   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Note: PVH points out that although only the Phillips-Van Heusen label is officially listed as applicable under 
the FLA system, the PVH monitoring program has had spillover effects for other PVH brands, such as Izod 
and Geoffrey Bean, which are often produced in FLA applicable facilities.  
 
 
Phillips-Van Heusen’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of the Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) 
compliance program.  In addition to some basic facts about the structure of PVH’s 
compliance program and its participation in the FLA, it provides readers with a general 
overview of the company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on 
noncompliance issues during the reporting period.   The activities described below took 
place during the Year One reporting period (August 1, 2001 through July 31, 2002). 
 
The Compliance Program  
 
Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation was a founding member of the Apparel Industry 
Partnership, the FLA’s predecessor.  PVH’s standards are enumerated in “A Shared 
Commitment,” which was formulated in 1991, and later revised to correspond with FLA 
standards.  During the reporting period, PVH’s compliance program focused to a large 
degree on critical engagement with factory suppliers and other stakeholders in order to 
have a greater impact on working conditions.  Through new programs, such as the 
Critical Engagement and Impact Program (described below), and staff trainings focused 
on new approaches for coaching and educating management, PVH aimed to address 
some of the more serious and prevalent noncompliance issues in East Asia (i.e., hours 
of work, freedom of association, forced overtime).  Engagement in various regions of the 
world also aimed at establishing systems in factories for self-monitoring.  
 
In 2001 PVH committed to implementing its Company Obligations in accordance with the 
FLA Charter over the course of three years. During this reporting period, the first of 
those three years, the PVH Human Rights Programs Department was overseen by the 
Vice President of Human Rights Programs, who reported to the Executive Vice 
President of Foreign Offices and the Chairman/President of the PVH Board.  Eight part-
time Human Rights Regional Leaders (split between footwear and apparel) functioned 
as managers in four geographic regions.  They directed the field efforts of 8 full-time 
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Human Rights Officers and 31 part-time human rights trained monitors. The Human 
Rights Regional Leaders reported directly to the VP of Human Rights Programs. Internal 
monitoring undertaken by PVH human rights associates was supplemented by Verité, 
Intertek Testing Services, Global Social Compliance, LIFT Standards, and Merchandise 
Testing Laboratories on 17 occasions during the reporting period. PVH relied on these 
third-party monitors to do internal audits in countries where PVH staff was not located or 
did not have language capacity; when PVH Human Rights staff had too large a 
workload; or, to obtain an independent opinion when controversial issues arose. 
 
In addition to the Human Rights Program staff, PVH has established several committees 
which involved executives and staff whose official responsibilities did not fall under 
Human Rights Programs, but who contributed to the integration of “A Shared 
Commitment” into the business during the reporting period. The Human Rights Approval 
Committee, which oversaw factory compliance ratings (see description below), as well 
as the Human Rights Executive Committee, which influenced the direction of the 
Program, are two cases in point.  Similarly, three Human Rights subcommittees (for 
training, database and engagement) brought compliance staff from different regions 
together to address key compliance issues. 
 
Monitoring  
 
PVH conducted 143 monitoring visits of 73 factories during the reporting period.  One 
hundred percent of PVH’s applicable facilities were internally monitored at least once 
during Year One. The company’s internal monitoring process started with the pre-
approval of factories.  This means that new factories were evaluated and approved by 
the PVH Human Rights associates before purchase orders were issued to suppliers.  In 
addition to pre-approval audits, internal monitoring visits focused on re-evaluation of 
factories that were in the process of remediation, as well as periodic audits of active 
facilities to ensure on-going compliance.  Moreover, the Human Rights staff used 
focused audits (i.e., visits that monitor compliance with a particular Code element in a 
given country or region where local practice may not uphold it) and surveillance audits 
(i.e., surprise visits to facilities where PVH Human Rights staff suspect noncompliance) 
to address various noncompliance patterns more effectively.  
 
PVH reported that its approach to monitoring was generally risk-based during the 
reporting period.  Factories that were “approved”, or assessed to be in compliance 
following pre-approval or follow-up evaluations, fell into a “lower risk” category.  
Factories that were located in higher risk regions or countries were considered to be 
higher risk facilities, and were often targeted for PVH audits.  Nonetheless, all applicable 
factories, including “lower risk” facilities, could be subjected to on-going monitoring.   In 
some cases, surprise follow-up monitoring was employed to confirm the factory’s 
continued compliance.  
 
During the reporting period, PVH monitors utilized the PVH audit instrument to conduct 
audits, which incorporated FLA monitoring protocols and included an evaluation of 
working conditions, a review of factory records, and confidential interviews with workers 
and management.  PVH also consulted with local NGOs to supplement information 
gained during monitoring visits.  Generally, pre-approval audits were scheduled in 
advance, while periodic, surveillance, focused and re-evaluation audits were 
unannounced.    
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During Year One, 5 applicable facilities of PVH were monitored by FLA-accredited 
independent external monitors, in accordance with its Charter obligations12.  At the start 
of Year One, PVH and the FLA had agreed upon a list of 8 facilities for independent 
external monitoring, which represented 10% of PVH’s applicable facilities. These 
facilities were selected on the basis of a risk assessment of country risk and other 
factors. However, three of the selected facilities were located in countries where the FLA 
expected to have monitors accredited during the course of Year One, but by the end of 
the reporting period, there were still no accredited monitors available for these countries.  
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
PVH established the Human Rights Approval Committee to improve the consistency and 
neutrality of the company’s factory assessments and sourcing decisions.  Committee 
members received comprehensive audit reports and recommendations from a Human 
Rights Regional Leader in a region that was different from the one for which they were 
responsible. After reviewing these assessments, the committee members evaluated the 
compliance of the factories under review based on specific rating guidelines established 
by PVH. They assigned the factory status (i.e., “Approved,” “Requires Follow-up Visit,” or 
“Not Approved”), which then determined PVH sourcing from that factory.  By 
empowering an executive from another region to assign these ratings, PVH endeavored 
to ensure that sourcing pressures would not influence the status assigned to factories. 
This status was then entered into the PVH Human Rights database on a weekly basis.  
This information was used by PVH Sourcing and Merchandising staff to make sourcing 
decisions.  
 
In those cases where remediation and follow-up were necessary, the Human Rights 
associate who undertook the audit was responsible for engaging the factory in a 
remediation process to bring the factory into compliance. PVH reported that it worked to 
center its remediation program on the engagement and education of suppliers.  The aim 
was to achieve full disclosure on the part of the supplier, and sustainable remediation of 
noncompliance issues for all stakeholders.   
 
PVH reported that Human Rights associates conducted one or more follow-up audits of 
such factories during Year One, on a mostly unannounced basis, to establish whether 
the factory had made progress and had fully implemented the corrective action plan. If 
corrective action plans were fully implemented, factories were “approved” with an 
expiration date. The length of time between the visit and the expiration date depended 
on the assessed risk of the facility. Two months prior to the expiration date, the process 
of re-evaluation would begin again.  The status of “approved” or “unapproved” was not 
permanent, and served as a basic indicator for sourcing decisions.  
 
 
Phillips-Van Heusen’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  These obligations represent 
minimum standards for participation in the FLA, and many participating companies 
surpass these standards.  The information provided in this section is in no way an 
                                                 
12
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.   
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exhaustive recounting of all PVH compliance activities during the reporting period.  
Rather, this section includes information that PVH reported to the FLA in order to 
demonstrate progress in the implementation of its Human Rights Program.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
 PVH revised its “A Shared Commitment” (created in 1991) code of conduct to 
incorporate FLA standards.  These standards have been enumerated on a poster 
designed by PVH and translated into 9 languages for distribution to factories.  
 Before engaging in business relationships, PVH associates met with suppliers to 
review PVH’s Human Rights Program. Documents used to outline the application of 
the PVH Human Rights Program included: “A Shared Commitment” (code of 
conduct); the Human Rights Evaluation Form; “Most Commonly Asked Questions”; 
an initial letter highlighting PVH requirements with regard to pre-approval, 
confidential worker interviews, and access to all areas of the factory and dormitories, 
and documentation; and, the Human Rights Evaluation Request Form outlining the 
information required for submission. Suppliers were in turn required to read and sign 
PVH’s letter of agreement committing to comply with PVH standards.  
 PVH has included a human rights clause in all purchase orders and key business 
agreements relating to sourcing. The clause specifies that all products must be 
manufactured in accordance with PVH human rights standards, and that PVH 
reserves the right not to accept merchandise made in conditions where these 
standards have not been upheld.  
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
 PVH conducted “Awareness Sessions” for PVH vendors and PVH staff around the 
world.   These sessions addressed PVH standards and requirements with regard to 
compliance. PVH also requested that suppliers participate in regional conferences, 
conducted by organizations like Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), Verite and 
Intertek Testing Services (ITS).  During the reporting period, suppliers attended 
conferences in Mexico, Brazil, India, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Thailand, Honduras, 
and the Dominican Republic.  
 PVH published a Human Rights Newsletter every two months, which was distributed 
internally to PVH associates, and externally to agents, key suppliers, and other 
business associates.  The newsletter included articles that highlighted innovative 
approaches to compliance and other monitoring training tools. 
 PVH Human Rights associates conducted periodic individual meetings with 
suppliers, agents, and licensees to address the code of conduct and corrective 
actions in particular factories. 
 PVH’s Human Rights Program held periodic meetings with Sourcing Divisions, which 
focused on the integration of human rights into all company activities.  
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 PVH Human Rights associates were able to access the PVH database from 
headquarters and regional offices.  
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 As part of the pre-approval process, PVH required that its suppliers disclose all 
facilities producing PVH products, as well as other key data used for factory tracking.  
PVH Merchandising and Sourcing staff used the PVH Human Rights Evaluation 
Request Form to submit this information to the Human Rights Program.  The 
submission of this document initiates the pre-evaluation process and the inclusion of 
factory information in the human rights database.  
 Records on each supplier were periodically updated with information about audits, 
corrective action plans, red-flag suppliers, etc. With read-only access to this 
database, the PVH Sourcing Divisions could make sourcing decisions according to 
compliance ratings.  
 
 
D)  Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 Monitors received training during compliance training sessions, which included slide 
presentations, training videos, case studies, mock worker interviews, and conflict 
prevention training. They also participated in conferences and workshops on specific 
compliance subjects hosted by BSR, Verite, ITS, the U.S. Department of Labor, and 
UN/Global Compact. 
 PVH conducted trainings for sourcing staff, who were involved in remediation and 
follow-up activities in factories.  
 PVH developed various written materials for Human Rights associates and monitors 
to supplement training. These included: a Walk-Through Guide; Health and Safety 
Manual; guidance documents on techniques for confidential interviews, follow-up, 
remediation, payroll verification, and detection of falsified records; and, “A Shared 
Commitment” Evaluation Form – Training Tool, which included photos, policies, 
examples of best practices, and detailed instructions for finding and measuring 
various noncompliance issues.  
 The PVH “training subcommittee” developed the following training tools for the 
Human Rights team, suppliers, workers and other stakeholders: “Most Commonly 
Asked Questions by Factories Guide”; “Guide to Basic Ergonomic Practices”; and 
“Non-Intrusive Body Search Guide.”   
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
 As mentioned above, PVH conducted 143 internal factory visits (including pre-
approval visits, internal audits, and follow-up visits) in a total of 73 facilities.  One 
hundred percent of PVH’s applicable facilities were internally audited during the 
reporting period, and most facilities were audited more than once.  
 All PVH associates were responsible for reporting any serious noncompliance issue 
observed in factories directly to the VP of Human Rights and the Executive VP of 
Foreign Offices.  Such serious noncompliance issues were treated as “red flags.”  
When a “red flag” was reported, a representative of the Human Rights Program (and 
often the VP of Human Rights or Human Rights Regional Leaders) performed a 
factory audit, and undertook corrective action as soon as possible.    
 In consultation with the FLA, PVH commissioned 5 FLA independent external 
monitoring visits, as mentioned in the “Monitoring” section above. These visits were 
undertaken by Intertek Testing Services (2), Verité (2), and LIFT Standards (1) and 
represented seven percent of PVH’s applicable facilities.   
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F) Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
 
 PVH viewed confidential worker interviews as a means by which workers could 
report noncompliance.  Auditors were instructed to conduct these interviews on- or 
off-site and in a manner that protected the identity of the worker.  Moreover, Human 
Rights associates provided their phone numbers to the workers they interviewed, so 
workers could contact them should additional issues arise.   
 PVH required that internal audits verify secure channels of communications within 
the factories. In the event that these were not in place, PVH prescribed the 
implementation of an internal secured complaint system in the factory, including the 
installation of complaint forms and boxes in bathrooms, in addition to worker training, 
as corrective action plans.  
 PVH reported that its associates acted as facilitators in newly unionized facilities until 
effective modes of communication between workers’ representatives and 
management were developed.  
 PVH also relied on NGOs as sources of information about working conditions.   
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups 
 
 During 2001 and 2002, PVH established and strengthened relationships with various 
labor, human rights, religious and local groups. PVH conducted meetings, consulted 
and/or collaborated with various organizations in the following countries: 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hong Kong (and Macao), India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, the UK, the 
US, and Vietnam.  
 PVH actively participated in Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) meetings 
during the reporting period, and sponsored activities undertaken by the BSR Human 
Rights Group. PVH has also been a member of the Prince of Wales International 
Business Leaders Forum in England.  
 PVH continued its long-term cooperation efforts with faith-based organizations in the 
US.  
 Through participation in the FLA, PVH exchanged information with the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (US), Phulki (Bangladesh), Lift Standards 
(Bangladesh), and Kenan Institute (Thailand).   
 PVH also developed working relationships with various groups focusing on labor 
conditions in China. 
 PVH also reported that labor rights organizations provided important information to 
the company, particularly in regards to Central America.  
 PVH Human Rights associates draw from information from various sources, such as 
the International Labor Organization (ILO).  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
 
 Upon completion of an audit, PVH Human Rights associates reported results of 
audits to factory owners, managers, supervisors and workers, as well as PVH 
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sourcing staff.  The company reported that “transparency” among key actors proved 
effective in bringing about compliance.   
 Once the noncompliance issues were communicated to factory management, PVH 
required the factory to establish a comprehensive corrective action plan, and a 
timeline for its execution.  The corrective action plan and timeline were then reviewed 
by the Human Rights Regional Leader, with input from the Human Rights Officer.  
 Once the plan was approved, the Human Rights Officer monitored its implementation 
through on-going communication with the factory.  The Officer returned to the factory 
to monitor progress, when necessary.  
 When the factory communicated the required corrective actions were completed, 
PVH staff conducted a follow-up audit, usually unannounced, to verify compliance. 
 During the reporting period, PVH Human Rights Regional Leaders and Officers 
endeavored to provide factory management with examples of best practice and other 
compliance know-how to assist them in reaching full compliance. They also focused 
on finding ways to close the communication and commitment gap between the 
factory owners and their managers/supervisors, as well as vendors and factory 
management, that it found at the heart of many noncompliance issues.  
 During this reporting period, the PVH Human Rights Program laid out plans for the 
Critical Engagement and Impact Program (CEIP), aiming to address the problems 
PVH encountered in many of its facilities in East Asia with regard to lacking 
transparency, inconsistent books, coaching of workers before audits, and other 
related issues.  The CEIP was designed to provide the means for Human Rights 
Program associates to establish stronger, more transparent relationships with 
suppliers, and then work with management to implement sustainable corrective 
action plans with specific and realistic guidance from the PVH Human Rights team.  
This project will be carried out in the second FLA implementation year, and will be 
reported upon in greater detail in the next public report.  
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Phillips-Van Heusen: Conditions for  
Chinese Migrant Workers in the Americas 
 
Migrant workers are vulnerable in today’s global economy, in which domestic 
governments often fail to protect their rights. FLA participating companies commit to 
ensure that all workers, regardless of nationality, are treated in accordance with FLA 
standards.  However, local practices sometimes represent considerable obstacles to 
participating company efforts to uphold these standards.  Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) 
found that intensive engagement with factory owners and managers can improve the 
treatment of migrant workers in the workplace. 
 
In 2001, PVH conducted an internal monitoring visit in a factory in the Americas and 
found that the conditions of work for migrant workers from China were abusive and 
discriminatory. Monitors reported that migrant workers were working mandatory hours 
that were in excess of 60 hours a week, and that they were not being paid adequately for 
their regular or overtime work.  What compensation they did receive was paid to family 
members in China, which meant added costs in terms of double taxation, unreasonable 
deductions, and significant delays in funds reaching families.  They found that pregnancy 
tests were required of the mostly female worker population, and that workers’ passports 
were being withheld by management.  Moreover, the monitors found that migrant 
workers’ dormitories were unsafe and inadequate, and that the Chinese workers were 
verbally abused, and did not receive the same legal benefits enjoyed by local workers.  
 
In order to address the numerous code violations that were occurring in this factory, PVH 
employed a two-tiered approach: 1) PVH brought factory owners and management to 
New York for meetings to discuss the situation and find realistic solutions to these 
serious problems; and 2) PVH undertook a program of intensive and frequent monitoring 
and coaching visits at the factory level. 
 
Over the course of months of engagement, PVH was able to work with factory owners to 
implement a remediation plan which included the following corrective actions:  
 
 Factory management and supervisors underwent training to learn about PVH’s Code 
of Conduct and ways in which to communicate effectively with workers.  Policies 
were also instated that penalized supervisors who engaged in discriminatory or 
abusive behavior.  
 Work policies that led to forced overtime and inadequate pay were revised in 
accordance with PVH and FLA standards. 
 The factory opened bank accounts for migrant workers, in order to offer them easy 
access to their money and to help reduce fees involved in transferring funds 
overseas.  
 Excessive employment fees charged to workers by a Chinese recruitment agency 
were renegotiated to a reasonable level. 
 Pregnancy testing was discontinued, and passports were returned to the workers.  
 The migrant workers were relocated to a safer, cleaner dormitory with more suitable 
living quarters. 
 The factory started to provide benefits to migrant workers that were equal to those 
enjoyed by local workers.  
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While the remediation of this situation is ongoing, and while solutions to such serious 
noncompliance have required a great deal of engagement with factory owners, 
management, supervisors and workers, PVH has seen considerable changes in this 
factory.  Most importantly, migrant workers are no longer treated as second-class 
workers as a matter of policy and are aware of their rights enumerated in local labor laws 
and the FLA code.  
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Phillips-Van Heusen Factory/Audit Profile 
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where PVH 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  While this information can help readers gain a better grasp of the geographic 
scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance efforts, it should be interpreted 
in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of each company’s compliance 
program.  
 
 
Phillips-Van Heusen Monitoring Program 
Year One 
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
 
India (14), Honduras (7), China (9), Bangladesh (8), USA (4), Korea 
(5), Hong Kong (4), Mongolia (4), Indonesia (3), Thailand (1), Taiwan 
(2), Macau (2), Ukraine (2), Israel (1), El Salvador (1), Philippines 
(1), Pakistan (1), Jamaica (1), Egypt (1), Costa Rica (1), Cambodia 
(1) 
73 
Internal Monitoring 
Visits* 
 
India (25), Honduras (16), China (18), Bangladesh (16), USA (8), 
Korea (9), Hong Kong (8), Mongolia (7), Indonesia (5), Thailand (3), 
Taiwan (4), Macau (4), Ukraine (2), Israel (2), El Salvador (3), 
Philippines (2), Pakistan (2), Jamaica (4), Egypt (1), Costa Rica (2), 
Cambodia (2) 
143 
FLA Independent 
External Monitoring 
visits** 
 
India (1), China (1), Bangladesh (2), USA (1) 
 
5 
 
* These figures include pre-approval, periodic, re-evaluation, focus, and surveillance audits. PVH conducted at least one 
internal audit per applicable factory during the reporting period.  
 
** At the start of Year One, PVH and the FLA had agreed upon a list of 8 facilities for independent external monitoring 
(10% of PVH applicable facilities). However, three of the selected facilities were located in countries where the FLA 
expected to have monitors accredited during the course of Year One, but by the end of the reporting period, there were 
still no accredited monitors available for these countries. 
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 Reebok International Ltd. 
 
 
Basic facts about Reebok: 
 
Reebok consolidated revenue in FY2001:   
US$ 2.99 billion 
Applicable Reebok Brands (percentage of  total sales in 
FY2001):  
Reebok® footwear (53%) 
Reebok® apparel (28.4%)* 
*This includes Reebok’s NFL/NBA licensed apparel 
Total applicable facilities worldwide during reporting 
period: 
569 facilities  
 
 
Reebok’s Approach to Compliance during FLA Year One 
 
In this section, we review some key aspects of Reebok’s compliance program.  In 
addition to some basic facts about Reebok’s participation in the FLA and the structure of 
its compliance program, this section provides readers with a general overview of the 
company’s approach to monitoring, remediation and follow-up on noncompliance issues 
during the reporting period.  Please keep in mind that the activities described below took 
place during the Year One reporting period (August 1, 2001 through July 31, 2002), and 
were undertaken in accordance with Reebok’s monitoring plans for its footwear and 
apparel lines.  The company committed to implement its monitoring plans over the 
course of two or three years, as described below. 
 
The Compliance Program  
Reebok International Ltd. (referred to in this report as “Reebok”) is a founding participant 
in the Fair Labor Association, and its predecessor, the Apparel Industry Partnership. 
Reebok’s Human Rights Production Standards (referred to as “the Standards”) 
correspond with the FLA’s Workplace Code of Conduct.  The company made minor 
modifications to its Internal Audit Instrument and the Guide to Reebok Human Rights 
Production Standards to incorporate FLA monitoring principles.  
Reebok submitted two separate monitoring plans to the FLA for its footwear and apparel 
production lines, respectively.  The monitoring plan for footwear will be implemented 
over a period of two years (July 2001 – July 2003), while the monitoring plan for apparel 
will be implemented over a period of three years (September 2001 – August 2004).  
During the first year of implementation, the Reebok Human Rights Team was headed by 
the Vice President of Human Rights Programs, who reported to the CEO and Chairman 
of Reebok International Ltd. Reebok’s Human Rights Program consisted of 12 full-time, 
and 4 part-time, staff located in Asia, Latin America and Europe, and 2 full-time staff 
members, in addition to the VP of Human Rights Programs, based at headquarters.  
Reebok also worked with specialized consultants with regard to health, safety and 
environmental matters during the reporting period.  In countries where Reebok did not 
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have dedicated field staff to visit facilities that were deemed to be “high-risk,” the 
company worked with the following FLA accredited monitors: A&L Group (ALGI), Cal 
Safety Compliance Corporation, Cotecna Inspections, Global Standards/Toan Tin, 
Intertek Testing Services (ITS), Kenan Institute Asia, Merchandise Testing Labs (MTL), 
Phulki, and Verité.  Moreover, compliance was aided by the active collaboration of 
dozens of Reebok footwear production staff and apparel sourcing managers at head 
quarters and in producing countries. 
Monitoring  
Reebok monitored 42% of its apparel facilities, and 63% of its footwear facilities during 
the reporting period. In selecting facilities to monitor internally, Reebok favored those 
facilities in “high-risk” countries (i.e., 32 of 37 [86 %] footwear facilities in high-risk 
countries were audited, while 157 out of 222 [71%] high-risk apparel facilities were 
audited). Reebok reported that the Human Rights Program also relied on information 
provided by manufacturing personnel, who visited facilities daily, to supplement official 
monitoring visits to all facilities where Reebok production took place.  
 
Reebok has described its strategy for monitoring in terms of sustainability.  It found that 
worker involvement in problem-solving on small and large problems lessened Reebok’s 
role in remediation of noncompliance issues, and served as a more sustainable method 
of enhancing code compliance. In the interest of sustainable solutions and decreased 
intervention by Reebok staff, the company focused on fostering worker representation 
projects (see sidebar on programs in China, Indonesia and Thailand), and on training 
workers and management to communicate and problem-solve with one another.  
 
During internal audits, Reebok monitors reviewed records, interviewed management and 
workers (in private), visually inspected factory premises, and consulted with local 
worker-focused organizations.  They also reviewed collective bargaining agreements to 
assess whether obligations of facilities under those agreements were being 
implemented. During these visits, monitors were trained to focus on finding systematic 
noncompliance issues by corroborating workers’ experiences with regard to particular 
violations. Reebok reported that its continued policy to distribute Reebok monitors’ cell 
phone numbers to workers resulted in more open communication between workers and 
Reebok field staff. 
 
Reebok monitors typically announced their first visits to facilities and, during these first 
audits, reminded facilities that the company reserved the right to make unannounced 
visits at any time.  Monitors based the need for unannounced visits on the degree of 
noncompliance in a given facility, the volume of Reebok goods being produced at a 
facility, reports of noncompliance, and random selection for spot-checking purposes.  
 
Before placing orders with any new factories, Reebok conducted preliminary evaluations 
of the factories’ compliance with regard to what the company called “threshold issues”. 
Reebok defined threshold issues as: minimum wage and overtime wage noncompliance, 
poor fire safety, child labor, forced labor, major health and safety concerns, 
discrimination, harassment of unions, or unauthorized subcontracting.  If one or more of 
these threshold issues was determined to be a problem in a factory, then Reebok did not 
approve the factory for production until recommended corrective actions were made.   
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If initial evaluations did not indicate that threshold issues were arising in the workplace, 
factories received the factory designations “data on file; no factory inspection” (i.e., 
management signed the factory commitment to apply the Standards and submitted a 
“self assessment form”) and “no data on file; not approved” (i.e., there was insufficient 
information provided by management) until full factory inspections took place.    
 
A sourcing manager was able to place orders at facilities that had received a “data on 
file; no factory inspection” designation; however, he/she was responsible for considering 
whether the factory was located in a “high-risk” region or country, and whether there 
were substantial claims of noncompliance in the factory.  If either of these was the case, 
sourcing managers were asked to request a third-party audit of the facility prior to 
placing orders there.  Once Reebok conducted follow-up inspections at factories, or if 
noncompliance issues arose, factory designations would be revisited.  
 
During Year One, 27 applicable facilities (20 apparel and 7 footwear) of Reebok were 
monitored by FLA-accredited independent external monitors, in accordance with its 
Charter obligations13.  Reebok and the FLA agreed on the list of facilities to be subject to 
independent external monitoring, targeting high-risk or high-volume facilities.  The 
majority of visits were unannounced, although Reebok reports that some monitors did 
announce their visits before arriving onsite.   
 
Remediation and Follow-up 
 
Once a facility was internally or externally monitored, the Reebok Human Rights 
Program evaluated its compliance and then designated facilities as “approved” (minimal 
corrective action required), “conditionally approved” (need for corrective action on non-
threshold issues), or “ not approved” (failure to meet adequate compliance on threshold 
issues). Sourcing managers were instructed not to place orders in “not approved” 
factories, and the Human Rights Program followed up with factories where remediation 
was prescribed.   Depending on the completion of corrective actions, factory 
designations would be modified.  
 
During the reporting period, Reebok Human Rights staff worked with management and 
workers to remediate noncompliance issues uncovered during audits. If a factory did not 
demonstrate a willingness to make necessary improvements to meet Reebok Standards, 
the factory was designated “not approved”. If orders were in-process in facilities that 
were designated as “not approved”, sourcing managers were required to demonstrate 
that steps were being taken to immediately address serious noncompliance issues or all 
future orders would be ceased.   
 
During the reporting period, Reebok maintained that if a facility was unwilling or unable 
to make good faith efforts to comply with the Reebok Standards, the company would 
terminate its business relationship.  However, Reebok reported that termination is a last 
resort. Reebok would first work with the factory to fix problems, as they would rather 
invest resources to improve conditions for workers, than leave a factory and risk the 
displacement of workers. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Please refer to the “FLA Process” section of this report for a description of the differences between Year One and Year 
Two in the conduct of FLA independent external monitoring.    
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 Reebok’s Efforts to Fulfill FLA Company Obligations  
 
The information in this section is organized according to the FLA participating company 
obligations listed in the FLA Charter (see Appendix A).  Since these obligations 
represent minimum standards for participation in the FLA, the FLA encourages 
companies to surpass these standards, which they often do.  The information provided in 
this section is in no way an exhaustive recounting of all Reebok compliance activities 
during the reporting period.  Rather, this section includes information that Reebok 
reported to the FLA in order to demonstrate progress in the implementation of its human 
rights program.  
 
 
A) Establish Clear Standards 
 
 Reebok’s Guide to the Reebok Human Rights Production Standards outlines the 
Reebok Standards and explains approaches to their application in facilities.  Reebok 
translated the Guide into 8 languages, and transmitted it to factory managers, as well 
as internal and external monitors, who used it as a reference tool in their work during 
the reporting period.   
 Reebok’s agents and suppliers signed manufacturing agreements and the “Welcome 
Kit”, by which they agreed to apply the Reebok Standards and to permit internal and 
external monitoring of all factories and subcontractors producing for Reebok.  
 In December 2001 and February 2002, Reebok notified footwear and apparel 
facilities, respectively, that FLA-accredited independent external monitors must be 
allowed access to factory sites, records, and workers at any time -- for announced or 
unannounced audits.  
 The Human Rights staff developed a manual for apparel sourcing managers, which 
was designed to facilitate the consistent application of the Reebok Standards.   
 Reebok communicated with agents and factory management about the Reebok 
Standards and FLA requirements at periodic meetings and trainings.   
 
 
B) Create an Informed Workplace 
 
 During the first implementation year, Reebok changed its code of compliance poster 
which was posted in each factory for years.  The new poster, “Notice to Workers”, 
outlined the Standards and provided contact information for the local Reebok Human 
Rights monitor.  The posters also included the clarification that the posting of the 
Notice did not indicate that the factory was in compliance with the Reebok 
Standards.  As of the end of the reporting period, the posters had been translated 
into 25 languages. 
 During worker interviews, Reebok monitors informed workers about the Reebok 
Standards, in addition to asking about noncompliance issues.  
 Reebok conducted trainings for suppliers to promote effective communication 
between workers and management, and to institutionalize human rights compliance.  
These took place in Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and Macau. In many of these countries, Reebok 
sponsored more than one supplier training session annually in order to ensure 
supplier knowledge of the Reebok Standards. Reebok conducted health and safety 
training for worker representatives in China. 
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 The company also organized trainings for management and workers in association 
with groups like Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), Verité, and other qualified 
individuals or organizations for improved communication and comprehension of the 
Standards.  
 In the first half of 2002, the Human Rights staff trained Reebok apparel sourcing 
managers in the United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Mexico, Spain, Korea, 
France and India.   
 
 
C) Develop an Information Database 
 
 Reebok required all facilities to complete Self-Assessment forms, included in the 
Welcome Kit, to provide the initial factory tracking information for the Reebok Human 
Rights Database. The information is used to conduct an initial risk assessment of the 
facility.  
 The Reebok Human Rights Database has two primary components: the factory 
tracking sheet (factory logistics, number of workers, product type, and Reebok 
approval designation) and the audit report (summaries of monitors’ findings and 
corrective action plans).  
 During this reporting period, Reebok made plans for a new web-based database to 
be launched in the FLA’s second implementation year. 
  
 
D) Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
 
 Reebok monitors received the Guide to Reebok Human Rights Production 
Standards, the Reebok audit instrument, and detailed instruction on management 
practices that support compliance. Labor law summaries were updated for 2001 
using international labor sources such as BSR’s web-based legal database.   
 Reebok paired less experienced monitors with more experienced monitors for 
training purposes in order to improve consistency in monitoring and reporting across 
regions.  
 Reebok Human Rights staff participated in an annual meeting aimed at refreshing 
and improving monitoring skills and consistency across regions. 
 Reebok Human Rights staff participated in a “train the trainer” session in Hong Kong, 
which was associated with the Ivey School, as well as a “train the trainer” session in 
Bangkok.  They also participated in trainings offered by different groups, such as 
BSR, where topics included compliance with local labor law, wage and hour issues, 
the benefits of compliance, and internal compliance teams.  
 
 
E) Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits 
 
 Reebok monitored 240 apparel and footwear facilities (out of 569) over the course of 
the reporting period.  Reebok used a “risk-based” model to determine which facilities 
to monitor, by concentrating in facilities and countries with a history of poor labor 
standards and poor compliance.  Most of these facilities received multiple site visits 
during this time.  In primary footwear facilities, for instance, Reebok monitors visited 
once a month or more.  In the monitored apparel facilities, Reebok monitors visited 
an average of 2 ½ times during the year.  Follow-up site visits were used to verify 
remediation and to assess additional code provisions.    
 Reebok commissioned FLA independent external monitoring visits of 20 apparel 
facilities and 7 footwear facilities, as mentioned in the “Monitoring” section above.  
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Independent external monitoring visits were conducted by Cotecna (4), Global 
Standards –Vietnam (1), Intertek Testing Services (12), Kenan Institute Asia – 
Thailand (1), Merchandise Testing Laboratory (5), Phulki – Bangladesh (1), SGS (1), 
Verité (2).  Thus, five percent of Reebok’s applicable factories were monitored by 
independent external monitors during the reporting period. 
 During the first implementation year, Reebok created the internal Reebok Audit 
Instrument, which matches the revised version of the Guide to Reebok Human 
Rights Production Standards.  
 
 
F) Provide Employees with the Opportunity to Report Noncompliance 
   
 Reebok reported that monitors routinely assessed the grievance systems that 
factories had in place, and made clear the extent to which these were useful for 
addressing the legitimate concerns of workers. Facilities were required to adopt a 
non-retaliation policy and to communicate it to workers.  
 Reebok launched a Worker Communication System (WCS) in 1997 to provide a 
secure channel for workers in footwear facilities to report noncompliance issues 
directly to Reebok. Reebok distributed pre-paid mailers to factory workers at 
specified intervals during the year to provide them with the means to report instances 
of noncompliance directly to Reebok.  
 The new “Notice to Workers” posters also listed direct telephone contact information 
for local Reebok monitors, which workers utilized to contact monitors by phone or 
SMS messaging. 
 During the reporting period, Reebok monitors began pilot programs in Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Turkey to foster communications committees for improved 
communication between management and workers as well as increased worker 
participation in factory management decisions. Worker committees were elected by 
confidential ballot and met with factory management at least once a month. In 
Turkey, meeting minutes were posted on factory notice boards, while in El Salvador 
and Guatemala, they were documented by the factory’s Human Resources 
Department, and were available to Reebok – along with management responses – 
upon request. This process is on-going.  
 
 
G) Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Groups  
 
 Reebok updated its monitoring protocols to require that collective bargaining 
agreements be examined as part of the internal monitoring process, and included 
interviews with union representatives in the monitoring process at unionized facilities. 
If unions were present at facilities using Reebok’s Worker Communication System 
(WCS), issues raised through this system were routed through union representatives 
in order to encourage union participation in resolving differences.  
 Consultation with local NGOs was also included in Reebok’s monitoring process. 
Each Reebok monitor was accountable for managing NGO contacts in his/her 
country/region. At a more global level, Reebok participated in seminars with the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) and consultation with the International Business 
Leaders Forum in London to discuss innovative approaches to code compliance in 
China. In the Dominican Republic, Reebok collaborated with the Research Center for 
Feminist Action (CIPAF) for worker interviews and factory inspections at the BJ&B 
apparel factory. Reebok also worked with union activists in this factory throughout 
the worker-management dispute. In Mexico, Reebok worked with local labor experts 
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and the International Labor Organization to facilitate worker education on freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.  In Bangladesh, Reebok worked with Phulki to 
facilitate day care services for two Reebok producing apparel facilities.  
 In China, the company cooperated with the following NGOs on a project aimed at 
improving health and safety conditions in footwear facilities: Chinese Women 
Workers Network (CWWN), Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (HKCIC), 
Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC), and the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade 
Unions (HKCTU).  HKCIC and the Labor Education Service Network (LESN) also 
worked with Reebok on training programs for the union committee of Kong Tai 
Shoes (KTS) factory, as well as trade union training for workers at KTS.  Reebok 
also reported that it served on the executive committee of the China Business 
Principles Working Group (CWG), a coalition of businesses, non-governmental 
organizations and socially responsible investors addressing working conditions in 
China.  
 
 
H) Establish Means of Remediation 
  
 Reebok Human Rights staff shared all internal and external monitoring reports with 
factory managers and Reebok sourcing managers. Where instances of 
noncompliance were found, Reebok monitors called for particular action steps to be 
taken to remediate the noncompliance. Reebok monitors were then accountable for 
ensuring that the factory took steps to correct the areas of noncompliance. 
Compliance was aided by the active collaboration of dozens of Reebok footwear 
production staff and apparel sourcing managers at headquarters and in producing 
countries.  They offered advice and oversaw many remediation processes in 
coordination with Reebok monitoring staff and factory management. The time period 
allotted for corrective action generally ranged from immediate action to 60 days, with 
some special projects taking longer (e.g., extensive training programs which require 
planning and outside resources).  
 In instances where facilities failed to correct noncompliance in the agreed-upon 
timeframe, Reebok issued a final warning, and then reviewed the factory's response. 
If unsatisfactory, Reebok terminated its relationship with the factory.  
 Reebok reported that remediation and prevention of future noncompliance focused 
on education and good management systems during this reporting period. Reebok 
considered that by supporting the development of communication channels and 
shared decision-making between workers and management, and by advancing 
management approaches that address problems systematically, its monitoring 
program would have sustainable results.  
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 Worker Representation Groups in Indonesia, Thailand and China 
 
Reebok has found that the need for external remediation is greatly reduced when 
workers act responsibly on their own behalf.  Acting upon this principle, Reebok has 
been engaged in ongoing efforts to promote workers' freedom of association in 
Indonesia, Thailand and China.    
 
In countries like Indonesia and Thailand, where the right to free association is protected 
by law, there is a general lack of enforcement of this right.  Union organizers often 
experience resistance to their organizing efforts with limited legal recourse.  In other 
instances, trade unions are controlled by the government or management.  In an effort to 
address these trends, which have often left workers without a voice vis-à-vis workplace 
issues, Reebok has encouraged the development of democratically-elected worker 
committees through its establishment of Worker Representation Projects.  
 
Reebok has facilitated union/welfare committee training conducted by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and various academics focusing on labor issues in Thailand and 
Indonesia. Moreover, in order to expose worker representatives to new ideas and 
strategies, Reebok conducted an exchange between Thai welfare committee leaders 
and their counterparts in Indonesian factories, as well as exchanges between more- 
experienced and less-experienced worker representatives in different Reebok factories.  
In Thailand, worker populations of various factories attended training sessions 
conducted by academics and local labor leaders, who taught workers how to exercise 
their rights in accordance with internationally recognized standards and local law.  
Furthermore, as a general policy, Reebok’s compliance staff has challenged workers to 
become involved in factory problem-solving, and to professionalize the administration of 
unions and welfare committees.   
 
In China, the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively in accordance with 
internationally recognized standards are not fully recognized.  Nevertheless, during this 
reporting period, Reebok took steps to augment the ability of workers to represent their 
views with management in various factories. Towards this end, Reebok facilitated the 
introduction of the first democratically-elected worker representative group in a Reebok-
producing footwear factory near Shenzhen.  It also worked on other similar ground-
breaking projects on the mainland. Since these are such novel projects, the long-term 
outcomes of these efforts remain to be seen.  However, many commentators from the 
labor rights community and China have hailed these projects as revolutionary. 
Reebok reported that the Worker Representative Project has served to improve 
communications and negotiations between worker leaders and management.  They 
considered that a large percentage of tensions and problems arise as a result of 
misunderstanding and miscommunication, and that capable worker representatives have 
already proven to be effective as mediators between workers and factory management 
as a result of these programs.  
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Reebok International, Ltd. Factory/Audit Profile  
 
In accordance with the FLA Charter, the chart below lists the countries where Reebok 
applicable facilities were located during the reporting period, as well as the number of 
internal and FLA independent external monitoring visits that took place during that time.   
 
Please note that this chart represents only one of a number of activities undertaken by 
participating companies to ensure factory compliance with the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct.  The number of site visits conducted by a participating company does not 
indicate whether one or more of a company’s applicable facilities are in compliance with 
the Code.  The geographic scope and the number of monitoring visits reflects the 
approach to compliance taken by participating companies, based on the likelihood of 
noncompliance and other risk factors.  While this information can help readers gain a 
better grasp of the geographic scope and focus of participating companies’ compliance 
efforts, it should be interpreted in the context of the more qualitative characteristics of 
each company’s compliance program.  
 
Reebok Monitoring Program 
Year One  
 
Description Countries (number) Total 
Applicable 
Facilities  
 
 
China* (83), South Korea (82), United States (52), Taiwan* (44), Peru 
(29), Vietnam* (29), Indonesia* (26), Mexico* (24), Spain (21), El 
Salvador* (19), Guatemala* (18), Thailand* (17), Canada (16), Portugal 
(15), Malaysia* (14), Macau* (7), Bangladesh* (6), Italy (6), Philippines* 
(6), Dominican Republic (5), Sri Lanka (5), India* (4), Brazil (3), 
Cambodia* (3), Honduras* (3), Turkey* (6), Albania (2), Bulgaria (2), 
Costa Rica (2), Hong Kong (2), Japan (2), United Kingdom (2), France 
(1), Jordan (1), Macedonia (1), Morocco (1), Scotland (1), Singapore 
(1), Slovakia (1), Swaziland (1), Venezuela (1) 
 
561 
Internal 
Monitoring Visits 
(8/01-7/02)** 
 
China* (59), South Korea (12), United States (4), Taiwan* (0), Peru 
(11), Vietnam* (25), Indonesia* (24), Mexico* (11), Spain (0), El 
Salvador* (14), Guatemala* (13), Thailand* (17), Canada (0), Portugal 
(0), Malaysia* (9), Macau* (4), Bangladesh* (5), Italy (0), Philippines* 
(6), Dominican Republic (3), Sri Lanka (5), India* (3), Brazil (0), 
Cambodia* (0), Honduras* (2), Turkey* (6), Albania (0), Bulgaria (0), 
Costa Rica (1), Hong Kong (0), Japan (0), United Kingdom (0), France 
(0), Jordan (0), Macedonia (0), Morocco (0), Scotland (0), Singapore 
(1), Slovakia (0), Swaziland (0), Venezuela (0) 
 
235 
FLA Independent 
External 
Monitoring Visits 
Counted for Year 
One  
 
 
China* (8), United States (1), Vietnam (1), Indonesia (3), Mexico (2), El 
Salvador* (4), Thailand* (3), Bangladesh* (1), Philippines* (1), Turkey* 
(3) 
 
27 
* denotes high-risk countries.   
 
** Numbers reported in this row represent the number of factories where internal monitoring activities took place in this 
reporting period, as reported by Reebok in accordance with the FLA Charter.  In some cases, in various footwear facilities, 
for example, Reebok human rights staff visited facilities more than once a month.  However, multiple visits to the same 
facility during the reporting period are not included in these numbers.   
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IV. FLA Findings and Remediation 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the FLA’s efforts to promote adherence to the 
FLA Workplace Code of Conduct (“FLA Code”) in factories around the world, focusing 
specifically on the role of independent external monitoring and remediation, and the 
challenges to compliance in the countries where FLA participating companies operate.  
 
During the reporting period covered in this report, the FLA conducted independent 
external monitoring visits of 185 production facilities in 19 countries.  Each of these 
independent external monitoring visits were conducted by FLA-accredited14 monitors, 
who were responsible for investigating and assessing factory compliance with each 
provision of the FLA Code. After the conclusion of each visit, the participating 
company/companies submitted a report on its/their remediation plan to the FLA and the 
action taken by the company/companies in accordance with the plan. 
 
The information provided in this section has been drawn primarily from monitoring 
reports completed by FLA-accredited monitors, participating company remediation plans, 
and participating company reports describing their compliance programs. Where 
appropriate, external sources are referenced to provide a broader contextualization of 
the Code element in question.     
 
This section begins with a global overview of the countries where independent external 
monitoring visits were conducted in Year One.  The following sub-sections are organized 
by each separate provision of the FLA Code.  Each of the sub-sections pertaining to the 
specific FLA Code provision includes the following information: 
 
A description of the FLA Code standard. Each of the Code provisions is based on 
fundamental and internationally-recognized principles of labor rights, including 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions. 
 
The monitoring scope of an independent external monitoring visit and methods15 
employed by FLA monitors. In assessing compliance with the FLA Code, it is 
important to note that monitors are required to evaluate compliance with the FLA 
compliance benchmarks and any applicable national and local laws and 
regulations in the country where monitoring is being conducted.   
 
A general description of the relevant compliance issues with respect to the FLA 
Code provision. 
 
Examples of findings from independent external monitoring visits.  
 
Graphs depicting the incidence of noncompliance as a percentage of aggregate 
findings and a regional breakdown of the noncompliance issues identified.  
 
Examples of remediation activities of participating companies in response to 
findings by internal or FLA-accredited independent external monitors.     
                                                 
14
 The FLA accreditation process requires prospective monitors to demonstrate independence, impartiality, and meet the 
core competency requirements of monitors, as specified in the FLA Charter. For more information on the accreditation 
process, please visit the FLA website at www.fairlabor.org.   
15
 The complete FLA monitoring methodology is outlined in the FLA Monitoring Guidance Compliance Benchmarks, which 
are available on the FLA website at www.fairlabor.org.   
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 It should be noted that given the limited time span of our data, no statistical analysis of 
trends over time has been provided. This presentation of FLA findings from Year One is 
an attempt to enhance the understanding of the FLA Code compliance issues identified 
by monitors and the remediation efforts of participating companies, and in doing so, to 
contribute to improvements in participating companies’ compliance programs and the 
FLA system.  
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YEAR ONE MONITORING VISITS 
 
In Year One, the FLA undertook independent external monitoring (IEM) of 185 facilities 
in 19 countries.  The graph below provides a global overview of where IEM took place 
and illustrates the percentage of total IEM visits that each country represents.   
 
In the graph, the country name is followed by the number of IEM visits performed in that 
country and the percentage of all IEM visits that the number represents.  For example, 
52 of the 185 IEM visits took place in China, which represents 25% of all IEM visits for 
Year One. 
 
Graph 4.1: Year One IEM Visits by Country 
IEM VISITS YEAR ONE-BY COUNTRY
Sri Lanka, 1, 0.5%
Nicaragua, 1, 0.5%
Guatemala, 1, 0.5%
Taiwan, 3, 1.4%
Dominican Republic, 3, 1.4%
Hong Kong, 4, 1.9%
Malaysia, 3, 1.4%
Vietnam, 6, 2.9%
Bangladesh, 8, 3.8%
India, 7, 3.4%
Korea, 6, 2.9%
Portugal, 8, 3.8%
Turkey, 6, 2.9%
El Salvador, 12, 5.8%
Philippines, 10, 4.8%
USA, 12, 5.8%
Thailand, 16, 7.7%
Mexico, 24, 11.5%
Indonesia, 25, 12.0%
China, 52, 25.0%
 
Within each of the following code element sections, two graphs are presented.  The first 
graph depicts the percentage that noncompliance with that code element represents out 
of the global aggregate, and the second graph presents a regional breakdown, which 
represent the percentage of noncompliance that each code element represents out of 
the total noncompliance found within the region.  The regions are broken down as 
follows: China, East and South East Asia (SEAsia), Latin America (LAmerica), Europe 
and the Middle East (EMEA), South Asia (SAsia), and the United States (USA).  Given 
the large number of IEM visits that were conducted in China, it was decided to include 
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this information separately from the rest of East and South East Asia.  The findings from 
the United States were also highlighted to provide further context for readers who may 
be more familiar with the labor rights situation in this country.  The East and South East 
Asia region includes: Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam. The Latin America region includes: Mexico, Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.  The Europe and Middle East region 
includes: Turkey and Portugal.  Finally, the South Asia region includes: India, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh.  
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CODE AWARENESS 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct/Obligations of Companies 
Create an Informed Workplace: Ensure that all Participating Company factories as well 
as contractors and suppliers inform their employees about the workplace standards 
orally and through the posting of standards in a prominent place (in the local languages 
spoken by employees and managers) and undertake other efforts to educate employees 
about the standards on a regular basis.  
 
 
ILO Conventions 
No applicable ILO Conventions 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
To investigate Code Awareness, monitors are required to ensure that workers are 
informed of their rights under the FLA Code, both orally and through the posting of the 
Code in prominent places (in the local languages spoken by employees and managers) 
and to ensure that other efforts to educate employees about the standards take place on 
a regular basis. This includes an assessment as to whether workers are properly 
informed and aware of their legal rights, including any legal benefits to which they are 
entitled.   
 
 
Compliance Issues 
High labor turnover and low literacy levels in many of the regions where factories are 
located complicate the task of ensuring workers and management are made aware of 
the standards enumerated in the FLA Code.   
 
These issues are particularly pronounced in countries such as India, where, according to 
the International Confederation of Trade Unions, workers were often employed 
temporarily.16  According to Asha for Education, an action group advocating education in 
India, only 52% of the population is literate, and literacy among rural women in only 
10%.17  The combination of the use of temporary labor contracts and low levels of 
literacy among the workforce contributes to high levels of Code Awareness 
noncompliance in countries such as India.   
 
Ensuring Code Awareness is also particularly challenging in countries or regions where 
there is a high presence of foreign workers, as foreign workers are often not informed or 
aware of their legal rights, and the local laws may not be posted in the workers’ native 
languages.   
                                                 
16
 ICFTU (June 21, 2002) REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF TRADE POLICIES OF INDIA 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215480&Language=EN) 
17
 Asha (1991) The Need for Literacy in India (http://www.ashanet.org/stanford/resources/need.html) 
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 FLA Findings 
The most common findings from independent external monitoring visits related to low 
worker awareness of their legal rights and their rights under the Code of Conduct or 
participating companies’ workplace standards. 
 
For example, at a factory in Mexico, an FLA independent external monitor reported that 
no labor laws regarding minimum wage, overtime rates or collective bargaining and 
freedom of association were posted in the factory. The monitor also reported that 
although there were laws regarding benefits and work hours posted, they were written 
only in Spanish, and the Chinese contract workers were unable to read them. It was also 
reported that in general, worker awareness of the Code was low.  
 
During an independent external monitoring visit of a factory in Turkey, a monitor reported 
that workers had low awareness of some of their legal rights, including their right to 
freedom of association.  For example, more than half of the workers interviewed 
reported that they did not know whether they have legal rights to associate freely or to 
form or join unions. 
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.2: Aggregate Findings: Code Awareness Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One. 
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Graph 4.3: Regional Breakdown: Code Awareness Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.18 
 
Noncompliance with Code Awareness represented 9% of all noncompliance 
internationally, and represented 6% of all Code noncompliance in China, 8.5% of all 
Code noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 12.8% of all Code noncompliance in Latin 
America, 13.6% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region 
(EMEA), 14.3% of all Code noncompliance in South Asia, and 8.8% of all Code 
noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Participating companies pursued a number of strategies to promote awareness of the 
standards enumerated in the FLA Code.  At a minimum, they required the factory 
management to post the Code in locations throughout the factory in the workers’ native 
language or languages. Some participating companies also stipulated that the Code be 
                                                 
18
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in 
South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in 
absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance in each region, Code 
Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance issues 
within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to calculate 
the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance issues in 
region) x 100.    
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posted in locations which are outside the purview of management, such as in 
bathrooms.   
 
Participating companies also undertook various initiatives to promote worker awareness 
of their rights.  For example, in Guatemala, Liz Claiborne (LCI) collaborated with 
COVERCO, a local NGO, to produce an illustrated pamphlet which described workers’ 
rights using a cartoon format.  Below are two additional cases that demonstrate efforts 
by participating companies to promote Code Awareness.  
 
In India, Liz Claiborne (LCI) discovered through its internal monitoring program that 
many of its contract facilities needed to inform workers of the Code of Conduct, internal 
policies, or terms of employment.  In response, LCI worked with suppliers to ensure that 
the Code of Conduct was posted in factories and that workers were able to meet with 
each other and management to improve worker awareness of the Code and of their 
rights.  LCI also reported that workers were provided with information explaining benefits 
and payroll calculations.   
 
Despite these efforts, follow-up worker interviews by monitors revealed that many 
workers still did not understand their rights.  At a minimum, Liz Claiborne insists that the 
Code is posted in the workers' native language and in prominent locations in the factory, 
and is undertaking other efforts to inform workers of their rights.  
 
 
Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) also considered that factory management’s awareness of the 
FLA Code was an essential component in efforts to achieve sustainable compliance in 
workplaces.  In this regard, PVH conducted many HR Awareness and Training sessions 
for factories in their supply chain. They also conducted a number of individual meetings, 
where education, brainstorming and coaching were all key elements.  
 
PVH also required the participation of factories in training sessions provided by 
independent third-parties in an effort to provide more information and promote 
interaction with a different set of stakeholders and factories. PVH reported that the 
external training sessions included: BSR training in Jakarta, Indonesia; Verite training in 
Dalian, China; BSR training in Shenzhen in China; Verite training in Xiamen in China; 
BSR training in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; and United Nations, Global Compact 
conference in Beijing, China.  
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FORCED LABOR 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
There shall not be any use of forced labor, whether in the form of prison labor, 
indentured labor, bonded labor or otherwise. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (C. 29) 
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (C. 105)  
 
 
Other Relevant Instruments 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 8 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
In assessing the Forced Labor situation of a factory, monitors are required to investigate, 
inter alia, any known or suspected cases of forced labor at the factory, the employment 
terms and conditions of migrant workers, and any restrictions on the ability of workers to 
move freely in and out of the factory.  Additionally, monitors are required to investigate 
the use of employment deposits or excessive recruitment fees, which restrict the ability 
of workers to terminate their contracts. 
 
 
Compliance Issues 
Severe cases of Forced Labor in the manufacturing sector more commonly involve the 
abuse of migrant workforce populations. The increased migration of workers from 
countries with labor surplus economies to countries with labor shortages has led to 
various forms of exploitation of migrant workers. In labor-receiving countries, it is often 
the case that recruitment and employment practices used to attract and maintain foreign 
workers effectively amount to situations of forced labor. For example, migrant workers 
are often recruited through brokers or agents, who require excessive recruitment fees 
from workers who must then work to pay off the debt. In extreme cases, the employer 
retains workers’ passports and personal documents in order to prevent migrant workers 
from leaving.   
 
 
FLA Findings 
The most common findings of noncompliance with Forced Labor related to unreasonable 
restrictions on workers’ freedom of movement. For example, FLA independent external 
monitors discovered a number of cases in which workers were not allowed free egress 
to leave the factory premises.  During an independent external monitoring visit of a 
factory in Mexico, a monitor reported that some workers interviewed indicated that they 
were physically barred from leaving the factory at will, and other workers reported that 
they were not permitted to leave the factory under reasonable conditions.  
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 While less common, FLA monitors also identified situations in which the ability of 
workers to terminate their employment was restricted. These findings included the 
confiscation by factory management of workers’ personal identification documents, such 
as identity cards. This issue was more prevalent in countries where there is a high 
presence of internal migrants or foreign migrant workers within a factory workforce. For 
example, at a factory in China, it was reported that the factory kept the identification 
cards of new employees for one month.   
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.4: Aggregate Findings: Forced Labor Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One. 
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Graph 4.5: Regional Breakdown: Forced Labor Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring reports for Year One.19 
 
Forced Labor noncompliance represented 5% of all Code noncompliance internationally, 
5.7% of all Code noncompliance in China, 5.4% of all Code noncompliance in Southeast 
Asia, 3.6% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 3.9% of all Code noncompliance 
in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 5% of all Code noncompliance in S. 
Asia, and 2.9% of all Code noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Given the vulnerability of migrant workers in global supply-chains, most of the efforts of 
participating companies with respect to Forced Labor were concentrated on identifying 
and combating labor abuses associated with migrants.  A number of initiatives were 
undertaken by participating companies to better inform migrant workers of their rights, to 
eliminate the use of excessive recruitment fees, and to ensure that migrant workers 
received their legal benefits.   
 
                                                 
19
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in 
South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in 
absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance in each region, Code 
Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance issues 
within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to calculate 
the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance issues in 
region) x 100.    
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Below are two examples of participating company remediation activities in this area: 
Phillips-Van Heusen’s remediation efforts to address excessive employment fees and 
exploitative contracts, and a Nike project aimed at minimizing the negative effects of 
migration on rural workers by relocating production to rural communities. 
 
In Jordan, an internal monitoring visit to one of Phillips-Van Heusen’s (PVH’s) contract 
facilities revealed that Chinese migrant workers were subject to excessive employment 
fees and exploitative contract terms.  According to PVH, “[this] put the financial burden 
on the worker, and therefore, if the worker was being abused, he/she would have 
hesitated to terminate the contract as they could have lost the fees already invested and 
the cost of their ticket back home. “ Additionally, PVH internal monitors discovered that 
maternity leave was not provided to these workers and that the workers demonstrated a 
lack of knowledge of Jordanian labor law.  
 
In response to these findings, PVH worked closely with the factory management to 
remediate the Code noncompliance and to institute better practices.  According to the 
remediation plan, factory management renegotiated the abusive terms of the 
employment agency’s contracts with the agency on behalf of the workers. The fees were 
reduced and a clause was included in the contract that allowed the workers to resign for 
just cause without suffering financial burden. PVH reported that following their 
remediation efforts, workers were informed of their rights, benefits and legal protections 
under Jordanian law prior to signing the employment agreement, and maternity leave 
was granted without any financial penalty to migrant workers. 
 
 
To address the societal and individual difficulties associated with migrant labor, Nike 
developed the NIKE Village project, which encourages contractors to establish 
production facilities in rural areas, so workers do not have to move to the cities for formal 
sector employment.  In a village where the NIKE Village project has been established, 
Nike funded the construction of a community center; sponsors community programs 
such as education and women’s advocacy; and has launched micro-credit initiatives and 
deforestation programs.   
 
Nike believes that by relocating production to rural areas, workers in those communities 
will not be forced to move to unfamiliar urban centers to find formal employment.  By 
employing local laborers in rural areas, Nike believes that a number of the problems 
associated with migrant labor, such as the use of recruitment fees and attempts to hold 
workers’ documents, may be alleviated.   
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CHILD LABOR 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
No person shall be employed at an age younger than 15 (or 14 where the law of the 
country of manufacture allows) or younger than the age for completing compulsory 
education in the country of manufacture where such age is higher than 15. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Minimum Age Convention, 1974 (C. 138) and Recommendation (C.146) 
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 1999 (C. 182) and Recommendation (C. 190) 
 
 
Other Relevant Instruments 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 10 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
To investigate Child Labor, monitors are required to use, inter alia, methods of verifying 
workers’ ages appropriate to the local area and to identify common techniques for 
falsifying proof of age.  It is also important to note that monitors review and report on 
factory compliance with national laws or regulations governing the employment of child 
workers, as well as young workers,20 when monitoring factories with regard to Child 
Labor. For example, monitors are required to assess whether the factory maintains 
appropriate documentation for young workers and whether the factory is in compliance 
with legal regulations on the type of work and working hours of young workers.   
 
 
Compliance Issues 
Child labor in the manufacturing sector has been the subject of international media 
attention and a source of growing public concern. Increasingly, in order to attract multi-
national buyers, factories producing for export have begun enforcing stricter controls on 
age limits for workers. This trend is due in part to media scrutiny and the public shaming 
of factories that have been found using child labor. The US Department of Labor reports 
that as a response to public concern, some factory managers have instituted policies 
against hiring 14-17 year-old workers, even if domestic law and codes of conduct permit 
workers of these ages to work.21  Additionally, the ILO has reported that in some 
developing countries, initiatives have been undertaken at the national level to eliminate 
child labor in order to improve the country’s image to attract foreign investment.22       
                                                 
20
 For the purposes of this report, “young worker” refers to any worker above the age of a child, as defined by national law, 
and under the age of 18.  
21
 US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution 
to the International Child Labor Program?, 1996. 
22
 Globalization of the footwear, textiles and clothing industries: Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on the 
Globalization of the Footwear, Textiles and Clothing Industries: Effects on Employment and Working Conditions (Geneva: 
International Labor Organization) 1996, 75 [hereinafter ILO Textile Report]. 
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 However, while there have been fewer reported cases of child workers in production 
facilities that are regularly monitored, it is suspected that the problem of child labor has 
shifted to less transparent areas of the supply chain, such as through home work or 
illegal subcontracting. UNICEF reports that larger factories sometimes contribute 
indirectly to child labor by subcontracting certain production tasks to small workshops 
and home workers, which make extensive use of child labor, and which are generally not 
covered by domestic child labor law, and much more difficult to monitor.23  Additionally, 
in some cases, the exclusion of child workers from the formal sector has contributed to 
forcing children to seek work in the informal economy, which is unregulated and 
therefore often more dangerous and exploitative. 
 
Child labor is a complex phenomenon that must be examined by understanding the root 
causes of the problem.  A comprehensive strategy to address these basic causes should 
involve the broad-based participation of all concerned actors – including governments, 
international and national organizations, and representatives of working children.  
Accordingly, strategies should be developed specific to local economic, social and 
cultural conditions.  While companies alone cannot effectively address the causes of 
child labor, they should play a role in cooperating with other stakeholders to design and 
implement action plans that are child-centered, appropriate, and sustainable.  The 
effective enforcement of this Code provision should aim at not only eliminating child 
labor from the production of goods, but also to improve the quality of life of child workers, 
with an emphasis on creating viable economic alternatives for children and their 
families.24   
 
FLA Findings  
FLA independent external monitors reported very few cases where child workers (as 
defined by the FLA Code) were found working in factories that were independently 
monitored. The most common compliance issue identified with respect to Child Labor 
related to inadequate or fraudulent age documentation. For example, at a facility in 
Vietnam, a monitor reported that:  
 
Worker interviews, external information and management interviews indicate that the 
factory has had cases of juvenile workers (15-18) who have been hired after presenting 
false identification and who were ‘encouraged to leave’ once they were discovered with a 
promise that they would be hired back upon turning 18. Workers believe that some young 
workers are still employed (with false identification), yet the factory lacks policies to 
protect such workers and terminates those it discovers. Age checks performed by the 
factory appear insufficient to prevent such problems from continuing…The factory’s social 
security office confirmed that since 2001 there have been up to 100 workers with fake ID 
files who have applied to change to new files (in order to receive their social security 
benefits) and that many of them were under 18 years of age.  
 
Other findings of noncompliance with this Code provision pertained to factories lacking 
appropriate protections for young workers. In a case at a factory in China, workers 
reported to the FLA monitor that young workers were not given special consideration in 
                                                 
23
 UNICEF: The Nature of the Problem: Some Basic Facts. 
http://www.unicef.org/programme/cprotection/focus/legal/problabour.htm 
24
 Ibid. 
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the assignment of duties and hours at the factory. This was corroborated by the 
monitor’s observation of young workers working in the printing and leather print sections 
of the factory where toxic chemicals are handled. During this independent external 
monitoring visit, the monitor also found no evidence indicating that the juvenile workers 
were registered with the local labor department.  
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.6: Aggregate Findings: Child Labor Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One. 
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Graph 4.7: Regional Breakdown: Child Labor Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One25.  
 
Child Labor noncompliance represented 5% of all noncompliance internationally, and 
represented 6.5% of all Code noncompliance in China, 4.7% of all Code noncompliance 
in Southeast Asia, 1.5% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 2.9% of all Code 
noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 4.2% of all Code 
noncompliance in S. Asia, and 0% of all Code noncompliance in the USA.   
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Participating companies, through their internal monitoring programs, also discovered a 
number of cases of noncompliance with Child Labor in facilities that produce their 
products.  For example, in some instances where young workers were identified during 
factory visits, participating company internal monitors found that they had been working 
overtime hours and handling chemicals, in noncompliance with the Code and local law.  
As a remedial response, participating companies worked with their factories to ensure 
that the employees were relocated to areas requiring lighter work and that their hours of 
work were under the legal limit. Additionally, in some cases, participating companies 
worked with factories to ensure that young workers were provided with regular health 
checks, per their legally mandated benefits.   
                                                 
25
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in 
South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in 
absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance in each region, Code 
Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance issues 
within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance found within each region to calculate the 
percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance in region/ total noncompliance in region) x 100.    
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 Below are three examples of initiatives undertaken by participating companies to 
improve compliance with Child Labor in their supply chains. 
 
In Mexico, Reebok reported that their internal monitors routinely ask management to 
provide age-related documentation during factory inspection, including parental 
permission forms and proof of employee registration with local labor authorities. Reebok 
has also worked with factory management to implement a hiring process that better 
ensures age limit compliance, and requires monitored factories to provide 
documentation of social security payments and employee payroll for up to six months. 
 
 
In a project initiated in 1997 in Pakistan, adidas, Nike and Reebok engaged with 
international and local organizations to support an independent monitoring body aimed 
at eliminating the use of child labor in the soccer industry.  The monitoring body was 
formed by the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF, and Save the Children 
in partnership with a range of local organizations, including the Sialkot Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry.  In the past, the ILO has implemented the program. Now, the 
ILO is one of many international and local organizations in a Board of Governors set up 
to oversee the performance of the partnership that will appoint the monitors. This is an 
on-going project, in which adidas, Nike and Reebok have continued to participate.  
  
In addition to participating in the Sialkot partnership, some participating companies have 
undertaken programs to support educational opportunities for area children and to 
improve working conditions for factory workers in the region.  
 
 
In Vietnam, adidas undertook a comprehensive and long-term remediation project to 
address child labor in consultation with international NGOs and local actors.   
 
The project was developed in response to the findings of adidas internal monitors (the 
SOE team), who found that many young workers were working overtime illegally and 
that at least one child worker (14 years old) was employed at a supplier facility in 
Vietnam. The SOE team discussed the problem with the factory management and 
explained that simply laying off the young workers was not an option.  As an alternative, 
adidas established an education program with the assistance of Verité, an international 
NGO based in the U.S.  The workers below 16 were offered full-time schooling at the 
factory and local teachers from the district were invited to lead the group through the 
Vietnamese primary curriculum. 
 
The program is currently being assessed by the local Vietnamese staff of Save the 
Children, Sweden, and the assessment will be provided to all parties directly involved 
with the program.  It will also provide adidas with broad recommendations regarding the 
control of underage workers and education programs for young workers. 
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HARASSMENT OR ABUSE 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
Every employee shall be treated with respect and dignity.  No employee shall be subject 
to any physical, sexual, psychological or verbal harassment or abuse. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
No applicable ILO Conventions 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
As part of their monitoring methodology, monitors are required to identify particular 
groups of workers that might be at risk with respect to Harassment or Abuse and 
determine whether workers feel free to complain and use the factory’s internal grievance 
procedures without fear of reprisal. In order to investigate compliance with this FLA 
Code standard, monitors investigate any reported situations of verbal and physical 
harassment and/or abuse; whether the factory has written disciplinary procedures and a 
system of progressive discipline; and whether managers and supervisors are trained in 
appropriate disciplinary practices. 
 
Compliance Issues 
Harassment or Abuse is a difficult and complex Code provision to investigate and 
resolve, often due to social, cultural and ethnic factors. In many countries the 
subordinate position that young women workers occupy in society brings with it 
treatment that is often exploitative and abusive. Monitors need to be highly sensitive to 
patterns of abuse that may be obscured by various social factors, leading to workers’ 
reluctance to speak.  
In some factories, cultural or linguistic differences between managerial staff and the 
production workforce have complicated the development of effective communications 
between management and workers. This divide exacerbates workplace tensions and 
increases the risk of noncompliance with harassment or abuse. 
 
 
FLA Findings 
Incidents or situations of verbal abuse ranked among the highest number of cases 
reported by FLA independent external monitors with respect to this Code provision.  
 
For example, during an independent external monitoring visit of a factory in Sri Lanka, 
workers interviewed by the monitor reported that a line supervisor shouted at workers 
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when they did not reach their production targets. It was also reported that the factory did 
not have standard procedures to deal with harassment and abuse.   
 
In other monitored factories, there were reports that supervisors physically abused 
workers. During an independent external monitoring visit in Bangladesh, workers 
informed the monitors that physical abuse, such as slapping, pushing and pulling the 
workers’ hair occurred daily. Cases of sexual harassment, while less common, were also 
reported. In a factory in the Dominican Republic, a monitor noted that: 
 
Workers reported on-going sexual harassment at the factory.  A worker reported that a 
supervisor had dated a woman inside the factory and had dismissed workers who 
refused to go out with him. Another female worker reported that she received 
“unwelcome/indecent solicitations” from various people all the time and that she has not 
reported the incidents because “it is so common, nobody would care”. 
 
Independent external monitors also found that some factories imposed monetary fines or 
penalties for poor performance. For example, at a factory in Thailand, a monitor found 
that monetary fines were levied on the workers for being late or for not punching their 
time cards.  
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.8: Aggregate Findings: Harassment or Abuse Noncompliance 
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One. 
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 Graph 4.9: Regional Breakdown: Harassment or Abuse Noncompliance 
Harassment or Abuse Violations by Region
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Visit Reports for Year 
One.26 
 
Harassment or abuse noncompliance represented 8% of all noncompliance 
internationally, and represented 2.7% of all Code noncompliance in China, 11% of all 
Code noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 10.7% of all Code noncompliance in Latin 
America, 6.8% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region 
(EMEA), 7.6% of all Code noncompliance in S. Asia, and 2.9% of all Code 
noncompliance in the USA.   
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
When internal or FLA monitors have identified cases of harassment or abuse, it has 
been critical for participating companies to develop an appropriate and culturally 
sensitive remediation response that ensures the protection of workers interviewed from 
any retaliation.  Participating companies have been able to facilitate remediation 
                                                 
26
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in 
South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in 
absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
issues in region) x 100.    
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programs by developing cooperative relationships with factories and implementing 
preventative measures.    
 
Below are examples of steps taken by participating companies to prevent and remediate 
harassment or abuse in their supply chains. 
 
In the United States, Reebok monitors have witnessed worker discrimination and 
harassment in some independently owned and operated facilities. These factories tend 
to be characterized by clear cultural, ethnic, or linguistic divisions between management 
and the worker population, and Reebok monitors have been alerted to related 
preferential hiring and promotion practices. To counter this, Reebok has required that 
factories provide documentation of ability and performance reviews to support workers’ 
wage rates and promotion. To further combat intimidating work environments, Reebok 
producing factories are required to adopt, develop, and train management in accordance 
with a non-harassment policy, and to publicly post these corporate policies workplaces in 
all languages spoken by the community of workers.  
 
Sexual harassment has been an even more complex and difficult issue to detect and 
remediate.  To counter the practice, some participating companies’ compliance efforts 
have involved implementing prevention training to promote awareness about the 
problem.  
In order to combat sexual harassment at their supplier facilities, Nike developed a video 
training program to educate supervisors and workers on how to recognize and report 
sexual harassment noncompliance in the workplace.  In Vietnam, more than 31,000 
supervisors and workers took the training.  This program was translated into three other 
Asian languages, and was made available in Korea, Taiwan, China, and Indonesia.   
 
During an independent external monitoring visit of a factory manufacturing products for 
Phillips-Van Heusen in Bangladesh, an FLA-accredited monitor discovered through on-
site and off-site worker interviews that workers were subject to harassment and abusive 
practices in certain areas of the factory. To address these serious issues, PVH 
cooperated with the factory chairman to facilitate a remediation plan at the facility and to 
monitor its progress. PVH reported that the following corrective actions have taken place 
in this factory: 
 
 A comprehensive “worker manual” was implemented and distributed to each worker, 
stating his or her rights and benefits. Management conducted meetings to ensure 
that the workers understood all the information. 
 A training and awareness program was implemented for supervisors and middle 
management on appropriate treatment of workers.  
 A female team was formed to conduct periodic secured interviews and report directly 
to the chairman and personnel manager of the division.  A human rights compliance 
consultant was later hired to continue monitoring and reporting noncompliance to the 
factory chairman. 
 An internal monitoring program was implemented with guidance from PVH in order to 
continue to make improvements to workplace conditions.  
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 NONDISCRIMINATION 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
No person shall be subject to any discrimination in employment, including hiring, salary, 
benefits, advancement, discipline, termination or retirement, on the basis of gender, 
race, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, nationality, political opinion, or social or 
ethnic origin.  
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (C. 111) 
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (C. 100) 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966  
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1965 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
1979. 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods  
In investigating noncompliance with Nondiscrimination, monitors are instructed to pay 
particular attention to categories of workers that would most likely be victims of 
discriminatory practices in the country where they are monitoring (i.e. migrant workers, 
women, union members, young workers, pregnant workers, ethnic minorities, etc.).  
Monitors are responsible for determining whether employment decisions are made solely 
the basis of education, training, demonstrated skills or abilities, and that there are no 
differences in compensation and benefits attributable to gender. The FLA Monitoring 
Guidance provides suggested approaches to uncovering discrimination during a 
monitoring visit, and pays special attention to issues relating to pregnancy and 
reproductive health. For example, monitors are required to assess whether factories 
require pregnancy testing of female employees; whether employers unfairly discriminate 
against pregnant workers; and whether pregnant workers are afforded appropriate 
protections. 
  
 
Compliance Issues 
Discrimination can take many different forms in the workplace, including both direct and 
indirect forms of discrimination. Cultural practices and social attitudes also contribute to 
discrimination as an endemic problem, manifested differently in various countries.  As 
discriminatory practices can be both pervasive and subtle, they are often difficult to 
uncover, document and quantify.  
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In the supply chain covered by the FLA system, the labor force is predominately 
comprised of women workers in developing countries, who are often the most vulnerable 
to exploitative conditions of work.  J. G. Frynas, in a survey based on Clean Clothes 
Campaign findings, reports that “among the most typical concerns voiced by female 
workers in different countries are lower pay or inferior contract terms than men, no 
provision for, or difficulties in obtaining, maternity leave; sexual harassment by 
supervisors, forced pregnancy tests and dismissal of pregnant women” (Frynas, 2000). 
In We in the Zone, Women Workers in Asia’s Export Processing Zones, the Asia Monitor 
Resource Centre corroborates this observation.  Allegations reported in that publication 
include age discrimination; lack of promotion opportunities; lack of child care options, 
effectively preventing women from applying for certain positions; non-receipt of legally-
entitled benefits (such as menstrual leave); and sexual harassment (AMRC, 1998). 
 
Migrant workers are also vulnerable to mistreatment, as they often lack legal status in 
host countries and are either not protected by the law, or lack knowledge of their rights 
under law.  Factories located in countries with a high presence of migrant workers 
present a particular challenge with regards to the application of the Nondiscrimination 
FLA Code provision. 
 
For example, in Taiwan, migrant laborers (mostly from the Philippines and Thailand) 
reportedly pay anywhere from US$364 to US$5,45427 in recruitment fees to be placed in 
factories.  Added costs are incurred, for instance, when recruitment agents “kickback” 
money to employers to secure contracts (AMRC, 1999).28  The end result of this 
corruption is that workers must borrow at interest rates as high as 25%29 to pay fees.  
Workers, moreover, are often forced to use their homes and farms as collateral to 
receive needed loans.       
 
In Korea, where there are approximately 350,000 migrant workers, approximately 30% 
are foreign trainees.  Like other migrants, “trainees” pay excessively high recruitment 
fees, have their identification documents confiscated, and are often assaulted on the job.  
In addition to trainees, there are an even greater number of undocumented workers in 
Korea.  It is estimated that 65% of migrant workers in Korea are undocumented30 and 
subject to the same abuses suffered by “trainees” (Common Committee for Elimination 
of Discrimination against Migrant Workers, 2002).  
 
In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has a large presence of migrants from other countries in the 
region with labor surplus economies, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India 
and Nepal. While Malaysia has no national minimum wage, in some cases the 
Malaysian government has a Memorandum of Understanding with migrant-sending 
countries that cites a basic wage for immigrant workers from these countries. As a result, 
employers are required by law to pay workers of different nationalities different wages.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The typical migrant worker in Taiwan has been reported to earn $600 per month or $7,200 per year; $1,800 (20-30% of 
annual wages) is spent on recruitment fees.  
28
 In “Contract Labor in Taiwan- Systemic Problems in Need of Reform” AMRC estimates that as many as 260 recruitment 
agencies are published in Taiwan’s Employment Department web site.  
29
 Filipino and Thai “finance companies” are not formal banks but instead are part of an “informal finance network,” most 
closely resembling pawnshops.  In Thailand, these “companies” reportedly charge between 3-5% in interest rates; 
whereas, Filipino “companies” charge up to 25%.   
30
 This figure does not include legal “trainees.” 
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FLA Findings 
The most common noncompliance finding identified by FLA independent external 
monitors with respect to Nondiscrimination was the use of pregnancy testing in factories, 
either as a condition of hiring or of continued employment.  For example, in Sri Lanka, a 
monitor found that a sample application for employment at the factory being monitored 
asked applicants about their marital and pregnancy status.  During interviews, workers 
also reported that factory management did not lessen the workload of pregnant women.  
At the same factory, the management reported to the monitor that married woman were 
only hired if they had experience, because only young women were hired as trainees.  
Management further explained that they only hire men to do button attachment and side-
seaming work.   
Another common compliance issue was the inconsistent use of factory policies with 
regards to hiring, assignment of work, bonuses, promotion, discipline, termination of 
employment and other employment decisions. At a factory in Vietnam, a monitor 
reported the following findings of noncompliance: 
 
For promotions, workers receive good evaluations based on their cooperative attitude 
and willingness to work overtime. Decisions on promotion and job assignments made by 
line supervisors based on their evaluations, which were largely subjective. Policies and 
guidelines for these evaluations were unwritten, unclear and open to discrimination or 
abuse.   
 
 
Graphs: 
Graph 4.10: Aggregate Findings: Nondiscrimination Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One. 
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Graph 4.11: Regional Breakdown: Nondiscrimination Noncompliance 
Nondiscrimination Violations by Region
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
China SEASIA LAMERICA EMEA SASIA USA
Region
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.31 
 
Nondiscrimination noncompliance represented 4% of all noncompliance internationally, 
and represented 1.8% of all Code noncompliance in China, 5.3% of all Code 
noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 5.6% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 
2.9% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 4.2% 
of all Code noncompliance in South Asia, and 2.9% of all Code noncompliance in the 
USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Participating companies, through their internal monitoring programs, also investigated 
and uncovered cases of pregnancy testing and other forms of discrimination in their 
contract facilities. As a response, most participating companies undertook remediation 
that focused on changes in policy and, in some cases, management training programs.   
 
                                                 
31
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in 
South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in 
absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
isues in region) x 100.    
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Below are examples of steps taken by participating companies to prevent and remediate 
discriminatory practices in their supply chains. 
 
In Thailand, Reebok monitors identified a situation in which female workers were 
required to submit a medical certificate which may include pregnancy testing, prior to 
employment. In order not to discourage the employment of married or pregnant women, 
Reebok required factories to formulate written hiring procedures that would help prevent 
discrimination.  The procedures specifically prohibited inclusion of pregnancy testing or 
other methods utilized by management to gain this information.  The company further 
established a system whereby recruiting staff would be disciplined if they required a 
pregnancy test or inquired about a female applicant’s pregnancy status. 
 
 
During an independent external monitoring visit of a factory producing for adidas in 
Mexico, the factory management informed the monitors that pregnant women could not 
be hired by the factory, and that this practice was the factory’s official policy.  As part of 
their remediation plan, adidas required the factory to develop a written nondiscrimination 
policy. The nondiscrimination policy included a guarantee that no pregnancy tests would 
be required in the hiring process and that no discrimination against pregnant women 
would take place.  adidas also required that all employees be informed of the 
nondiscrimination policy and that it be posted in prominent locations throughout the 
factory.   
 
During a follow-up visit to the factory, monitors found that the policy had not been 
implemented, and the management requested a temporary extension.  The extension 
was granted, and at a subsequent monitoring visit, monitors found that the 
nondiscrimination policy had been developed and posted throughout the factory.  
 
Participating companies also undertook efforts to combat discrimination against migrant 
workers. For example, in Malaysia, in order to address discrepancies in base pay, some 
participating companies have been working with their contract facilities in Malaysia to 
develop and institute performance-based pay scales, in which workers are paid 
according to objective criteria for job performance.  
 
For more on FLA participating company remediation efforts to address discriminatory 
practices against migrant workers, see the case study in Phillips-Van Heusen’s company 
review in Section III of this report.   
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 HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
Employers shall provide a safe and healthy working environment to prevent accidents 
and injury to health arising out of, linked with, or occurring in the course of work or as a 
result of the operation of employer facilities. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Protection of Workers Health Recommendation, 1953 
Occupational Health Services Recommendation, 1959 
Workers Representatives Convention, 1971 (C. 135) 
Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (C. 155) and Recommendation  
Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents Convention, 1993 (No. 174) 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
The FLA audit instrument provides a checklist of the elements of Health and Safety to be 
reviewed in the visual inspection.  These include readily discernable items such as 
general appearance and maintenance; fire safety including evacuation plans and fire 
extinguishers and alarms; electrical wiring;  medical facilities and first aid kits; machine 
guarding; personal protective equipment; hazardous and combustible material use, 
storage and control; adequate chemical management, such as use of MSDS (Material 
Safety Data Sheets) and chemical labeling; comfort and cleanliness in bathroom 
facilities, dining facilities and food preparation; and dormitory conditions.  Additionally, 
monitors are required to ensure that workers have received training in proper health and 
safety procedures. 
 
Compliance Issues 
The prevalence of health and safety noncompliance is not only a reflection of the general 
conditions and workplace environment of the manufacturing industry, but can also be 
attributed to the fact that there are measurable indicators of noncompliance, which make 
it easier for monitors to identify and quantify.  Moreover, monitors often have more 
training and experience in occupational health and safety. 
 
In China, the Chinese press has reported on the increasing number of industrial 
accidents in the last few years. The latest statistics show that in the first two months of 
2003 alone there were 1,639 deaths from 1,417 workplace accidents in industrial and 
mining enterprises. The government has responded to this trend by forming a new State 
Administration of Work Safety to promote safety at work. According to the China 
Business Weekly (April 17, 2003) the causes of the accidents could be found in the 
“prevailing ignorance among employers of working conditions resulting from irrational 
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pursuit of profits” but the “main reason is that many local officials have tolerated some 
employers' malpractice in a bid to pursue economic development at the cost of work 
safety.”  The US State Department found that Health and Safety violations occurred in 
other Southeast Asian countries as well, and reported that violations were common in 
Indonesia.32 
 
 
FLA Findings 
Issues related to fire safety were the most common health and safety noncompliance 
findings identified during independent external monitoring visits by FLA independent 
external monitors. Findings included: inadequate fire extinguishers, blocked exits or 
aisles, infrequent or no fire drills, and a lack of proper fire safety training for workers. For 
example, at a factory in India, an FLA monitor submitted the following finding: 
 
No evacuation plans posted on different floor. - Some fire extinguishers are blocked -
Exposed wiring found - Fire extinguishers not marked with inspection and expiration 
dates - Some workers do not know how to operate fire extinguishers -Some doors 
marked as exits locked - Room to the Generator room not locked. 
 
Independent external monitors also reported situations in which safety equipment was 
improperly used or not available, such as eye guards on sewing machines, face masks, 
or other personal protective equipment (PPE) for workers.  For example, at a factory in 
China, during their visual inspection of the factory, the monitors reported that “workers 
working with toxic glues were wearing dust masks, not using filtered breathing masks.” 
Others reported health and safety issues related to access to clean drinking water on the 
factory floor, inadequate first aid kits, and improper storage and treatment of potentially 
harmful chemicals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 State Dept. (2003) Indonesia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm)  
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Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.12: Aggregate Findings: Health and Safety Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One 
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Graph 4.13: Regional Breakdown: Health and Safety Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Visit Reports for Year 
One.33 
 
Health and Safety noncompliance represented 26% of all Code noncompliance 
internationally, 23.2% of all Code noncompliance in China, 24.9% of all Code 
noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 24.9% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 
36.9% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 16% 
of all Code noncompliance in S. Asia, and 52.9% of all Code noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
To combat health and safety noncompliance throughout their supply chains, participating 
companies undertook a number of projects that included local nongovernmental 
organizations and health experts.  By engaging with local actors, participating 
companies were able to more effectively tailor their remediation plans to the needs of the 
local community.  Below are three examples of health and safety projects undertaken by 
participating companies. The first case demonstrates the potential for collaborative 
remediation when multiple companies work with local groups to encourage change, 
while the second and third examples show how government and nongovernmental 
                                                 
33
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance issues 
in South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, 
in absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
issues in region) x 100.    
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organizations can work with companies to create safer working environments for factory 
workers. 
 
Nike, Reebok, and adidas cooperated with international health and safety experts, Hong 
Kong-based NGOs, and local NGOs to develop a health and safety project in China.  
Project participants aimed to develop the capacity of local groups to address health and 
safety issues, while providing workers and management with the skills to establish 
workplace health and safety committees with support from local NGOs.   
 
The project, which was based on a needs assessment conducted by China Working 
Women’s Network (CWWN) in cooperation with other groups, has the potential to have 
an enormous impact by working in footwear factories with as many as 60,000 workers.  
The first stage of this project involved a four-day intensive training for local groups, and 
selected factory management and worker representatives.  Lessons were conducted by 
an international training team, which consisted of representatives from the Maquila 
Health and Safety Support Network, the Labor Occupational Health Program at the 
University of California at Berkeley, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with 
input from NGOs, including CWWN, the Asia Monitor Resource Center (AMRC), the 
Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (HKCIC), and the Association for the Rights 
of Industrial Accident Victims.  
 
The team used creative and participatory techniques to train participants in the 
identification and evaluation of health hazards, the impact of chemicals on the body, and 
key aspects of ergonomic, electrical, noise and fire safety.  The trainings also addressed 
workers' legal rights, and workplace inspection techniques. Popular education training 
methods were also shared with participants so that they could pass along the 
information to others in their NGOs and communities. Participants also met with the 
labor practices managers of adidas and Reebok in Hong Kong, and visited a 60,000-
worker shoe complex in Dong Guan City.   All training materials were translated into 
Chinese; English-speaking instructors had simultaneous translation for their presentation 
and activities. After the training, each factory’s participants reunited to create a proposal 
for setting up a health and safety committee in their respective factories. 
Outcomes include:  
 
-Local NGOs gaining expertise in monitoring, evaluating, and training about health and 
safety issues;  
 
-Factory management from participating factories meeting to share their experiences in 
setting up the health and safety committees; 
 
-New worker-management committees beginning to function as mechanisms for 
improving the health and safety of factory workers;  
 
-One of the health and safety committees that evolved out of this project working in 
cooperation with democratically-elected worker representatives to improve conditions in 
one of the participating factories; 
 
-Participating companies support of health and safety committees in their efforts to 
address remaining health and safety issues with the goal of sustainable improvements.  
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 Another example of cooperation with government and non-governmental initiatives was 
adidas’ work with the Vietnam Business Link Initiative to improve conditions in its 
Vietnamese factories.  Jointly managed by the International Business Leaders Forum, 
the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce, and the Vietnam footwear industry, the 
Business Link Initiative aimed to improve workplace conditions in footwear factories 
across Vietnam.   
 
The Initiative, now in its third year, had focused on awareness-raising and health and 
safety training until the end of 2001, when it moved to a new stage with the development 
of a Management Support System (MSS).  The MSS, available in both hard copy and 
CD-ROM, is a tool for factory managers to review factory conditions, practices and 
procedures against established standards, and then to address health and safety issues 
through remedial action plans.  The first edition of the MSS was distributed to 
participating factories in the third quarter of 2001. The project also allowed factories to 
share best practice sessions, helping them model improvements on the achievements of 
other factories, and organized train-the-trainer programs. 
 
 
In Indonesia, Nike joined with International Standards for Occupational Safety (ISOS) to 
observe occupational health programs in 10 Nike footwear production facilities, and to 
identify remediation opportunities and potential improvements in occupational health 
performance. This helped Nike implement an occupational health program that is 
compliant with government requirements and pertinent to the needs of Nike footwear 
contractors.  A number of programs were reviewed:  occupational health policies and 
standards; occupational health structure and performance; emergency response and 
referral procedure; health promotion activities; clinic and primary activities; and catering 
facilities.  ISOS staff moved from factory to factory on a weekly basis, where they 
conducted first aid and occupational health training for factory staff and some workers.  
ISOS also conducted continuing occupational health evaluations with factory staff to 
gauge the progress made against the aims set out each year.  As one result of this 
cooperation, Nike reports that all of its footwear factories in Indonesia have health 
doctors on staff. 
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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
Employers shall recognize and respect the right of employees to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (C. 
87) 
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (C. 98) 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Article 22 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 8  
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
To investigate freedom of association, monitors are required to inquire into any history of 
conflict or problems regarding workers’ rights of association, including incidents relating 
to organizing efforts, union membership drives, union representatives’ access to 
workers, and any management practices intended to counter unionization.  They are 
also required to ask whether a collective bargaining agreement exists, and to identify the 
employee grievance procedure in the factory.   
 
In “abstract” areas such as freedom of association, worker interviews are a crucial 
source of information. In interviewing workers a monitor will try to establish: whether they 
were asked about their union sympathies or affiliation at the time of hiring; if union 
supporters applying for jobs had been rejected; whether anti-union sentiments were 
expressed by managers or supervisors during the workers’ orientation period; and, if 
union members had been unfairly dismissed. Sometimes the monitor will be able to 
corroborate the worker testimony with information gleaned from the personnel files or the 
management interviews.  However, in most cases monitors were left with a series of 
reinforcing indicators that pointed to the likelihood that anti-union activities were probably 
taking place.  
 
Understanding the local context is another key to identifying potential noncompliance. 
Monitors are required to be familiar with local laws and labor market dynamics, and to 
consult with knowledgeable local sources to establish general or factory specific 
compliance issues before conducting a monitoring exercise. They should also look at 
local cases regarding freedom of association, labor conflicts, the extent of worker 
organization in the area, and the degree of collective bargaining and of labor law 
enforcement. If the monitor establishes that the factory is located in an industrial zone in 
which no collective agreements exist and where the local labor inspectors have not 
made any findings with respect to freedom of association, they should be alert to the 
possibility of anti-union activity.  
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Compliance Issues 
Freedom of association may well represent the greatest challenge to the FLA system, 
both because of the extent of the problem and the difficulty of monitoring and remedying 
it.  Detection of this issue represents a major area in which FLA independent external 
monitors need to improve in Year Two.  The issue is further complicated by a plethora of 
legal limitations on freedom of association in a number of the countries where 
participating companies operate.  Despite recent evidence showing that countries with 
effective labor relations regimes and workers organization performed better 
economically than those which repressed labor rights (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2003), a 
surprising number of countries either will not or cannot ensure that workers’ rights to 
organize and bargain collectively are respected.   
 
In countries such as China, one state-sponsored trade union is legally mandated to 
represent workers.  In theory, the Chinese Constitution guarantees Freedom of 
Association, but this right is determined by the interests of the State and the Communist 
Party. In a complaint considered by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
(Case #2031), the Committee noted that while the government of China believes that its 
laws guarantee the rights of workers to form and join organizations of their own 
choosing, the Committee concluded that many provisions of the Trade Union Act were 
contrary to the fundamental principles of freedom of association.  
 
The Committee on Freedom of Association also recalled that it had concluded in two 
previous cases (#1652 and #1930) that the Trade Union Act prevented the 
establishment of trade union organizations independent of the Government and the 
Party. Only one trade union, the ACFTU, is recognized. It has traditionally seen its role 
as protecting the interests of the Party, the government, the employer and the worker. 
The growth of the market economy and the concomitant shift from state-controlled to 
private enterprise, however, is bringing about a reevaluation of that role, and many local 
union officials are adopting Western trade union techniques, and adapting them to their 
circumstances. According to the ACFTU, there were 103 million trade union members in 
China in 2000, and 67,000 unions in foreign-invested enterprises, with a membership of 
6 million workers. However, unofficial estimates place the ACFTU presence in foreign-
invested enterprises at less than 10%.  
 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Free Trade Zones (FTZs) represent a significant 
risk in terms of the right to organize and bargain collectively.  EPZs and FTZs seek to 
create a ‘pro-business’ investment climate where freedom of association is restricted or 
prevented altogether – officially or unofficially.  This is common throughout Central 
America, where a number of FLA participating companies reported that freedom of 
association noncompliance occurred, despite laws protecting freedom of association and 
ILO and US Government efforts to reform local labor laws and improve labor law 
enforcement. The ICFTU concluded that “Latin America is still the most dangerous 
region in the world to be a trade unionist.  Harrassments, dismissals, attacks, even 
abduction and murder are part of their daily lot…The export processing zones of Central 
America are virtually rights-free zones… Trade unions are almost non-existent.” 
(Americas: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2002). 34 
                                                 
34In recognition of the systemic and widespread nature of the issue in Central America, the FLA has decided to launch an 
initiative to address the most common instances of noncompliance in a coordinated and concerted way. The initiative will 
operate at multiple levels, from the Government through the zone authorities to the suppliers, and will draw on 
contributions from all FLA constituents. The core of the program will be the installation of common policies and 
procedures designed to prevent discrimination against union supporters in hiring and firing, and the introduction of 
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 In El Salvador, for example, a number of organizations have pointed to a systemic failure 
to protect workers associational rights. A US State Department report found that “there 
are credible reports that some factories dismissed union organizers, and there are no 
collective bargaining agreements with the 18 unions active in the maquila sector” (El 
Salvador Human Rights Country Report, 2002). Perhaps the most damaging reports of 
anti-union activity came from the Monitoring Report on the Maquila and Bonded Areas 
prepared for the USAID, the Secretaría Técnica de Financiamiento Externo (SETEFE) 
and the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social.  Working with the full support of the 
Government the researchers found that “blacklists” of the names of workers who belong, 
or at some point have belonged, to a union organization are retained by management in 
at least one EPZ.  These workers are then not hired. The report also noted that workers 
belonging to the boards of unions that do exist in the EPZ are systematically fired. The 
report was withdrawn by the Government of El Salvador shortly after its release in June 
2000.      
 
 
FLA Findings 
The most common freedom of association noncompliance uncovered during 
independent external monitoring visits was a lack of knowledge of the freedom of 
association Code provisions among the factory workforces.  A number of cases of 
attempts to prevent unionization and the firing of union organizers were also found.  For 
example, in a factory in Guatemala, workers reported to the FLA independent external 
monitor that they were not free to join the unions and that they had suffered reprisals for 
having joined or for continuing to belong to the unions. 
 
During an independent external monitoring visit of a factory in Mexico, a monitor 
reported the following:  
 
During the employee interviews there were comments on employees being fired for trying 
to form a union. During the management interview, the Vice-President of the company 
explained that those employees were trying to stop the production in an illegal way, and 
they were asked to stop. The ones that accepted, still work for the company, the others 
were liquidated. Papers [verifying] these liquidations were shown for us.  
 
At a factory in Vietnam, it was reported by a monitor that:  
 
The Labor Union President said the factory does not have suggestion boxes for the 
Union, but that Union shares boxes with the Mgt’s Labor Practice [LP] office.  All 
complaint letters to the Union are thus filtered through LP Dept.  The Union office is also 
located inside the Mgt office beside the LP Department so there is no way for workers to 
communicate with or visit the Union without the knowledge and oversight of [the] LP 
Dept. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
grievance and disciplinary processes and procedures. The exercise of these functions will be documented in a consistent 
way and monitored by independent monitors. 
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Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.14: Aggregate Findings: Freedom of Association Noncompliance 
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Graph 4.15: Regional Breakdown: Freedom of Association Noncompliance 
Freedom of Association Violations by Region
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
China SEASIA LAMERICA EMEA SASIA USA
Region
P
er
c
e
n
ta
ge
Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.35 
 
Freedom of Association noncompliance represented 6% of all Code noncompliance 
internationally, 4.8% of all Code noncompliance in China, 5.5% of all Code 
noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 12.2% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 
3.9% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 9.2% 
of all Code noncompliance in S. Asia, and 2.9% of all Code noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Participating companies have adopted a number of strategies to help inform workers of 
their right to freely associate, and have taken steps to ensure that management respects 
this right.  For example, Reebok requires that factories adopt a non-retaliation, non-
harassment, and non-discrimination policy to comply with Reebok Standards, and has 
concentrated upon management training to ensure proper respect for worker rights.   
 
                                                 
35
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance issues 
in South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, 
in absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
issues in region) x 100.    
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Despite a number of advancements, freedom of association represents a great 
challenge for the FLA and participating companies.  Below are two examples of 
participating company efforts to systematically improve workplace conditions by 
encouraging worker organization and collective bargaining in regions were such 
practices are not widely accepted.  
 
As part of its program to encourage factory workers to participate in workplace 
decisions, Reebok facilitated the democratic election of worker representatives in the 
Kong Tai Shoe factories located in Longgang, China, in July 2001. The athletic shoe 
factory is publicly listed in Hong Kong and employs just under 6,000 workers.  Workers 
elected 27 representatives out of 63 self-nominated worker candidates.  A second 
election was held in a Taiwanese-invested factory in October 2002.  The 12,000 workers 
at the Fu Lu Sports Shoes factory in Fuzhou, China voted for 192 self-nominated 
candidates in seven election zones, reflecting different production departments. While 
both factory unions are officially affiliated with the ACFTU, these elections are the first 
known efforts to give workers the opportunity to elect their own worker representatives.  
 
Both elections were preceded by: 
 
 The enhancement or creation of a Union Charter that clearly defined the purpose 
and structure of the unions, and which supported open, transparent elections 
 A decision to use a proportional representation system so every factory 
 department would be represented proportionally on the union committee 
 A series of steps to communicate with and inform workers, including Open Forums, 
to describe the process and answer workers’ questions, and the distribution of 
“frequently asked questions” 
 Campaign speeches given in public by all candidates prior to election day   
 
The voting was conducted by secret ballot.  Vote counting was fully transparent, and 
was observed by representatives of labor NGOs and academics. In Fu Lu, for example, 
19 female and 12 male representatives were elected, while the incumbent chair person, 
who was supported by local officials of the state controlled union, was voted out.  
 
Following the elections, Reebok provided elected representatives with training in its 
Code of Conduct and organizations that have the trust of workers provided additional 
training, which included skill-building for conducting meetings and recording grievances.  
 
Longer term, Reebok will continue to provide ongoing informal guidance to worker 
representatives, and challenge them to become actively involved in factory problem-
solving by involving them in the compliance resolution process undertaken by Reebok 
factory monitors. Reebok will also arrange opportunities for representatives to meet with 
their peers in other factories, and in other countries to expose them to new ideas.    
 
Reebok has made an important contribution to the promotion of freedom of association 
with worker representation initiatives in Indonesia, Thailand, and increasingly in China.  
These experiments with worker representation are based on the idea that remediation 
will be most effective and sustainable when it focuses on education and training, and the 
development of systems for worker representation and participation.  As Reebok 
maintains, workers are the best monitors. A detailed description of the initiative can be 
found in Reebok’s company review in Section III of this report. 
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 Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) reported on its efforts to address systemic freedom of 
association non-compliance at the factory and Ministerial levels.  In one such case, PVH 
reported that workers at a factory in El Salvador contacted the brand to inform it of anti-
union activity. An investigation was immediately conducted, and the dismissal of several 
workers who were planning to organize a union was confirmed.  
 
Following the investigation, PVH’s Human Rights team worked closely with key 
government officials in El Salvador, and with the assistance of the Ministry of Labor, the 
dismissed workers were rehired with full benefits.  The workers subsequently organized 
a union at the factory.  During the unionization process, PVH required the factory 
management to ensure effective and open communication channels with the union 
organizers and the union (Sitehsa). PVH continues to monitor the situation and works to 
maintain clear lines of communication among all involved parties. 
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WAGES AND BENEFITS 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
Employers recognize that wages are essential to meeting employees’ basic needs.  
Employers shall pay employees, as a floor, at least the minimum wage required by local 
law or the prevailing industry wage, whichever is higher, and shall provide legally 
mandated benefits. 
 
 
ILO Conventions  
Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (C. 95) 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (C. 102) 
Maternity Protection Convention, 1952 (C, 103) 
Employment Injury Benefits Convention, 1964 (C. 121) 
Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969 (C. 130) 
  
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
To investigate compliance with Wages and Benefits, monitors examine the factory’s 
compensation system and review time-keeping and payroll records to ensure that 
records are maintained accurately, and that workers are paid the correct rate for their 
hours worked.  Monitors are also required to review the factory’s policies with respect to 
wages and benefits, including any policies regarding training wages.  During worker 
interviews, monitors assess worker awareness about their wages, incentive systems, 
benefits and bonuses to which they are entitled in the company and under applicable 
law. They must also determine whether workers are provided with a pay statement for 
each pay period, showing their earned wages, regular and overtime pay, bonuses and 
all deductions.  
 
 
Compliance Issues 
There is a nexus of Code noncompliance that involves wages, hours of work and 
overtime compensation. Contactors in global supply chains face increasing competition, 
which requires them to cut costs and increase output. Typically, they respond to those 
pressures by working harder, rather than smarter.  Labor costs and rent are major 
components of their overall costs and so they try to limit those, working their existing 
labor force for longer hours rather than expanding the size of their facility and workforce.  
In addition, the uncertainties of the global market make contractors reluctant to take on 
new commitments in the form of workers and plant and equipment, so they tend to 
simply stretch their existing resources to try and cope with peak periods. The result is an 
increased risk of Code noncompliance in the areas of wages, hours and overtime. 
Remediation programs need to take this nexus into account, since attempts to address 
only one of the three intertwined variables may not succeed.  
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FLA Findings 
The most common issues of noncompliance with Wages and Benefits identified during 
independent external monitoring visits related to workers not receiving their legally 
mandated benefits, such as insurance or leave. For example, at a factory in China, an 
FLA independent external monitor reported the following finding:  
 
It was noted, based on the provided social insurance receipt, that all the employees 
participated in the retirement, illness or injury, unemployment and child-bearing 
insurance, but did not participate in the disability caused by work-related injury insurance 
or occupational disease insurance as required by law. 
 
The second most common issue related to improper calculations of workers’ wages, 
resulting in underpayment of wages. This finding often correlated to poor or inadequate 
time-keeping systems. In some cases, it was discovered that the factory was paying 
workers less than the legal minimum wage. For example, at a factory in China, a monitor 
found that “workers are paid less than minimum wage, about 35-85%.” 
 
FLA monitors also identified cases in which pay slips were not provided in the workers’ 
native language or did not clearly delineate between regular and overtime hours worked. 
During an independent external monitoring visit of a factory in Mexico, a monitor 
reported that workers’ pay slips did not detail the number of regular or overtime hours 
worked.  In addition, the auditors reported that the factory’s pay slips were very difficult 
to understand, as the factory used a code number system, which was not explained on 
the pay slips themselves.  Eight of the fifteen workers interviewed reported that they did 
not understand how their wages were calculated. 
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Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.16: Aggregate Findings: Wages and Benefit Noncompliance 
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Graph 4.17: Regional Breakdown: Wages and Benefit Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.36 
 
Wages and Benefits noncompliance represented 14% of all Code noncompliance 
internationally, and represented 21.4% of all Code noncompliance in China, 12.9% of all 
Code noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 9.6% of all Code noncompliance in Latin 
America, 6.8% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East region (EMEA), 
14.3% of all Code noncompliance in South Asia, and 5.9% of all Code noncompliance in 
the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Compliance with the Code provision on Wages and Benefits is sometimes complicated 
by discriminatory wage practices and inadequate or fraudulent time-keeping systems.  
FLA participating companies developed a number of strategies to improve compliance in 
this area.  The implementation of some participating company remediation plans 
involved working with factories to improve their time-keeping systems to ensure correct 
payment of wages to all employees.   
                                                 
36
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance in South Asia than in 
Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, in absolute terms, in 
that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance in each region, Code Awareness represents 
a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance issues within each Code 
category was divided by the total number of issues found within each region to calculate the percentage.  The formula = 
(number of Code category noncompliance in region/ total noncompliance in region) x 100.    
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 Below are three examples of efforts undertaken by participating companies to promote 
improvements with respect to Wages and Benefits.    
 
Reebok worked to promote fairer wages in Vietnam, a country in which footwear 
manufacturing is growing, and where Vietnamese law permits a two-tiered wage system 
based on the structure of factory ownership.  State-owned factories and private 
Vietnamese-owned factories are allowed to pay a minimum wage of VND 240,0000 
(US$16)/month, while foreign-invested factories are required to pay a minimum wage of 
between VND 556,000- 626,000 (US$40 - 45)/month in areas in and around Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi.  The discrepancy between these two different legal minimum 
wages is dramatic and has a direct impact on the ability of workers to provide for 
themselves and their families.  Reebok adopted a policy that requires Vietnamese 
factories to pay the foreign-invested minimum wage regardless of the ownership 
structure. In those instances where a factory is not paying the foreign-invested minimum 
wage, Reebok designates the factory as "conditionally approved" for production, 
provided that the factory provides a firm commitment to raise wages to the foreign-
invested wage within six months.   
 
 
In Thailand, Reebok monitors reported that Thai workers are sometimes underpaid due 
to the “projected target rate” calculation. Theoretically, the target wage rate is set for 8 
working hours with payment above the minimum wage, but in practice the working hours 
are sometimes extended to meet the target, resulting in payment below the minimum 
wage.  In factories where this is the case, many workers continue work during their lunch 
so as to meet the daily target as soon as possible.  To counter this, Reebok required 
factories violating the minimum wage provision to institute a policy that workers are not 
allowed to work in the factory during the lunch break, and that workers who violate the 
policy will be subject to disciplinary measures.  In the rare situation where it is necessary 
to work during lunch time due to pressures of production, the working hours must be 
recorded and paid with an overtime hourly rate.  The factory must also post the working 
hours on a daily basis, as recorded by electronic swipe cards, so that workers can 
double check whether the payment received matches the actual number of hours 
worked. 
 
 
Eddie Bauer was advised by an NGO that serious wage and other Code violations were 
occurring at one of its supplier factories located in an Export Processing Zone in 
Southeast Asia, resulting in labor unrest.  
 
Upon learning of the allegations, Eddie Bauer launched a two-week onsite investigation 
which included an audit of the factory and other neighboring facilities of the vendor as 
well as interviews with workers, factory management, and local officials and 
organizations.  A combined Eddie Bauer field and corporate monitoring team traveled to 
Southeast Asia to collect information and address the concerns. The investigation 
revealed that factories in the region operated by the vendor were violating the wage and 
benefit standards in Eddie Bauer’s Workplace Code of Conduct.  Issues included 
misclassification of job function, improper overtime calculation and incomplete time 
cards, all resulting in reduced compensation. 
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In order to improve practices, a joint team of senior vendor staff and Eddie Bauer 
associates guided and trained factory management on remediation.  The vendor also 
adopted the new practices at all its local facilities.   
 
Upon completion of the corrective action plan, the following improvements occurred at 
the factories as reported by the NGO and the factory, and observed by Eddie Bauer: 
 
 A workers committee was formed at each of the vendor’s local factories through 
which employees could inform factory management of its concerns and help remedy 
them.  The formation of the committees helped relieve the tension between the 
workers and factory management 
 A new computerized wage and hour system was implemented at the factories as well 
as employee training on the new system 
 Full legal benefits began to be provided to all employees 
 Payments of back wages were distributed to all employees 
 
Eddie Bauer reported that their response to the alleged violations, the input of the NGO, 
and their partnership with the supplier resulted in improved wage and hour practices at 
the supplier’s factories in the region, and improved relations between workers and 
factory management.  
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HOURS OF WORK 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
Except in extraordinary business circumstances, employees shall (i) not be required to 
work more than the lesser of (a) 48 hours per week and 12 hours overtime or (b) the 
limits on regular and overtime hours allowed by the law of the country of manufacture or, 
where the laws of such country do not limit the hours of work, the regular work week in 
such country plus 12 hours overtime and (ii) be entitled to at least one day off in every 
seven day period. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Hours of Work Convention, 1919 (C. 1) 
Weekly Rest Convention, 1921 (C. 14) 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
In order to assess compliance with hours of work, monitors are required to, inter alia, 
review the factory’s time-keeping records and cross-check the information with workers’ 
statements regarding their working hours. Monitors must determine whether the factory 
is in compliance with FLA Code limits on working hours (including any legal restrictions 
on regular and overtime hours), and whether workers have been afforded one day off in 
every seven-day period.  Monitors are also required to interview management and 
workers on methods used to handle periods of peak production. Additionally, monitors 
must investigate and verify the “voluntary” nature of overtime hours worked. This can be 
facilitated through a combination of worker and management interviews where the 
monitor inquires about the factory’s policies and procedures regarding overtime. These 
responses should then be cross-checked with the factory’s actual performance records 
in the wage and hour records review.  
 
 
Compliance Issues 
The principle behind the hours of work Code provision is that excessively long durations 
of work can have grave physiological effects on workers, such as increased mental and 
physical duress, which endanger the health and safety of workers. Workers should also 
be afforded adequate time off to meet their social needs, and to protect their welfare and 
that of their families. However, the reality is that the successful implementation of the 
hours of work standard is complicated by various factors.  
 
For example, national and local labor laws in many countries of manufacture, such as 
Indonesia, China and India, often allow factories to request exemptions from hours of 
work limitations during peak production seasons. In China, regular working hours are 
limited by law to 40 hours per week and overtime is restricted to 36 hours per month. In 
order to override these standards, it is common practice for factories to obtain exemption 
certificates from the local authorities or acquire illegitimate certificates that appear to be 
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official. Similar practices exist in Vietnam and other countries. In some countries, the 
laws regulating working hours are felt to be antiquated, impractical, and/or not enforced 
by local labor authorities. Additionally, countries such as Thailand and Sri Lanka have 
legal working hour limits beyond the FLA’s 60-hour/week cap on mandated work. 
Therefore, enforcing the Code limits on hours of work in these countries can create a 
competitive disadvantage for factories producing for participating companies, since other 
local factories can work longer hours and still be in legal compliance.  
 
This issue is compounded by the fact that countries with surplus labor and low labor 
costs often suffer from high poverty rates, unemployment, and low wage and living 
standards. In these labor markets, workers are likely to want to work more overtime to 
supplement their incomes. As a result, it is sometimes the case that workers will not 
want to work at a factory that does not provide opportunities to work overtime. 
Additionally, the fluctuating and seasonal nature of production results in excess overtime 
at peak periods. Another problem is the fact that suppliers are often producing for 
multiple buyers and accept more orders than they can handle without extending hours of 
work beyond legal and Code limits.  
 
 
FLA Findings 
The most common hours of work noncompliance finding during independent external 
monitoring visits was excessive working hours. For example, at a factory in China, an 
FLA independent external monitor found that during periods of peak production, the 
factory’s overtime hours ranged from 40 hours to 70 hours per month on average, with 
the highest at 83 hours per month.  
 
FLA monitors also identified cases in which workers were not provided a day off in every 
seven-day period. For example, at a factory in Sri Lanka, a monitor noted the following 
finding:  
 
Fourteen workers reported that they have worked 7 days a week during busy production 
periods. Two workers reported working 30 days per month and eleven workers reported 
working 28 days per month during busy production periods. 
 
Other findings related to cases of involuntary overtime, inadequate time-keeping 
systems and discrepancies between hour records and payroll. For example, at a factory 
in Turkey, a monitor reported that “there is no accurate time recording system, [and] 
consequently employee working days do not match with payroll records. Employee pay 
stubs do not reflect real overtime hours.” 
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Graphs: 
Graph 4.18: Aggregate Findings: Hours of Work Noncompliance 
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Graph 4.19: Regional Breakdown: Hours of Work Noncompliance 
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.37 
 
Hours of work noncompliance represented 15% of all noncompliance internationally, and 
represented 17% of all Code noncompliance in China, 17% of all Code noncompliance 
in Southeast Asia, 10.2% of all Code noncompliance in Latin America, 12.6% of all Code 
noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region (EMEA), 16.8% of all Code 
noncompliance in South Asia, and 14.7% of all Code noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
Given the various challenges to compliance with hours of work detailed above, 
monitoring and promoting compliance with this Code provision is an ongoing task for 
participating companies.  To counter the practice of forced overtime in factories, some 
participating companies have worked with their suppliers on measures such as: 
establishing an overtime policy where workers can refuse overtime requests without 
negative repercussions; implementing the use of overtime consent forms that require the 
                                                 
37
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance issues 
in South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, 
in absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
issues in region) x 100.    
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signed consent of workers; and formalizing a policy to provide workers with advance 
notice about anticipated periods of overtime.    
 
A particular challenge has been for participating companies to identify and implement 
long-term, sustainable solutions to excessive hours of work.  Below are two examples in 
which participating companies undertook initiatives to improve compliance with hours of 
work in their supply chains.  In the first example, a factory producing for Phillips-Van 
Heusen experienced efficiency gains in reducing its overall hours of work.  The second 
example describes a project undertaken by adidas to address the problems associated 
with seasonal ordering.   
 
In China, Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) worked with one of their contract facilities to 
discuss the problem of excessive overtime.  After a review of their practices, the factory 
management determined that, as a result of the excessive working hours, there were 
significant quality problems and an excessive number of ‘re-works.’  Additionally, there 
was a high percentage of absenteeism, low morale, and higher overhead cost.  
 
In order to address these inefficiencies while addressing noncompliance with Overtime 
standards, PVH reported that the owner of the factory:  
 
 Applied for “Comprehensive working hours permit” from the Labor Bureau 
 Established a working hours schedule for the entire year within the Code of Conduct 
requirements and the local labor law 
 Increased the workforce by 10% and improve workforce allocation 
 Implemented a monitoring program tracking individual working hours 
 Established a system that ensures voluntary overtime practice 
 Increased wages by 5% to offset the impact on reduced overtime 
 Created an incentive piece rate system 
 Modified contract terms with the workers’ consent 
 Educated workers on the new system, and conducted cross-training of workers with 
on-going incentive increase upon completion. 
 
Following the implementation of the corrective action plan, PVH reported that the factory 
has increased efficiency by 5% and that both worker and factory earnings have 
increased.  PVH reported that other efficiency gains were registered, and that the factory 
saw improvement in the quality of the production, a reduction in the absenteeism, and an 
increased retention of the workforce. 
 
 
adidas has an initiative on hours of work underway in Asia and is currently in the process 
of reviewing its progress. This project is a follow up to the “Work Hour Project 2” of 2000.  
In 2001, adidas had elected around 30 to 40 factories from 10 different Asian countries 
to study their working hour pattern.  They found many factories working hours were 
much higher than 60 hours per week, and that one of the reasons was the seasonal 
order pattern of the garment industry (i.e. in low season, factories have very little or 
nothing for production, but in Peak season, factories have too many order to rush for the 
short delivery lead time).   
 
The adidas apparel management team tried to smooth the seasonal pattern with a “Pull 
Forward” system, where some of the Peak Season orders are advanced to the Low 
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season period for production.  The current project, “Work Hour Project 3,” has tried to 
measure the effectiveness of the “Pull forward” system.  The project was conducted 
between August 2001 and Dec 2001.  At the time adidas sent its compliance report to 
the FLA, only the first 2 months of the project had been completed.   
 
adidas reported that the amount of factory overtime was not affected by the 
implementation of the “Pull Forward” system at the mid-point of the project.  A number of 
possible reasons were offered by adidas:  
 
 The “Pull Forward” order volume is NOT very large when compared with the total 
factory capacity 
 The true order volume and capacity in the factory is not known by adidas (e.g. 
Factory management may receive a lot of other customer's order which cause them 
to work long OT hour) 
 adidas changed the Pull Forward order from time to time, further complicating the 
system. (i.e., some pull forward orders changed back in normal delivery in Peak 
season) 
 Hours of Work noncompliance depends more on the other production reasons. 
  
As of the mid-term review, adidas continued to employ the “Pull Forward” system in an 
attempt to improve Hours of Work compliance, but improvement had not yet been 
registered.  Despite the initial inability of the “Pull Forward” system to improve Hours of 
Work compliance, adidas continued to observe the outcomes of this project aimed at 
remediating Overtime. 
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OVERTIME COMPENSATION 
 
 
FLA Code of Conduct 
In addition to their compensation for regular hours of work, employees shall be 
compensated for overtime hours at such premium rate as is legally required in the 
country of manufacture or, in those countries where such laws do not exist, at a rate at 
least equal to their regular hourly compensation rate. 
 
 
ILO Conventions 
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (C. 1) 
 
 
Other Relevant International Instruments 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
 
Monitoring Scope and Methods 
To investigate compliance with overtime compensation, monitors are required to 
determine whether workers are being paid the proper premium for overtime hours 
worked, through a combination of worker and management interviews and a review of 
time-keeping and payroll records. As a part of this review, monitors are required to 
examine the factory’s time-keeping system, including an investigation of the use of 
fraudulent records, such as double books or double time cards.  
 
 
Compliance Issues 
Excessive overtime and non-payment of overtime wages were among the most difficult 
and pervasive problems encountered by monitors. As mentioned in previous sections, 
noncompliance with Overtime Compensation is closely related to Hours of Work and 
Wages and Benefits, and these Code categories must be addressed jointly for 
improvements to be registered.  A related and growing problem has been the 
proliferation and improvement of fake books, and the falsification of wage and hour 
records to demonstrate compliance with standards that factories have difficulty meeting.  
 
 
FLA Findings 
Noncompliance with this Code provision was reported by FLA independent external 
monitors as either a finding of incorrect payment of overtime wages, or a lack of 
accurate and reliable records for working hour verification. At some factories, piece-rate 
workers were particularly subject to underpayment of wages due to improper overtime 
calculations. For example, during an independent external monitoring visit of a factory in 
China, a monitor reported the following:  
 
[Workers interviewed] stated that they did not need to punch time card as the working 
hours were registered by leader. However, the factory did not provide the related 
attendance record for checking. According to the factory wage calculation system, the 
overtime wage was paid at 150%, 200% and 300% of normal wage rate. However, piece-
rate workers stated that the overtime payment was RMB 0.5 plus piece rate per hour 
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during overtime work at nights. [Some workers interviewed] stated that they affixed their 
seals in payroll instead of signing. However, the payroll records with all workers' 
signatures were provided by the factory management. 
 
Monitors also uncovered fraudulent practices used to conceal actual hours worked at the 
factory.  For example, at a different factory in China, a monitor reported that while some 
workers interviewed stated that they had worked overtime on a certain day, no record of 
overtime appeared on those workers’ time cards for that day. Instead, all the time cards 
for that day appeared to be brand-new, and time in and out was recorded as the same 
for the workers. 
 
 
Graphs: 
 
Graph 4.20: Aggregate Findings: Overtime Compensation Noncompliance 
Violation Percentages-World
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One. 
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Graph 4.20: Regional Breakdown: Overtime Compensation Noncompliance 
Overtime Violations by Region
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Source: Manual Compilation of Independent External Monitoring Reports for Year One.38 
 
Noncompliance with Overtime Compensation represented 8% of all noncompliance 
internationally, and represented 11% of all Code noncompliance in China, 5.1% of all 
Code noncompliance in Southeast Asia, 9.1% of all Code noncompliance in Latin 
America, 9.7% of all Code noncompliance in the Europe/Middle East/Africa region 
(EMEA), 6.7% of all Code noncompliance in S. Asia, and 5.9% of all Code 
noncompliance in the USA.   
 
 
Participating Company Remediation Efforts 
In order to address noncompliance with Overtime Compensation, participating 
companies undertook similar remediation responses as described in previous sections 
on Wages and Benefits and Hours of Work.  Participating company remediation plans in 
this area included improving time-recording systems and requiring factories to lower the 
number of units workers were expected to produce on a daily or weekly basis. Below are 
two examples of participating company remediation efforts to counter noncompliance 
with Overtime Compensation. 
                                                 
38
 The regional breakdown of Code noncompliance in each Code category section shows the percentage that each Code 
noncompliance category (i.e. Code Awareness, Forced Labor, Child Labor, etc.) represents out of the total number of 
noncompliance issues found within each region.  Thus, the higher percentage of Code Awareness noncompliance issues 
in South Asia than in Latin America, for example, does not necessarily mean that the Code Awareness is more prevalent, 
in absolute terms, in that region.  Rather, it means that as a percentage of the total noncompliance issues in each region, 
Code Awareness represents a higher percentage in South Asia than in Latin America.  The number of noncompliance 
issues within each Code category was divided by the total number of noncompliance issues found within each region to 
calculate the percentage.  The formula = (number of Code category noncompliance issues in region/ total noncompliance 
issues in region) x 100.    
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 In China, Liz Claiborne has undertaken a multi-phased approach to improving 
compliance with Hours of Work and Overtime Compensation in factories with poor time 
record-keeping systems or practices.  Liz Claiborne reported that findings from both 
internal and external audits revealed that many factories were making an effort to 
conceal overtime by not recording all the hours worked under one set of records. This 
practice has made it impossible for monitors to confirm actual working hours and the 
proper payment of minimum wage and overtime.  Liz Claiborne noted that this 
phenomenon seems to have emerged in response to increased pressure from brand-
name companies to reduce overtime in order to comply with either the company’s Code 
of Conduct or local law. 
 
This issue seemed to be most prevalent in China, where the local law limits overtime to 
36 hours per month.  When Liz Claiborne identified this practice in a factory with which 
they have an established business relationship, they have adopted a multi-phased 
approach in their remediation plan.  Liz Claiborne reported that the focus of this 
approach is to ensure that overtime is voluntary, not excessive, and properly paid.  
 
The first step of the remediation plan involved the factories’ committing to recording all 
hours on a single time system, which correlates with the factory payroll. During step two, 
the auditors return to the factory after a period of a few months to confirm that the factory 
has kept its commitments and is paying the workers properly.  At the time of this report, 
Liz Claiborne informed the FLA that several factories had been re-audited, and were 
found to be keeping to their commitments.  These factories will continue to be monitored 
and their payroll records will be audited on a quarterly basis.  However, Liz Claiborne 
reported that the issue has not yet been fully resolved, as follow-up visits to all the 
factories still need to be completed.   
 
 
In the Dominican Republic, PVH worked to address overtime noncompliance issues that 
resulted from factories’ imposing unreasonable quotas on workers in modular systems. 
PVH found that many manufacturing operations in the Dominican Republic had installed 
modular manufacturing systems in order to maintain competitiveness in the regional 
industry.  While this system did in fact improve efficiency, it also eliminated the overtime 
wage paid to workers.  
 
The modular system worked as follows: The module would be assigned a daily quota. 
Once the quota was completed, the workers could go home for the day, take off early, or 
if required, work into the night in order to complete the daily quota.  
 
PVH found that in most cases, the goals were unrealistically high, and required module 
team members to work late hours to complete the daily quota. Most importantly, the 
workers were not being compensated for these overtime hours. 
 
At that point, PVH conducted an investigation among other major US buyers to establish 
if they were sourcing from facilities with a modular system, and if they agreed with PVH’s 
position that the module quotas were unrealistically high. They all agreed.  
Consequently, PVH conducted focus audits in all their suppliers’ facilities in the 
Dominican Republic, and required factories to recognize any overtime hours and 
compensate workers in accordance with the legal overtime rate. 
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 After the factories implemented this change, PVH reported that the workers continued to 
meet their daily goals while earning the additional overtime wage. Moreover, PVH 
reported that in some critical cases, the factories did revise the daily quota to more 
realistic levels, which in fact eliminated the need for overtime hours. 
 
When assessing workplace conditions in factories in China, Reebok found a number of 
areas of noncompliance. Reebok reported that sub-minimum wage payments are 
common in China due to the pervasiveness of piece rate wage calculations.  Reebok 
human rights monitors frequently found underpayment in factories that calculate wages 
exclusively based on piece rate as opposed to a flat hourly rate.    
Much of the underpayment problem can be attributed to overtime hours not 
compensated at a premium as required by Chinese law.  Even when factories 
acknowledge overtime by paying a flat rate in addition to piece rate, the flat rate is often 
lower than the rate required by law.  In addition, Saturday work, which according to 
Chinese law should be paid as overtime, is commonly paid at the same rate as Monday 
through Friday work.  Sundays and holidays are also often worked and not paid at the 
proper overtime rates.  Excessive working hours generally correlate to the 
underpayment of wages.  
 
To combat this issue, Reebok requires factories to maintain accurate and reliable 
records of all hours worked, including overtime, both in timecards and payroll records.  
Factories are also asked to provide each worker an individualized pay slip showing a 
breakdown of earned income, regular and overtime pay, and all legal deductions. This 
allows Reebok to determine what wages are owed to workers.  For example, if a piece 
rate worker’s earnings fall below the applicable minimum wage, Reebok asks factories to 
pay the difference to bring the earnings up to the minimum level. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The first year of monitoring has been a learning experience for all involved. Although no 
trends over time could be compiled for the monitoring activities in Year One, we believe 
that the data presented in this section provides a baseline which can be used for 
comparisons in Year Two, and helps to illustrate where our priorities must lie in the 
following years.  Specifically, we hope that this information will help guide compliance 
and remediation efforts in Year Two, particularly in those areas where monitoring as 
currently practiced is not capturing the true extent of the problem.  
 
It is important to recall that monitoring in itself does not bring about compliance. 
Monitoring is the process by which we check and measure the integrity of compliance 
programs. The results of the independent external monitoring visit provide a list of 
priority areas for the participating company compliance staff to work on, but it is that 
development and capacity building work that makes the real changes in the factory, not 
the monitoring per se. 
 
The most challenging areas of compliance that emerge from an analysis of the data for 
Year One are freedom of association and hours of work.  Issues related to hours of work 
were among the most commonly cited noncompliance issues in Year One independent 
external monitoring reports, and there is an interconnection between the issues of hours 
of work, wages and overtime compensation that requires an integrated, comprehensive 
response. Part of that response lies in installing the appropriate policies and 
management tools, and part of it requires structural change in the way suppliers 
organize their business. This will take time and expertise that suppliers do not always 
have.  
 
Conversely, noncompliance with freedom of association was under-reported by monitors 
during Year One. However, evidence from the ILO Committees that review global 
compliance, U.S. State Department and ICFTU reports, NGOs, and our third party 
complaint procedure suggest that this issue is much more widespread than our monitors 
have been able to detect. In order to address the difficulty in identifying and documenting 
freedom of association, we are developing new indicators and monitoring techniques to 
improve our ability to investigate this issue.  Freedom of association is essential to the 
resolution of many other compliance problems, in that the most sustainable approach to 
compliance lies in developing the capacity of workers and employers to regulate their 
own workplaces.  
 
Monitoring, like labor inspection, cannot by itself guarantee compliance, since it cannot 
cover all factories often enough to be sure that labor standards are being observed. This 
is why we have to focus on the tools that allow workers and employers to address 
compliance issues in their own factories on an ongoing basis.  Such self-help tools are 
needed for all Code elements, from wages and benefits to discrimination to occupational 
safety and health. The sustainability of the FLA program depends on the FLA acting as a 
catalyst for the policies and processes that provide for sound labor relations, and 
defending them from attack wherever necessary. Monitors, for example, can never visit 
a facility regularly enough to ensure that fire safety procedures are maintained. But if the 
FLA concentrates on establishing clear safety policies managed by safety committees 
with trained safety stewards, and monitors the operations of those, then the safety 
 134 
committees and stewards can ensure compliance day in and day out. Additionally, as 
well as regulating their own workplaces, workers need support from government and the 
public sector, meaning strong labor laws and effective enforcement of them.     
  
Finally, informed and aware workers with access to grievance procedures, consultative 
structures and unions are a primary safeguard for Code compliance and a cornerstone 
of compliance sustainability.  The FLA monitoring process will increasingly focus on 
these structures and procedures to give participating companies the ability to target their 
remediation efforts more effectively in Year Two and beyond.  
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V. Third-Party Complaint Procedure and BJ&B Case Study 
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THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PROCEDURE 
 
The FLA process allows for any individual or organization to report serious incidents of 
noncompliance with the FLA Workplace Code of Conduct and to lodge a complaint with 
respect to any applicable facility of an FLA participating company through the Third Party 
Complaint Procedure, as defined by the FLA Charter.  According to the Charter:  
 
To initiate a Complaint of Alleged Noncompliance with respect to a Participating 
Company, a Third Party must provide information detailing with specificity the 
Alleged Noncompliance and shall include any evidence or other supporting 
information.  The Complaint must contain reliable, specific and verifiable 
evidence or information that the Alleged Noncompliance has occurred.  In 
assessing the reliability of any Complaint, the Association shall consider the 
reliability of any past Complaints made by the Third Party.  In the event that such 
a Complaint is submitted to the Association, the Association shall inform the 
Company of the contents of such Complaint.  The Association shall inform any 
Third Party which files a Complaint that it may elect to have its identity kept 
confidential, and the Association shall honor such request. 
 
Upon receipt of a complaint through this procedure, the FLA Executive Director 
assesses the complaint and makes a determination as to the nature and extent of any 
prior monitoring and remediation relating to the complaint.  If the Executive Director finds 
that the reported Code noncompliance has not been remediated, he/she then forwards 
the evidence of the Code violation to the appropriate participating company.  The 
participating company then has 45 days to report to the Executive Director on the 
progress of its remediation plan to prevent and remediate the noncompliance.  In Year 
One, the FLA responded to four third-party complaints. 
 
Of the third party complaints submitted, the reports of Code noncompliance at the BJ&B 
factory in the Dominican Republic were particularly problematic and were pursued 
aggressively by the FLA.  Fourteen months after Nike, Reebok and adidas jointly laid an 
FLA third party complaint with respect to the BJ&B factory, a sports cap manufacturer in 
the Dominican Republic, negotiations between workers and management there resulted 
in an agreement increasing workers’ wages and officially recognizing the employee 
union.  
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SUMMARY OF BJ&B CASE 
 
In October 2001, a group of workers at the BJ&B factory, located in the Dominican 
Republic, formed a union and filed a petition for recognition with the Ministry of Labor 
(SET).39  Over the next two months, the twenty workers concerned were either 
dismissed by the factory or resigned from their jobs.  
 
The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) brought the initial labor rights violations at BJ&B 
to the attention of the FLA in December 2001.  In view of the apparent violations of union 
leaders’ rights and anti-union actions by the factory, Nike, Reebok and adidas initiated a 
complaint with the FLA in January 2002.  The FLA was to investigate the situation, and 
make recommendations to ensure that freedom of association rights were respected at 
the BJ&B facility.  On November 13, 2002, the management finally recognized that the 
union had the necessary majority to represent the interests of the workers in the plant 
and negotiate a collective agreement.  On November 25th, management and the union 
sat down for the first time to start formal negotiations. 
 
More than a year had passed between the union’s first attempt to create the organization 
and its recognition, which permitted the beginning of negotiations between workers and 
employers’ representatives on working conditions in the factory.  This represented a real 
achievement for the workers and management involved, (whose compromise and 
collaboration were essential), but it would not have been possible without the mediation 
of FLA Ombudsperson Rafael Alburquerque, the brands sourcing from the facility, 
NGO’s, and the labor authorities of the Dominican Republic, in guaranteeing the respect 
for workers’ rights and the exercise of their rights to freedom of association. 
 
WORKERS’ FEAR OF UNIONIZATION 
 
The BJ&B case was complicated by the fact that there was a certain reticence towards 
unions on the part of workers and the community in general in Villa Altagracia, 
Dominican Republic (DR). This was motivated by a number of issues. 
 
1. Past events 
 
In 1987 the Korean company Yupoong Group set up the BJ&B plant in the Export 
Processing Zone of Villa Altagracia in the province of San Cristobal (Dominican 
Republic).  BJ&B is a cap manufacturing plant that produces for several brands, such as 
Nike (with 20 to 50% of total production), Reebok, Quicksilver, Gear and The Gap. 
Although there had been efforts to organize workers since 1996, a union had never been 
set up in the factory. 
  
A number of production facilities in Villa Altagracia had closed in recent years, robbing 
the community of its primary sources of revenue.  Unions were blamed for the closings 
by many of Villa Altagracia’s inhabitants and the media.  Consequently, many members 
of the community considered union activity a threat.  The situation was no different at 
BJ&B.  The downsizing since the beginning of 2001– resulting in a reduction of the 
                                                 
39
 The full name is Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo de la Republica Dominicana, or SET (http://www.set.gov.do). 
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workforce from 2,350 to 1,500 in January 2001– increased the fears of the workers and 
the community that the plant may close, particularly if the union drive intensified. 
Management claimed that the retrenchment policies were a result of the drastic 
reduction in orders, but the workers and the community were afraid that the company 
would relocate production to other plants and possibly even to other countries – robbing 
Villa Altagracia of its biggest employer and its biggest source of income. 
 
2. Fear of possible retaliation 
 
 Fear of being cancelled (cancelado)  
 
Article 75 of the Labor Code defines “deshaucio” as “the act by which any of the parties, 
with due notice, and with no cause, exercises the right to end the labor contract.”  Both 
worker and employer may exercise this right.  Generally, when the employer exercises 
this mode of dismissal, it is referred to as cancellation (cancelación) or settlement 
(liquidación). 
 
This type of termination, which is different from dismissal (despido), allows the employer 
to fire workers without justification, and with the absence of internal disciplinary rules that 
set standards of conduct in the workplace, it is relatively easy for an employer to end the 
employment relationship arbitrarily. 
 
Workers at BJ&B were afraid that sympathizing with the union would make them more 
vulnerable and that retaliation from supervisors could lead to termination. 
 
 Fear of not being hired 
 
There is a common practice in the DR called annual settlement (liquidación anual) under 
which a worker’s contract is terminated in mid-December (even if the contract is for an 
indefinite period).  The worker is given a new contract on the 10th or 15th of January and 
comes back to work for the company.  That time is considered as an interval between 
contracts.  In other words, workers’ contracts end annually.  
 
Despite questions about the legality of this practice, both workers and employers 
practice it despite efforts by the labor authorities to end it.  For the worker it offers an 
extra sum of money including severance pay, holidays and a Christmas bonus. 
Therefore, workers not only accept this practice but demand it.  Employers appreciate 
the additional flexibility that it gives them. 
 
It does however mean less job security for workers who can never be sure if they are 
actually going to have a job to return to the following year.  The system of liquidacion 
anual increases the workers’ fear of being associated with the union, since they believe 
it may have an impact on their employer’s decision to hire them again or not. 
 
 
THE PROCESS 
 
On October 19, 2001 a group of 20 workers filed a petition to the SET to register a union 
at BJ&B.  By the end of November the SET had rejected the petition for recognition of 
the union due to the fact that 10 of the workers that had signed the petition were no 
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longer workers of the facility40, and by December 2001 the founding members of the 
union had all been terminated or had resigned from the company.  FLA participating 
companies became involved in the process early on and Reebok conducted announced 
and unannounced visits to the factory as early as November 2001.   
 
The FLA received further information from the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) in 
January 2002 and brought this to the attention of the FLA participating companies 
sourcing from BJ&B.  Nike visited the factory and on January 16, 2002, filed a third party 
complaint with the FLA, which was joined by Reebok and adidas, alleging violations of 
the right to freedom of association and other Code noncompliance.  After filing the 
complaint, different representatives of the FLA participating companies and of the WRC 
visited the factory.  The participating companies also sent several letters to management 
at the head office in Korea and in the DR, in which they stated their concern over the 
situation at BJ&B and affirmed workers’ right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.  Following the initial receipt of the complaint, the FLA considered it and 
decided to investigate the issue.  An adidas compliance officer agreed to conduct an 
initial assessment and left for the DR within 24 hours.  After he confirmed the existence 
of severe issues, the FLA sent a delegation to the BJ&B facility in March and invited the 
Executive Director of the WRC to accompany them as an observer, which he agreed to 
do.  
 
On January 28, 2002, after several meetings organized by the SET, the company signed 
an agreement by which it committed itself to reinstate 13 of the 20 workers who had 
been dismissed following the petition for recognition of the union.  They also agreed to 
create a bipartite committee composed of representatives of the company and the union 
to settle any differences between them. 
 
The union resubmitted the petition for recognition at the beginning of February.  On 
February 12th it was approved by the SET.  
 
During the months of February and March the FLA participating companies carried out a 
series of visits to the factory, interviewed the management and the workers, organized 
several training courses and reassured the workers of their commitment to compliance 
with the Code of Conduct, the labor legislation of the DR and ILO Conventions. 
 
Only a few days before the FLA’s visit to the facility in March, another four workers were 
terminated due to their support for the union, according to union leaders.  The FLA 
delegation’s discussions with management were therefore focused on this issue.  The 
union members informed the FLA that the main problem in the factory was the restriction 
of freedom of association.  There were also disputes over overtime.  Additionally, some 
known union members could not move about the facility even though they were required 
to in the course of their work; workers were not allowed to talk to other workers about the 
union; and new hires were being advised not to speak to union members.  The FLA 
recommended to management that they reinstate the four workers, which the company 
agreed to do.  
 
During the course of the FLA’s visit, other issues of possible noncompliance with the 
FLA Code arose, and the FLA made several recommendations and offered assistance in 
                                                 
40
 The legislation of the DR obliges unions to be formed of at least 20 workers to constitute the union (article 324 of the 
Labour Code of 1992). 
 140 
drafting procedures covering discipline, retrenchment, grievance handling and union 
activity in the workplace.   
 
The FLA carried out a second visit to the factory in mid-May, where they observed 
positive progress by BJ&B management towards compliance with freedom of 
association principles.  Specifically, the factory had rehired all fired workers, and was in 
the process of instituting written rules on dismissals and progressive disciplinary action. 
Despite this progress, and the fact that management and the union had held a series of 
informal communications, tensions were still high and conflicts broke out regularly.  The 
FLA decided to appoint an Ombudsperson who would review any complaint presented 
by the workers and mediate disputes.  Dr. Rafael Alburquerque, a labor lawyer and 
former Secretary of State for Labor, was given the position and played a crucial role in 
getting labor and management to resolve conflicts around code elements.  The on-the-
spot presence of a respected national labor relations figure helped to consolidate the 
workers’ confidence in their exercise of their right to freedom of expression and 
association.  
 
Several events occurred during the first two weeks of June that accelerated the need for 
the presence of the mediator in the case.  The intoxication of more than 80 workers in 
the factory due to the inhalation of chemical agents that were being used to repair leaks 
in the roof during working hours caused the closure of the factory during three days. 
After the intervention of the SET, and with the mediation of Dr. Alburquerque, an 
agreement was signed on June 11th between the workers’ representatives and 
management to create a Safety and Health Committee at the factory.  The parties also 
agreed to reactivate the bipartite committee that they had created on January 29, 2002, 
whose task was to examine problems that arose in the relations between the union and 
management on a weekly basis.  
    
Shortly after the incident, anonymous anti-union flyers were distributed throughout the 
factory that caused greater confusion.  On July 12th management issued a 
communication to all the factory personnel announcing that a meeting had been held 
with all the supervisors to clarify that: management recognized the right to freely 
associate, that the administrative personnel of the factory could not carry out any anti-
union practices or policies, and that they had to allow the union to carry out their 
activities without interference. 
 
The FLA visited the factory for the third time in July 2002 to provide four days of training 
for workers, supervisors and management on freedom of association.  The objective of 
the training was to make workers aware of their rights, to help them understand that 
neither supervisors nor management could retaliate against worker organization without 
violating the Code of Conduct, and to reassure them that management would assume its 
responsibilities and would respect their rights. 
 
On September 19th the union submitted a draft collective agreement to the SET. 
Management however, did not recognize the union for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, claiming that they needed an absolute majority of the workers in the factory 
to negotiate collectively.41 Additionally, management demanded that the union prove its 
                                                 
41
 Article 109 of the Labor Code provides that the union is authorized to represent the professional interests of all the 
workers of a company as long as the absolute majority of the workers are members of the union. The workers that occupy 
directive posts or tasks of inspection will not be relevant in determining the required majority 
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representativeness.  At the same time, management continued downsizing and more 
workers were dismissed.  Dr. Alburquerque had to intervene and mediate.  With the help 
of three associates, Dr. Alburquerque verified that 51% (fifty percent plus one) of the 
factory workers were members of the union 
 
On November 13th, BJ&B recognized the union for the purpose of collective bargaining, 
and on November 25th representatives of the factory and the union initiated their first 
formal negotiations on the conditions of work in the factory. 
 
The final Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed on Tuesday, March 26, 2003. 
Those present for the signing included Rafael Alburquerque; Alberto Yang, the manager 
of BJ&B; union representatives; Cristina Anastacia Ordoñez, a representative of UNITE; 
Vinicio Reyes, an AFL-CIO representative; Rafael Abreu, the Executive Director of the 
Consejo Nacional de la Unidad Sindical; and the U.S. Embassy Labor Relations Officer, 
Tyler Mason.   
 
The BJ&B workers secured wage increases and had their union, the Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de BJ&B, officially recognized by the factory management.  The 
management and union agreed upon a 10% pay increase for January 2004.  This 
across-the-board pay increase is a major step towards improving the living conditions of 
BJ&B workers.  The BJ&B management and union also devised a number of monetary 
incentives to reward productivity.  
 
In addition to the productivity-based pay incentives, the BJ&B management has agreed 
to a number of pay and benefit improvements, including a special bonus for every 
employee on May 1st (International Labor Day), a Christmas gift basket with a value of 
RD $500 with products appropriate for the season, and RD$70,000 worth of 
scholarships to 75 university students: 67% to be distributed among factory workers or 
their children and 33% for the children of Villa Altagracia residents.   Additionally, a 
workers committee was established to deal with health and safety improvements in the 
factory. 
 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BJ&B 
 
The Collective Bargaining Agreement signed at BJ&B is the first collective agreement 
dealing with wage increases in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in the Dominican 
Republic, and represents a major step forward in improving the Dominican labor 
relations system and the living conditions of Dominican apparel workers.  Although 
greater progress stands to be made in other factories in the Dominican Republic, the 
case of BJ&B demonstrates the potential of the FLA Code of Conduct and independent 
monitoring to improve workers’ lives.  
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VI. Conclusion 
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Conclusion: Looking Toward the Future 
 
As this report demonstrates, the FLA’s first reporting year was a period of important 
lessons and growth.  We gained greater insight into the different approaches to 
compliance adopted by FLA participating companies and sought to align those with the 
best practices identified.  We made strides in standardizing the ways we identify, 
document and report on compliance issues.  By working through the FLA, participating 
companies were able to cooperate on independent monitoring and remediation, thus 
combining their leverage and resources.  Cooperation on internal audits and on projects 
is becoming more common as well.  All this has allowed the FLA to lay a strong 
foundation for implementing its standards in the future.  
 
Over the course of Year One, the FLA strove to make its system more effective.  For 
example, we responded to concerns voiced by labor activists relating to the 
independence of external monitoring and the transparency of the results.  We adopted a 
policy that all FLA independent external monitoring visits should be unannounced unless 
there were good reasons to announce them. 
 
We put a lot of effort into improving the quality of independent external monitoring. In the 
short term this involved the checking of facts, verification of findings and standardization 
of reporting.  In Year Two the FLA is endeavoring to provide more specific terms of 
reference to monitors in order to encourage deeper analysis and better results, but there 
is clearly a need for more training of monitors and the FLA will continue to scrutinize 
their findings very carefully.  
 
In Year One we started to experiment with innovative approaches to ensuring 
compliance.  In the BJ&B case in the Dominican Republic, for example, we decided to 
appoint an Ombudsperson, Dr. Rafael Alburquerque, to provide on-the-spot advice and 
mediation to the parties concerned.  This proved to be critical in getting the parties to 
respect the Code provisions and finally produced the first ever collective agreement in a 
free zone in the DR dealing with wages.  We are in the process of building on that 
experience and formulating creative approaches to conflict resolution, including the 
appointment of more ombudspeople.  In Year One we also started to cooperate with 
relevant local government agencies, labor and student groups in order to find solutions 
to complex factory situations.   
 
One of the most important developments during Year One was the activation of the third 
party complaint procedure.  The third party complaint procedure was designed to 
strengthen the FLA system’s ability to address serious non-compliance in the supply 
chain, supplementing other factory and brand-specific grievance systems.  The 
procedure provides a vehicle by which any person or organization can confidentially 
report to the FLA any situation of serious noncompliance with the FLA Workplace Code 
of Conduct or Principles of Monitoring with respect to the production of FLA participating 
company products.  An increasing number of issues have been referred to us in this way 
and then dealt with by the participating companies concerned. 
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Year Two  
 
Building on the lessons and accomplishments of Year One, the FLA started Year Two 
with some new policies that represented a considerable shift in its approach to 
promoting compliance.   
 
Independence  
 
Year Two involves greater independence as the FLA now oversees the entire 
independent monitoring process.  This means that the FLA staff reviews each 
participating company’s factory list, and using a process of risk-weighted sampling, 
chooses the factories it will monitor.  Then, without informing the factory, the 
participating company or other stakeholders, the FLA staff selects an accredited monitor 
to conduct a factory monitoring visit.  In each case, the independent external monitor is 
paid by the FLA, rather than the participating company.  The FLA and the participating 
company simultaneously receive reports from the monitor following the visit, initiating the 
remediation process.   
 
Transparency 
 
In an effort to be more transparent about the results of factory monitoring, the FLA 
produces independent monitoring “tracking charts” which are published on the FLA’s 
website.  These charts present the monitor’s findings from the factory visit; the FLA 
Code elements and monitoring benchmarks used by the monitor in reaching that finding; 
and track the remediation undertaken by the participating company and factory 
management.  These charts are updated periodically.   
 
Collaboration 
 
To support creative and collaborative approaches to compliance, the FLA is also 
working during Year Two to pool resources and know-how among participating 
companies, universities and NGOs in order to address challenging, and often endemic, 
noncompliance issues in specific regions.  Collaborative projects include an FLA network 
of labor experts in China, a campaign against union blacklisting in Central America, and 
a footwear industry initiative directed toward building new processes of labor-
management relations in footwear production facilities.  Moreover, the FLA’s first NGO 
Consultation, which was held in Bangkok in January 2003 and brought together 
approximately 50 NGOs and 25 representatives of accredited monitors and participating 
companies from around the world, served as a source of valuable feedback about ways 
the FLA can more effectively improve workplace conditions.  
 
 
**** 
 
The FLA is a work in progress in which we learn, innovate and improve daily.   
 
This report will hopefully set a precedent in terms of detail and transparency among 
independent multi-stakeholder initiatives.  At the same time we look forward to making 
continued improvements in our reporting on participating companies and noncompliance 
trends.   
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It is clear that the FLA system is a demanding one – it involves a huge commitment by 
the participating companies throughout their supply chains.  It also demands continued 
cooperation from the factory owners and management of the facilities producing for FLA 
participating companies.  Suppliers to FLA participating companies are often called upon 
to comply with national and international labor standards that are widely ignored in the 
local labor market.  With the right technical assistance those suppliers will undoubtedly 
become better enterprises as a result of the FLA compliance program, but there can be 
no doubt about the challenge this presents in the short term.  Transparency adds an 
additional discipline that will require even higher standards of follow-through by 
participating companies and factories to ensure that remediation has been completed 
and effective. 
 
We hope that you will communicate your thoughts about this report, as well as the work 
that we are doing generally, by contacting us at info@fairlabor.org.  We believe that we 
have made considerable strides in Year One, and hope to build on our progress with the 
help of various stakeholders whose participation is integral to this mission.   
 
 
 146 
Bibliography 
 
 
Aidt, Toke and Zafiris Tzannatos (2003) Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic 
Effects in a Global Environment (Washington, DC: World Bank) 
 
Amnesty International (1998) “Defend Labor Rights: Action Focus on Mexico” 
(http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/tunion/1998/mexico.htm) 
 
Asha (1991) “The Need for Literacy in India” 
(http://www.ashanet.org/stanford/resources/need.html) 
 
Asian Human Rights Commission (May 4, 2001) “Urgent Appeals Program” 
(http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2001/98/) 
 
Asia Monitor Resource Centre (1998) We in the Zone: Women Workers in Asia’s Export 
Processing Zones (AMRC: Hong Kong) 
 
Asia Monitor Resource Centre (1999) Contract Labor in Taiwan- Systemic Problems in 
Need of Reform (an abbreviated version of the full Verite report), 
(http://www.amrc.org.hk/Arch/3605.htm) 
 
Baker, Simon (1998)  “Working Children in the Economic Bust” 
(http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/vol14-1&2/v15bust.html) 
 
Business Coalition for US-China Trade  “Fact Watch: Correcting the Record on China 
Trade Issues” (http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/b4ct/fact0410.html) 
 
Common Committee for Elimination of Discrimination against Migrant Workers and 
Promoting the Basic Rights (CEDMW) (January 28, 2002) “December 18, Migrant 
Workers’ Strike in Korea: Abusive Training System”  
 
Cigno, Alessandro, Furio Rosati and Zafiris Tzannatos. Child Labor Handbook 
(Washington, DC: World Bank) 
 
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs (1996) The Apparel Industry 
and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Program? (DoL: 
Washington) 
 
Economist (April 6, 2000)  “Discrimination against rural migrants is China’s apartheid” 
(http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=299640) 
 
Economist (Feb. 13, 2003)  “China’s Economic Success” 
(http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1576786) 
 
Frynas, J.G. (2000) “Human Rights and the Transnational Garment Industry in South 
and South-East Asia: a Focus on Labour Rights.” Paper presented at International 
Studies Association (ISA) Conference, August 2000 (Washington DC) 
 
 147 
Gereffi, Gary (2001) “Global Sourcing in the US Apparel Industry” Journal of Textile and 
Apparel, Technology Management, vol.2, issue 1.  
 
ICFTU (Nov. 29, 2002)  “ICFTU CHINA POLICY” 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991217172&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Feb. 5, 2003)  “INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR 
STANDARDS IN EL SALVADOR”  
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991217133&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Nov. 18, 2002) ICFTU condemns incarceration of trade unionists in South Korea 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991216741&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Dec. 3, 1998) Indonesia: Report on Core Labour Standards for the WTO 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=990916188&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (June 1, 2002) Indonesia: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215670&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (June 21, 2002) REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF 
TRADE POLICIES OF INDIA 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215480&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Dec. 5, 2001) REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF 
TRADE POLICIES OF MALAYSIA 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991214373&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (March 22, 2002) REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF 
TRADE POLICIES OF MEXICO 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991214929&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Sept. 17, 2001) REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF 
THE TRADE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991213324&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (Nov. 11, 2002) RESOLUTION ON FREE ECONOMIC ZONES (FEZ) IN KOREA 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991216873&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (2002) Sri Lanka: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215679&Language=EN) 
 
ICFTU (2002) Taiwan: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
(http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991215681&Language=EN) 
 
ILO (1996) “Globalization of the footwear, textiles and clothing industries: Effects on 
Employment and Working Conditions”. Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on 
the Globalization of the Footwear, Textiles and Clothing Industries. (Geneva: 
International Labor Organization) p. 75. 
 
ILO (July, 1999)  “Committee on Freedom of Association Cites Progress in Indonesia 
and Nigeria” World of Work, no. 30.  
 148 
 ILO (Jan., 2000) “The ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor” 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/speeches/speech001.htm) 
 
ILO (May 24, 2001) “ILO STUDY FINDS FORCED LABOR AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
ON THE RISE” (http://us.ilo.org/news/prsrls/20010524_forcedlabor.html) 
 
ILO (2002) “CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 Bangladesh (ratification: 
1972) Published: 2002” (http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=6132&chapter=6&query=%23
year%3D2002+%2B+Bangladesh%40ref&highlight=&querytype=bool&context=0) 
 
IPEC (2002) “IPEC Action Against Child Labor: Highlights 2002” 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/about/implementation/ipecreport_2002.p
df 
 
Morici, Peter and Evan Schulz (2001) Labor Standards in the Global Trading System 
(Washington, DC: Economic Strategy Institute) 
 
Sen, Amartya (June, 1999) “Globalized Ethics in a Globalized Economy” Keynote 
Speakers at the 87th International Labor Conference, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
State Department (Feb. 23, 2000) “Jamaica: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
1999” (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/393.htm) 
 
State Department (March 4, 2001) “Mauritius: Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 2001” (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8393.htm) 
 
State Department (March 4, 2002) “El Salvador: Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices 2001”  (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8354.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) China (Taiwan Only): Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18240.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) India: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18311.htm) 
 
State Dept. (2003) Indonesia: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18245.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) Korea: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18250.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) Malaysia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18252.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) Mexico: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18338.htm) 
 
 149 
State Department (2003) Sri Lanka: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18315.htm) 
 
State Department (2003) Thailand: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18265.htm) 
 
Stone, Katherine V. (1999)  “To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global 
Labor Market” Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law vol. 3, no. 1, p. 93. 
 
Thai Labour Campaign (2000) Taiwan Shoemakers: Thai Workers 
(http://thailabour.org/docs/TaiwanShoes.html) 
 
UNICEF. The Nature of the Problem: Some Basic Facts. 
(http://www.unicef.org/programme/cprotection/focus/legal/problabour.htm) 
 
Verite, abbreviated by AMRC (1999) Contract Labor in Taiwan- Systemic Problems in 
Need of Reform (http://www.amrc.org.hk/Arch/3605.htm) 
 
World Bank (Sept. 14, 2003)  “China at a Glance” (http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Fchn_aag.pdf) 
 
World Bank (2001) “China Data Profile” 
(http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=CHN&CCODE=
CHN&CNAME=China&PTYPE=CP) 
 
 
 150 
 Appendix A: OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 
 
 
A. Establish Clear Standards  
 
Establish and articulate clear, written workplace standards 
 
Formally convey those standards to Company factories as well as to licensees, 
contractors and suppliers 
 
Receive written certifications, on a regular basis, from Company factories as well 
as contractors and suppliers that standards are being met, and that employees 
have been informed about the standards 
 
Obtain written agreement of Company factories and contractors and suppliers to 
submit to periodic inspections and audits, including by accredited external 
monitors, for compliance with the workplace standards 
 
B. Create An Informed Workplace  
 
Ensure that all Company factories as well as contractors and suppliers inform their 
employees about the workplace standards orally and through the posting of standards in 
a prominent place (in the local languages spoken by employees and managers) and 
undertake other efforts to educate employees about the standards on a regular basis.  
 
C. Develop An Information Database  
 
Develop a questionnaire to verify and quantify compliance with the workplace 
standards  
 
Require Company factories and contractors and suppliers to complete and 
submit the questionnaire to the Company on a regular basis 
 
D. Establish Program to Train Company Monitors 
  
Provide training on a regular basis to Company monitors about the workplace standards 
and applicable local and international law, as well as about effective monitoring 
practices, so as to enable Company monitors to be able to assess compliance with the 
standards 
E. Conduct Periodic Visits and Audits  
 
Have trained Company monitors conduct periodic announced and unannounced 
visits to an appropriate sampling of Company factories and facilities of 
contractors and suppliers to assess compliance with the workplace standards 
 
Have Company monitors conduct periodic audits of production records and 
practices and of wage, hour, payroll and other employee records and practices of 
Company factories and contractors and suppliers 
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F. Provide Employees with Opportunity to Report Noncompliance  
 
Develop a secure communications channel, in a manner appropriate to the culture and 
situation, to enable Company employees and employees of contractors and suppliers to 
report to the Company on noncompliance with the workplace standards, with security 
that they shall not be punished or prejudiced for doing so  
 
G. Establish Relationships with Labor, Human Rights, Religious or Other Local 
Institutions 
 
Consult regularly with human rights, labor, religious or other leading local 
institutions that are likely to have the trust of workers and knowledge of local 
conditions and utilize, where companies deem necessary, such local institutions 
to facilitate communication with Company employees and employees of 
contractors and suppliers in the reporting of noncompliance with the workplace 
standards 
 
Consult periodically with legally constituted unions representing employees at the 
worksite regarding the monitoring process and utilize, where companies deem 
appropriate, the input of such unions 
 
Assure that implementation of monitoring is consistent with applicable collective 
bargaining agreements 
 
H. Establish Means of Remediation  
 
Work with Company factories and contractors and suppliers to correct instances 
of noncompliance with the workplace standards promptly as they are discovered 
and to take steps to ensure that such instances do not recur 
 
Condition future business with contractors and suppliers upon compliance with 
the standards 
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Appendix B: WORKPLACE CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
 
Forced Labor There shall not be any use of forced labor, whether in the form of prison 
labor, indentured labor, bonded labor or otherwise. 
 
Child Labor No person shall be employed at an age younger than 15 (or 14 where the 
law of the country of manufacture42 allows) or younger than the age for completing 
compulsory education in the country of manufacture where such age is higher than 15.  
 
Harassment or Abuse Every employee shall be treated with respect and dignity. No 
employee shall be subject to any physical, sexual, psychological or verbal harassment or 
abuse. 
 
Nondiscrimination No person shall be subject to any discrimination in employment, 
including hiring, salary, benefits, advancement, discipline, termination or retirement, on 
the basis of gender, race, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, nationality, political 
opinion, or social or ethnic origin.  
 
Health and Safety Employers shall provide a safe and healthy working environment to 
prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of, linked with, or occurring in the 
course of work or as a result of the operation of employer facilities. 
 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Employers shall recognize and 
respect the right of employees to freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
 
Wages and Benefits Employers recognize that wages are essential to meeting 
employees’ basic needs. Employers shall pay employees, as a floor, at least the 
minimum wage required by local law or the prevailing industry wage, whichever is 
higher, and shall provide legally mandated benefits.  
 
Hours of Work Except in extraordinary business circumstances, employees shall (i) not 
be required to work more than the lesser of (a) 48 hours per week and 12 hours 
overtime or (b) the limits on regular and overtime hours allowed by the law of the country 
of manufacture or, where the laws of such country do not limit the hours of work, the 
regular work week in such country plus 12 hours overtime and (ii) be entitled to at least 
one day off in every seven day period.  
 
Overtime Compensation In addition to their compensation for regular hours of work, 
employees shall be compensated for overtime hours at such premium rate as is legally 
required in the country of manufacture or, in those countries where such laws do not 
exist, at a rate at least equal to their regular hourly compensation rate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 All references to local law throughout this Code shall include regulations implemented in accordance with applicable 
local law. 
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